THE REVIEW OF RELIGION

Volume XXII NOVEMBER, 1957 Numbers 1-2

EDITOR
Horace L. Friess

MANAGING EDITOR
Susan Taubes

EDITORIAL BOARD

Roland H. Bainton
Joseph L. Blau
Marguerite Block
W. Norman Brown
John Dillenberger
Robert T. Handy
John A. Hutchison
Arthur Jeffery
John M. Krumm
John T. McNeill
Ralph Marcus
Carl Mayer
Isaac Mendelsohn
Wilhelm Pauck
Cyril C. Richardson
Herbert W. Schneider
Jacob Taubes

The Review of Religion is published semi-annually. Subscriptions: $4.00 a year (foreign, $4.30); single copies $2.00 (foreign, $2.20). All subscriptions and business matters should be addressed to the publisher, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York City. Manuscripts, editorial communications and books for review should be addressed to the Editorial Office, 401 Low Memorial Library, Columbia University, New York City.

The articles in *The Review of Religion* are indexed in the *International Index to Periodicals,* New York City, and by the *Bulletin Analytique* and the *Bulletin des Sommaires,* Paris, France.

COPYRIGHT 1957 BY COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

To Marguerite Block, on Her Retirement 5

ARTICLES

The Sane Piety — SING-NAN FEN 7

Peripatetic Adversaries of Cartesianism in 17th Century France — LEONORA COHEN ROSENFIELD 14

BOOK REVIEWS

John A. Hutchison: *Faith, Reason, and Existence: An Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy of Religion* (DANIEL J. BRONSTEIN) 41

Heinrich Zimmer: *The Art of Indian Asia,* ed. by Joseph Campbell (JANE GASTON MAHLER) 50

Mircea Eliade: *Mythes, rêves et mystères* (GERRITT Y. LANSING) 58

Leland C. Wyman, ed.: *Beautyway: A Navaho Ceremonial* (CLYDE KLUCKHOHN) 63

Edna Bryner: *Thirteen Tibetan Tankas* (JANE GASTON MAHLER) 66

William R. Farmer: *Maccabees, Zealots, and Josephus: An Inquiry into Jewish Nationalism in the Greco-Roman Period* (MOSES HADAS) 72

Theodor H. Gaster: *The Dead Sea Scriptures in English Translation* (James Muilenburg) 73

W. Montgomery Watt: *Muhammad at Medina* (Arthur Jeffery) 76

N. J. Dawood: *The Koran: A New Translation* (Arthur Jeffrey) 78

The Bay Psalm Book: A Facsimile of the First Edition of 1640. Zoltán Haraszti: *The Enigma of the Bay Psalm Book* (Lewis Leary) 81

Benson Y. Landis, ed.: *A Rauschenbusch Reader: The Kingdom of God and the Social Gospel* (Joseph Schiffman) 84

Leon Festinger, Henry W. Riecken, and Stanley Schachter: *When Prophecy Fails* (Charles Y. Glock) 87

A. Dwight Culler: *The Imperial Intellect: A Study of Newman's Educational Ideal* (Barry Ulanov) 89

Jakob J. Petuchowski: *The Theology of Haham David Nieto, An Eighteenth Century Defense of the Jewish Tradition* (Milton Arfa) 92

Book Notes 95

Among the Periodicals 101

TO MARGUERITE BLOCK, ON HER RETIREMENT

THE EDITORIAL BOARD wishes to express its great appreciation of the expert and faithful service rendered to *The Review of Religion* since its inception in 1936 by Dr. Marguerite B. Block. She is now retiring from her office as Managing Editor, but fortunately will remain a member of the Editorial Board. Dr. Block's experience and broad sympathies qualified her to understand and to support thoroughly The Review's policy of furthering, without prejudice, a critical study of religion in all its world-wide variety. Before she began graduate studies at Columbia, she had acquired an excellent foundation in history and literature at Radcliffe College; and her personal contacts had awakened a liberal and independent interest in many phases of religion, both liturgical and social. At Columbia the offerings in the history of philosophy under Woodbridge and Randall, and the anthropological study of religion as conducted imaginatively by Ruth Benedict and Professor Wendell T. Bush, particularly appealed to her. Her theses for the M.A. and the Ph.D. were directed respectively to aspects of modern Hinduism and to the development of Swedenborgianism in America, a study which she pursued under the direction of Professor Herbert W. Schneider.

It would be impossible in brief compass even to mention all the services rendered by Dr. Block over twenty years in her dual office as Managing Editor of *The Review of Religion* and as Curator of The Bush Collection of Religion and Culture at Columbia. In addition, she especially enjoyed teaching introductory courses in Oriental Religions, and participating in the graduate course in the History of Religions, offered in the doctoral program jointly conducted by Columbia University and Union Theological Seminary.

As Editor of *The Review of Religion* I wish to add that Dr. Block's unfailing care of the journal made my own functioning possible. The burden of innumerable details was completely carried by her. I am happy to believe that, by way of some compensation, the far-ranging contacts opened by the conduct of The Review and by association with its Board were both pleasurable and rewarding to her. In this connection, it should be noted that the selected inventory of peri-

odical literature, published by The Review under the title "Among the Periodicals," a feature which has received frequent commendation, has for many years been compiled by Dr. Block. For this and all else the Editorial Board is now saying public thanks, but not farewell to Marguerite Block.

HORACE L. FRIESS
for the Editorial Board

THE SANE PIETY

SING-NAN FEN
Professor of Education, North Carolina College at Durham

IN HIS *Varieties of Religious Experience,* James defined religion as "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine." [1] Since neither solitude nor the divine is an essential constituent of our religious experience, we propose to revise the definition to be read as "the feelings, acts and experiences of individual men so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the infinite."

By emphasizing the psychological context of the religious object, James succeeded in doing away with generations of abstract theological controversy. Whether God exists or not is no longer a matter of speculation once we consider religion not in terms of metaphysical propositions but in terms of individual experience. If divinity is to be experienced, our religion will not be for that reason less authentic. Ontologically, there is a great difference between a divine experience and the divine as an experienced object. Still, no one can contend that one is less genuinely religious just because he is blessed in and through his own experience. Thus much can be said for James' interpretation of divinity.

Notwithstanding, James, in discussing religion, relied much on psychopathology. We are led to wonder where a clear line can be drawn between delirium and deliverance. Does religion in the form of intensive and personal experience have to be pathological? Do we find intensive religious experience only in pathological cases? In our rebellion against religious dogmatism, must we resort to esotoric experience?

Religion in its service to mankind need not appeal to the abnormal, natural or supernatural, to prove its case. From a psychiatric point of view there is reason to believe that a man's reorientation may be accompanied by certain psychological disturbance. But the logic of

[1] James, William, *Varieties of Religious Experience.* Modern Library Edition, Random House, 1902, pp. 31-32.

surgery should never be confused with the pathology of bleeding. To emphasize psychopathic experience at the expense of the gained sanity which is the real blessing of religious experience was the fallacy of mislocation committed by James and his mystic followers.

Neither theological intellectualism nor psychological irrationalism can do justice to our genuine religious experience of which the essential character should be sanity, enlightenment and regeneration. This character is present when we have a realization of the infinite. This sense of the infinite can be apprehended by any one who is devoted to a definite pursuit in the interest of workmanship whether it is gardening, teaching, painting, composing, manufacturing or philosophizing.

That our apprehension of the infinite can free us from unnecessary anxiety and thus cultivate sanity is well expressed by Dewey in the following passage: [2]

"There is a conceit fostered by perversion of religion which assimilates the universe to our personal desires; but there is also a conceit of carrying the load of the universe from which religion liberates us. Within the flickering inconsequential acts of separate selves dwells a sense of the whole which claims and dignifies them. In its presence we put off mortality and live in the universal."

We are under the strain of anxiety in as much as we are limited in activity and outlook by our provinciality. The sense of the infinite is a deliverance as it is an enlightening dawn on our confined and conceited self. The self, thus enlightened, need not commit itself to any faith; rather it emancipates itself from a presumptuous and irrational faith in its finite and limited self. The emancipation has a sanguine

2 Dewey, John, *Human Nature and Conduct,* Modern Library Edition, New York, Random House, 1922, pp. 331-32.

In this passage, Dewey was evidently interested in the cultivation of a sense of the infinite to be identified in what we may call the Great Society or Great Community which was his own persistent concern. In our opinion, a sense of the infinite need not be confined to the object called society; it can also be directed towards the object called nature which was another strain of Dewey's own thought. That nature consciousness can be as religious as social consciousness certainly would not have been denied by Dewey himself—witness his life-long polemics for the much misunderstood "scientific method." Particularly relevant in the present connection is Dewey's emphasis on relieving individual anxiety through a sense of the infinite.

effect exactly for the reason that it drives home to us the infinite in which alone our finite life can play its legitimate role.

That such a sense of the infinite can be apprehended by other means than by disinterested workmanship is not to be denied. In his book, James recorded some of these means. But the religious claim of these means is at best temporary and sentimental, at worst irresponsible and quarrelsome just because they are purely "psychological." On the other hand, the sense of the infinite realized by a particular individual in the particular context of an occupation is specific, organic and at the same time rational. Consequently it has better ground for a religious claim than any other way.

As workmanship is infinite in range even while it is specific in contexture, Spinoza's idea of sensing the infinite in finitude can naturally be realized in such a matter-of-fact problem-solving procedure as disinterested workmanship. Engaged in the pursuit of a specific workmanship, we are able not only to solve our problems, but also to live with them. To those who are disciplined in a particular endeavor, problems are no longer the cause of anxiety but the ignition for renewed vitality. Life becomes purposeful not because our reward or salvation is assured but because we are engaged in a pious pursuit due to the very sense of the infinite. This is not only true of the life of an Einstein or a Picasso but also of the lives of numerous devoted workers in any field. Thus the religion of each man is his chosen work. This can be readily illustrated in such work as child care, arts and science, and statesmanship.

Disinterested child care as a civilized institution is quite different from neurotic sentiment lavishly poured on helpless children. What touched a tough-minded thinker like Veblen was the disinterested workmanship developed through ages of adult, especially motherly, toil. The care of children acquires a religious quality when it becomes disinterested to the extent that whatever a child turns out to be and whoever the child is, the persons concerned are always ready to care for it.

Begun as an institution, child care has gradually become a chosen work. The religious significance of this work becomes evident when its effect on women's life is understood. The working strain involved in child care, instead of draining feminine vitality, rather strengthens

the morale of women, a morale which no theology ever succeeded in imparting to such a large portion of the human population.

Yet our genuine feeling for children is not a mystery as it is developed through our steady effort in working with them. A devout parent seldom gives up hope in his own children; superficially he may be said to have a sentimental partiality. The sentiment becomes understandable only in view of the long and intimate working association. Parents are ready to forgive justifiably because they see in their own children what others such as judges, parole officers, social workers, or teachers overlook and ignore due to inexperience.

As the sentiment is the result of work, it need not be extinguished in an industrial economy when more and more children are torn away from their working mothers. The pious work can be carried on by someone else with more understanding and more interest. That someone else may be more interested in our own children than we ourselves is unusual but no longer exceptional. The *more* can be infinitely *more* if through constant working with children, new discoveries are constantly made. Sooner or later child workers will realize that there is always more to be known about children and theirs is a workmanship commensurate with the infinite. In this way piety towards child care becomes saner and saner. With such a sane piety Sanguine and Binet spent their lifetime with idiots and imbeciles, and numerous others work with the dumb, the blind, epileptics and other helpless cases.

As the piety of child care is generally understandable, it is legitimately used as a metaphor to illuminate the devotion to workmanship in other areas. That is why creative effort is described as birth pain and the created product is described in no less intimate terms than as our own offspring. The logicality of such a description goes beyond metaphor. There is a valid analogy between the two cases. The validity lies in that which is common to them—the workmanship and the infinite thus apprehended.

A creative absorption in arts and sciences is different from anxiety on the one hand and vanity on the other. To scientists and artists with enough working experience, problems are not causes of anxiety but challenges to be met. Personal glory or competition is likely to be the strongest motivation of the newcomer. The beckon of the infinite will eventually tame the vain and fortify the less fortunate. The

humility of men of monumental achievement can be genuine and reassuring because the pebble in their hand reminds them of the ocean they have seen. What Spinoza celebrated as the intellectual love of God was really his personal record as a creative thinker. He was genuinely philosophical because he really loved his work. It does not matter whether his was a valid insight. It is enough that he won his peace of mind not through resignation, nor through mystic self-hypnosis nor through faith but through the sanest piety yet seen in the history of philosophy.

For those who pursue their chosen work, no faith is needed to fill the gap of reason just as no mother ever needs faith to love and care for her son. Our piety is sane to the extent that through the logic of workmanship reason is awakened to the infinite range of the problem on hand. When the infinite is thus apprehended is there any reason for us to fear, to ask for the support of faith? In thus apprehending the infinite what stimulates us most is no longer salvation but participation in the fullest Platonic sense. How else can we understand the piety of an already successful Einstein in the twentieth century or a despairing Gregory in the sixth?

Although Gregory the Great spent the happiest years of his life in a Benedictine monastery, these years did not make him the most religious man by any standard. On the other hand his life-long work in the Western part of the medievial world can be acclaimed by Christians and non-Christians alike. His own piety met the severest test when he returned from Constantinople empty-handed amidst the ruin of Rome. As no state was available to uphold the unity of Christianity with the sword, Christendom had to stand on its own merit. Gregory met the test not by asserting a set dogma, a practice which frequently resulted in schism before and after him. Nor did he attempt to meet it by following an established tradition which by the nature of the case ceased to work. Gregory met the test by exploring new ground and embracing new tradition, and he met it through diligent and meticulous work.

In view of his advice to St. Augustine to convert heathen temples to churches rather than to destroy them as well as his writings on pastoral care, his piety seems to have been embodied more in his sane statesmanship than in his provincial creed. The test facing Gregory faces all statesmen. Ever present was the political paradox between expediency

and principle, compromise and integrity. If Gregory succeeded in resolving the paradox this was essentially because he learned to view his problems not as personal problems, problems of his personal ambition or conviction, but as common problems of a culture and an institution. With this outlook he devoted himself selflessly to the work of rekindling much of the original Christian sense of the infinite and compassion through cosmopolitan pastoral care.

Aside from Christianity as a particular institution, Gregory illustrated in his person that piety can be demonstrated in the realm of politics if it is understood in terms of concrete human problems to be met by workmanship not personal ambitions to be fulfilled by statecraft.

Of all human enterprises, politics has been notoriously irreligious in that finite human beings have acted as pretenders to the role of God. The harm done ourselves as well as others due to these pretensions can be told on the numerous pages of political history, Eastern and Western, ancient and modern. The pretension is not limited to politics. All of us, whatever our line of pursuit, philosophy or agriculture, commerce or public relation, technology or administration, are liable to fall victim to it but for the disinterested workmanship which alone should lead us to the concrete apprehension of a specific infinite. For the same reason, the apprehension of the infinite as the object of our religious experience is not dependent on any particular institution, such as the church. The religious experience of Gregory the Great like anyone else was intensified not in the medium of any divine inspiration through a particular channel but in the medium of a particular line of endeavor which happened to be his special interest and competency.

By thus defining religious experience as apprehension of the infinite and tracing this apprehension in the disinterested workmanship of an energetic mind, we are reaching for a piety which educates finite men into sanity by reminding them of their very finitude in the presence of a specific infinite. The infinite does not appear in the form of bare abstract ideas, nor in a delirious moment but is co-present in our honest effort to meet specific problems. In the form of unfinished business, the infinite defies vain claims and beckons to further effort. After all, what is the sense of living if all problems are solved or no problem is approachable? While religious zeal cannot be

engineered by a vain quest for certainty neither can it be sustained as an eternal quest without experienced progress.

The pilgrimage of progress of our life career can be concretely and specifically experienced if we are disciplined in particular workmanship which by the nature of the case will enable us to be sensitive to things, persons and events otherwise ignored by us in our insulation. The consciousness of our own finitude as a result of learning by problem-solving is an eternal blessing for therein perhaps lies salvation—salvation from self-extermination, physical or spiritual, due to vanity, conceit and foolhardiness.

This way of viewing the religious quality of life is particularly relevant in a culture where dogmas are institutionalized as formulas of salvation or bizarre experiences are rationalized as miracles. James in his memorable work did a great service by separating religion from officialized dogma of any sort. But in associating religion with individual experience, he seemed unnecessarily to emphasize the esotoric and abnormal. The study of abnormal psychology might be a good lead to the study of normal psychology. Our psychology is normal to the extent that it operates and is disciplined in reason. For us, this reason is the reason in workmanship and this reason in workmanship will be the most likely to lead us on the road to a life of sane piety.

PERIPATETIC ADVERSARIES OF CARTESIANISM IN 17TH CENTURY FRANCE

LEONORA COHEN ROSENFIELD
Assistant Professor of French, University of Maryland

THE READER OF THEOLOGY, as well as of science, philosophy, and belles-lettres in seventeenth century France is familiar with the term "Peripatetic" used generally throughout that era and at least the first half of the succeeding century. The name so current then has fallen into desuetude, and when found today connotes rather the followers of Aristotle in ancient Greece. Not since Diderot's *Encyclopédie* do reference works throw an erudite light on the seventeenth century meaning of the word.

Who were the Peripatetics? How define and characterize their movement? Modern critical studies comment only rarely, and then usually in passing, on these figures of three centuries ago whom time has covered with the oblivion which they doubtless deserved. Not a single book squarely and uniquely on the subject has come to my attention after considerable search. Yet, in their day, these men were the cocks of the roost. Theirs was the voice of authority; in their tradition, the great and lesser writers and thinkers of France's golden age were usually formed. It would be impossible to attain a real grasp of the thought of that country at that crucial time without training one's sights on the cross currents stirred up between the old orthodoxies of scholastic and Aristotelian sources, and the new directions in science, religion, and philosophy.

Peripateticism was the Aristotelianism of its day, the post-Renaissance version of the scholastic interpretation of Aristotle. The term "Peripatetic" was used to designate the defenders of the theological, philosophical, and scientific status quo, who were generally critical of innovations. These traditionalists were united less in their positive allegiance than negatively in their common opposition to the new philosophies. As Father Daniel put it in a 1690 work satirizing Descartes: "Except in classes, Thomists, Scotists, and Nominalists are no longer mentioned, or at least no longer distinguished. They are all grouped together in the same category, and in the same party, called

the Old Philosophy in opposition to Descartes' Philosophy, or the New Philosophy." [1] It is particularly rewarding to view the "Old Philosophy" or Peripateticism, after the appearance of the "New Philosophy," or Cartesianism.[2]

No ready-made comprehensive list of Peripatetics existed. The present writer has had to compose her own,[3] in the hope that, withal, her results however incomplete and imperfect will prove a useful point of departure for future scholarship in the field. Louis XIV's confessor, Father de La Chaise, after whom the Paris cemetery is named, is one of the figures exhumed. Another, unnamed in a *Journal des Sçavans* mention of his book, I have identified as Michel Morus, once Rector at the University of Paris.

To unearth the works of a score of Peripatetics whose views were opposed to Cartesian doctrines in varying degrees and in various ways, then to show why these men must be resuscitated in order to bring their age to life, is the aim of the present study. An annotated bibliography of these Peripatetics' major publications in the field is appended to this general analysis of their significance. The books are usually in Latin, often voluminous tomes. They date from the 1640's to the end of the century, with most of the production from the 1660's on, that is, after the death of Descartes. They are for the most part exceedingly rare. In fact five of the twenty figures listed are not represented by a single word in the libraries of this country, so far as I could ascertain, and apart from the Père Lachaise, only a half dozen of the rest bear names whose ring is at all familiar (Bourdin, Daniel, J. D. Du Hamel, Huet, Pardies, Rapin).

To what extent were the seventeenth century Aristotelians faithful followers of Aristotle? One of them, Jean-Baptiste de La Grange, actually railed against him. But the Stagirite's was still the revered

[1] Translated from Gabriel Daniel, *Voiage du Monde de Descartes* (ed. 1691), 184-185.

[2] Lynn Thorndike has studied four pre-Cartesian Peripatetics in "The Cursus philosophicus before Descartes", *Archives internationales d'histoire des sciences,* IV (1951), 16-24.

[3] The fullest mention of Peripatetics since Diderot's Encyclopédie is found in Francisque Bouillier's *Histoire de la philosophie cartésienne,* 3 ed., (Paris, 1868), 2 vols., and Henri Busson's *La Religion des classiques, 1665-1685,* (Paris, 1948). In addition to the figures therein, I have added two more Peripatetics to my Bibliography—Père La Chaise and Michel Morus.

name to most of the Peripatetics, whose devotion was however customarily more nominal than essential. Needless to say, the real Aristotle, who had believed neither in grace, creation nor Providence, was not the Aristotle of the Peripatetics. In general, these neo-Aristotelians were steeped in Thomism, but even that had been if not watered down, at least adapted to the exigencies of the times, and as the century progressed was amended by the impact of other, often, conflicting factors. It is put succinctly in French when an authority on the literature of France's "grand siècle" refers to "l'aristotélisme bâtard de l'enseignement officiel." [4]

Can all the Aristotelians of whom we treat be lumped together *en bloc?* The answer is a vigorous "No". So impressive is the variety among them, that classifying them is a complex task. The decision as to whom to include was often a delicate one. Various electics demonstrated both Peripatetic and non-Peripatetic tendencies; nevertheless it would have been unwise to exclude from our list Casimir, Jean-Baptiste Du Hamel, La Grange, Maignan and Vincent. The allegiances of these neo-Aristotelians were varied. Most Catholic Peripatetics were Thomists, but some like Frassen were followers of Duns Scotus. Barbay praised Suárez more highly than Aristotle. A Father Gonet was favorably inclined toward St. Augustine, to the point where the Jansenist doctrine of predestination did not shock. A fellow Dominican, Father Goudin, evidently had some of his statements on pre-destination doctored after his death. Augustinianism has thus to be reckoned with, even among the Peripatetics. (Indeed, Aristotelianism flourished to a certain extent among Protestants in Holland and in Germany,[5] even for example in the thought of Luther's close collaborator, Philip Melancthon, despite Luther's opposition to all "stoneblind" philosophical reasoning). Another movement of which one finds echoes in the ranks of the Aristotelians is Platonism. Jean-Baptiste Du Hamel defended Ficino and neo-Platonism, which he sought to reconcile with neo-Aristotelianism. And Democritean atomism was the subject of Maignan's first book. Descartes himself should

[4] Antoine Adam, *Histoire de la littérature française au 17e siècle* (Paris, 1948), I, 304.

[5] Cf. Diderot's *Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers,* (ed. Neufchastel, 1751-65), "Aristotélisme", I, 652-673; "Peripatéticienne", XII, 372-373.

be included as one who reflected the influence of Aristotle, despite his revolt against him, according to the editor of the *Revue philosophique*.[6] One more point of difference among the figures listed below is that while most of them were professional churchmen, a few seem to have been non-ecclesiastics: Barbay, Jean Du Hamel, and Morus.

A further question that seems to cry out for answer is: where were the strongholds of the movement? The great center for theological neo-Aristotelianism was, of course, Paris. Its Sorbonne, its Parliament, its archbishop, even Louis XIV, at nearby Versailles, and his royal council, all officially condemned Cartesianism and expressly forbade the teachings of any system of philosophy other than Aristotle's. An edict of 1624 proscribed the death penalty to any who publicly taught contrary doctrines. When four candidates competed in 1669 for the chair of philosophy at the Collège Royal, they were required to discourse before a jury of thirteen on one of the following subjects: immortality of the soul, motion, and even more pointedly, the superiority of the Peripatetic philosophy, and refutation of Descartes.[7] We are not surprised then that most of the books in our bibliography appeared in Paris, but Toulouse also shows up as having been a seat for such studies. Casimir, Gonet, Labat, Maignan and Vincent all published there, within a period of just under twenty years.

The University and the college were the twin citadels of Aristotle. His position seemed heavily bulwarked by the fact that by and large teaching was in the hands of his defenders, in medicine as well as in philosophy and theology. Out of the twenty Peripatetics we list, thirteen were professors for at least part of their lives, usually in Catholic colleges, occasionally at one of the universities—Barbay, Bourdin, Jean Du Hamel, Jean-Baptiste Du Hamel, Fabri, Frassen, Gonet, Labat, La Chaise, Le Valois, Maignan, Morus, and Vincent. The historian of Cartesianism, Bouillier, tells us that almost all of the regents of philosophy in most universities and colleges were

6 Cf. Pierre-Maxime Schuhl, "Y a-t-il une source aristotélicienne du 'Cogito'", *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger*, CXXXVIII (1948), 191-194.

7 Guy Patin, *Lettres choisies de feu H. Guy Patin* (Roterdam, 1725), III, 331, 12 Oct. 1669. We find the name of the successful candidate with those of his competitors in Charles Jourdain, *Histoire de l'Université de Paris au 17e et 18e siècles* (Paris, 1862-1866), Pièces justificatives, II, 102-103.

scholastic adversaries of the "new philosophy." He adds that such academicians were the most numerous but usually the most obscure.[8] The above names bear out his last point.

The Papacy and the Jesuit Order were other garrisons. Rome put Descartes' works on the Index in 1663. One of those responsible was the Jesuit Father Fabri, according to some scholars. The point has frequently been made that Jansenist sympathy for Cartesianism became an added reason for Jesuit opposition toward it. At any rate, the Society of Jesus was a particular, though not invariable center of opposition to the new philosophy, all the more influential because of its eminence in education. Seven of the Peripatetics in our annotated Bibliography were members of that Society. But the Jesuits, whose Order was so prominent in the ranks of the Peripatetics, were not alone. Dominicans, Franciscans, a Minim Father, and Oratorians are also found among the twenty. The reaction of these first three Orders to the struggle between scholastic and altered directions in the teaching of philosophy and science would be a fruitful subject of further study to supplement what is already known about Jesuit, Jansenist, and Oratorian education during that age.

The next question, and the critical one to consider here, is: what figures and doctrines did the Peripatetics reject? Aristotelianism in the seventeenth century was on the defensive, fighting a losing battle despite its advantages in being so officially entrenched. Most of the barbs were directed against Descartes, who was attacked on philosophic, scientific, and theologic grounds. His method of critical doubt is the butt of Father Bourdin's objections to Descartes' *Meditations*. The latter's proof of the existence of God, and, elsewhere, his dioptrics are likewise opposed by this contemporary of his. Another Jesuit, Father Daniel, in a sort of philosophical amusement has Aristotle himself appear, and attack the Cartesian universal doubt. The author satirizes Descartes' cosmology, his vortices, considered basic to his science, and his hypothesis of the beast-machine, around which was

[8] Bouillier, *op. cit.*, I, 553. For a succinct summary of the tenets of Aristotelian credo taught in 1678, see Paul Lallemand, *Essais sur l'histoire de l'éducation dans l'ancien Oratoire de France* (Paris, 1887), p. 402-403. Camille de Rochemonteix furnishes texts of these defended by students of philosophy and science, *Un Collège de Jésuites au 17 et 18 siècles, le Collège Henri IV de la Flèche.* (Le Mans, 1889), IV, 359-387.

waging a battle royal.[9] The teacher Jean Du Hamel is an adversary of Descartes' philosophy right down the line—his method, his axiomatic ideas, his "clear and distinct ideas", his proof of the existence of God, immortality of the soul, principles of physics, including the nature of physical matter, and mechanism as applied to animals.

Maignan, whom Pierre Bayle [10] considered one of the foremost men of his age, is another who objects to Descartes' vortices. He differs with that philosopher about the properties of magnetism and weight. On the moot point of animal intelligence, Maignan unlike Descartes would grant them perception and thought. The secretary of the newly-founded Academy of Sciences, Jean-Baptiste Du Hamel, also centers his criticism about scientific matters. In two books of Latin dialogues, the Peripatetician refutes the Gassendist as well as the Cartesian spokesman, beginning with the nature of light. For the Cartesian in the first dialogue, light is movement, for the Gassendist effluvia, for the Aristotelian, light is a quality. Elsewhere Cartesian animal automatism is rejected by Du Hamel, as is Copernican heliocentrism. The latter hypothesis is disputed again by Father Fabri, who takes issue with Galileo in *Dialogi physici in quibus de motu terrae disputatur* (1665).[11] The figure of La Grange is a curious one. He is critical not only of Descartes, but of everyone else, from Aristotle to Copernicus, Gassendi, and Maignan, not omitting fellow Peripateticians. Atomism, heliocentrism and the theory of the rotation of the earth all fail to satisfy him. He strongly combats Descartes' views on fire, meteors, rain, etc. He insists that atoms are divisible and the earth immobile. Against Cartesianism, he argues that it leads to impiety.

Father Pardies claims that Descartes' proof of perpetual motion is the weakest of all proofs on the subject. Satisfactory statements of the infinite duration of movement are found in Aristotle's *Meteors* and *Physics*. Descartes' argument, that the cessation of motion implies

[9] For an account of the controversy, and its relations with Peripateticism, see Leonora Cohen Rosenfield, *From Beast-Machine to Man-Machine, Animal Soul in French Letters from Descartes to La Mettrie* (New York, 1941).

[10] Pierre Bayle, *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, 1697, "Maignan", in ed. Beuchot (Paris, 1820), X, 125.

[11] To continue the title of Fabri's Dialogues—*marini aestus nova causa proponitur, necnon Aequarum et Mercurii supra libellam elevatio examinatur . . .* Lugduni, C. Fourmy, 1665, 218 p., index, fig.

change in God, is laughable. If his reasoning were not so easy to refute, it would be highly dangerous, for it would demonstrate that God would have had to create originally all of the movement in the universe for all eternity. Pardies explains and defends the system of Tycho Brahe by the laws of mechanics, thereby rendering unnecessary the theories of Copernicus and Galileo. Pardies also refutes Epicurean atomism.

With the theologian, Father Le Valois, writing under the name of Louis de La Ville, we come to a crucial issue in Peripatetic theological opposition to Descartes. The latter's Eucharistic doctrine is denounced in a violent book on the subject designed to condemn him before an assembly of the clergy of France as a Calvinist sympathizer. The importance of the matter to the period has been clearly expounded by Kuno Fischer: "At this point", he wrote, "the great chasm arose which tore Protestantism from Catholicism".[12] Descartes' definition of matter necessitated his differing from the Church in this respect. Body is extension in space, he claims; the real or bodily presence of Christ can, therefore, in no way exist in the sacrament. With Descartes, forms are not substantial, but are modifications of two substances, material and spiritual. Whereas the Church teaches in the sacrament of the Eucharist that forms continue while the substance itself is changed. Descartes, then, believes in transformation, the Church in transubstantiation. The *Journal des Sçavans* in 1680 has another way of putting it. For Descartes, the essence of body consists in its extension, and its extension constitutes its essence. For the Church, the body of Jesus is without extension in the Eucharistic sacrament, and consequently the essence of the body has no extension.[13] Descartes' unorthodox view of the sacrament, deemed dangerous by the Church, was indubitably one of the reasons for his condemnation at Rome.

Bishop Huet's censure of Descartes is all the more venomous in that he had to excuse his own early flirtation with Cartesianism. His attack is double-edged. One book in Latin is launched against the various

[12] *Kuno Fischer, History of Modern Philosophy, Descartes and his School*, translated from the third and revised German edition by J. P. Gordy, edited by Noah Porter (N. Y., 1887), p. 507.

[13] *Journal des Sçavans*, VIII (1680), 49.

aspects of the Cartesian system, another in French and in a comic vein, directs its shafts against Descartes. The philosopher's system is dangerous for the Christian religion. In the famous Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns, Huet stood against the moderns and against Perrault in particular.

Along with Huet, the most widely known of our Aristotelians was the Jesuit Father Rapin. He disapproves of Descartes' system (1) for his weak principles of motion, little different from those of Democritus and Epicurus, (2) his premises are vastly disproportionate to his demands, (3) his proofs of the existence of God are inadequate, (4) above all, his method of doubt is carried too far. Philosophizing should teach us to be better Christians. Rapin censures along with the Cartesians, the Gassendists, deists, and atheists. We perceive a compelling reason for his admiration of Aristotle who in his view has rendered signal service to the cause of the Christian religion.

Father Vincent's Peripatetic commentary on Cartesian philosophy is unavailable in this country, and I have not seen it, but according to Bouillier [14] it attacks Descartes' methodical doubt, his proof of the existence of God through the concept of the infinite, the necessity of extension, the infinity of the world, the movement of the earth. The author complains bitterly about the progress of Cartesianism, in the face of strenuous measures to check it.

The evidence all points to the general discrediting of Aristotelianism in the course of the century.[15] Instead of seeking for new intellectual problems with which to grapple, Peripateticism had concentrated on defending the old texts and doctrines, which sometimes involved attempts to reconcile them to the newer theories, particularly in science. In any event, the movement had ceased to bring forth outstanding new views and great thinkers. Some of the evidence is indirect—for one thing, banning Cartesianism in favor of Aristotelianism all over the country, repeated so many times, was obviously ineffective. Another sign of the changed spirit was the ridiculing of Aristotle. Its

[14] Bouillier, *op. cit.*, I, 554.

[15] "Aristote, après avoir eu l'empire dans nos écoles, tombait dans le discrédit". II, 239 in the Abbé Theophile Marigeon Duvernet, *Histoire de la Sorbonne, dans laquelle on voit l'influence de la théologie sur l'ordre social,* (Paris, 1790). Henri Busson puts the date of the "ruin" of Aristotelianism as early as the first third of the century, *La Pensée religieuse française de Charron à Pascal* (Paris, 1935), p. 226.

most pungent manifestation was Boileau's *Arrêt burlesque,* at which the President of the Parliament, Lamoignon, laughed heartily.[16] The little satire was so successful that it forestalled more official bans on the part of the University and the Parliament. Nor did Molière hesitate to ridicule Aristotelians, as witness Pancrace, "Docteur aristotélicien," in *Le Mariage forcé,* the philosophy master in *Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme,* Diafoirus in *Le Malade imaginaire.* In 1684, Jurieu summed up the situation thus ironically: "les pauvres Péripatéticiens et les disciples d'Aristote doivent être bien confus, de voir que le Verbe éternel est devenu Cartésien sur ses vieux jours." [17]

With so many new discoveries, horizons, and worlds opening up, scholasticism and backward-looking Aristotelianism found themselves wanting.[18] The learned journals for these years bear out the dissatisfaction with the traditional physics. It was a century of science that witnessed the work of Gilbert, Galileo, Kepler, Huyghens, Boyle, Newton, Borelli, Harvey, Redi, Malpighi, and Leewenhoek, along with key developments in the telescope and microscope. The universe static? More than one Peripatetic philosopher, loudly decrying Cartesianism, introduced into his teaching especially of physics, Cartesian elements that he ascribed to Aristotle.[19] The Jesuits were beginning to favor eclectic works which without too obvious declaration of principles utilized Cartesianism. Father Daniel, himself, achieved a sort of synthesis between Cartesianism, Aristotelianism, and even Gassendism. He approved the moral values of Descartes' *Discours de la méthode,* saw good things in his *Météores,* in some of his letters, in the *Principia* and in *Le Monde,* and thought the *Traité des passions* his best scientific work. During the last third of the seventeenth century, a swarm of conciliatory works appeared that mingled Aristotelian, Gassendist

16 Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux, *Oeuvres complètes* (Paris, 1942), IV, 31-55, Notice et notes, 140-152.

17 Pierre Jurieu, *L'Esprit de M. Arnauld,* 1684, p. 78, cited by Paul Hazard, *La Crise de la conscience européenne,* 1680-1715 (Paris, 1935), I, 175.

18 Busson, *op. cit.,* p. 308. "Physique, astronomie, géographie ruinaient l'aristotélisme et paraissaient heurter de vieilles interprétations de la Bible."

19 Bouillier, *op. cit.,* 1, 485. Jesuit admiration in the 18th century for Descartes' science and mathematics is attested by the *Mémoires de Trévoux* for June 1721, and by André Schimberg, who quotes them, in *l'Education morale dans les collèges de la compagnie de Jésus en France sous l'ancien régime* (Paris, 1913), p. 519.

and Cartesian elements for school consumption.[20] Outstanding examples of this were Maignan's books, J. B. Du Hamel's *De consensu veteris et novae philosophiae,* and, for medicine, his *De corpore animato.* Cartesian philosophy became more readily acceptable to traditionalists after Malebranche gave it a decidedly religious tinge.[21] By 1691, Cartesianism entered the French Academy through the person of Fontenelle, and partly through him as intermediary went on to influence the century of the *Encyclopédie* and the Revolution. Universal doubt and universal reason proved as dangerous as Bourdin, Rapin, and Huet, not to mention Bossuet, had feared. Aristotelianism was one of the foundations of authority which along with the others was sapped before the end of the reign of Louis XIV.

This is not the place to tell the story of Cartesianism and of the quarters where it proved most pervasive.[22] But we must note how it affected the "old philosophy." One of the major modifications in Peripateticism at this time was that it was being tinged with some Cartesianism. The very Peripatetics who disputed Descartes underwent his influence in one way or another, as in the above-mentioned cases of Daniel, Maignan, and J. B. Du Hamel. Barbay, who had been a pupil of the Cartesian sympathizer Antoine Arnauld, stated at the start of his *Commentarius in Aristotelis metaphysicam* that proof is reached by reason as well as by the authority of Aristotle and other philosophers. The Dominican Father Goudin agreed with Descartes on the nature and origin of error. Huet's philosophical scepticism must have been abetted by the early imprint of Cartesianism upon him. Pardies presented the Cartesian view of animal automatism so attractively as to be accused of favoring it. Rapin praised Descartes as the most original of philosophers and paid compliments to his physics. Finally, Vincent, in his zealous defense of Peripateticism, evidently tried to rejuvenate it with judicious admixtures of more modern elements.

And the same forces which shaped Descartes were working, although to a lesser degree, on the Peripatetics. Father Ceñal has wisely pointed

[20] Pierre Mouy lists such works in *Le Développement de la physique cartésienne, 1646-1712* (Paris, 1934), pp. 173-174.

[21] Mouy, *op. cit.,* p. 176.

[22] For a detailed account of the progress of Cartesianism in the Netherlands, *vide* C. Louise Thijssen-Schoute, *Nederlands Cartesianisme* (Amsterdam, 1954).

out that Maignan for example was inspired less by Descartes directly than by the very factors that helped to form him—the naturalism of the Renaissance, enthusiasm for mechanical and experimental science, rejection of traditional philosophy allied with the old qualitative physics.[23] The growing taste for experimental philosophy contributed as much to ruining scholasticism as did Descartes, whom it in turn threatened, states Mornet.[24] Fabri came to the same conclusion as Harvey and Descartes about the circulation of the blood, for experimental reasons. His *Tractatus* affirmed that he followed Aristotle except when dissuaded by experimental evidence or demonstrative reason. He even refuted the doctrine of substantial forms, which according to scholasticism are intermediary between mind and matter, and claimed all form other than rational soul to be a relationship. Maignan was another Peripatetic who rejected substantial forms. To what extent was he swayed directly by Descartes? Impossible for me to say. Pardies is considered by some a predecessor of Huyghens in an early wave theory of light. La Grange, for all his zeal in defending the accepted physics, dared to criticize Aristotle, was stimulated into doing his own thinking about atomism, and conceived the idea that the atom could be split—a mathematical possibility, since matter is infinitely divisible, and a physical possibility, he feels, for "les Atomes s'useront les uns contre les autres; et ceux qui seront pointus émousseront leurs pointes contre les costés des autres." [25]

To sum up, three reasons may be adduced for the importance of examing this hybrid Aristotelianism. One perceives in the period what Busson calls the first duel between religion and science.[26] If, as Gilson says, the history of mediaeval thought must include that of its influences, and the history of modern thought that of its sources,[27] seventeenth century France, when Peripateticism and Cartesianism were at grips, occupies a central position. The fermentation that was then taking place between the attachment to the old orthodoxies of scholastic, pre-Galilean philosophy and the quest for new quantitative

[23] Ramon Ceñal, "Emmanuel Maignan: sur vida, su obra, su influéncia", *Revista de estudios politicos*, XLIV (Madrid, 1952), 111-149.

[24] "Aristote", signed Daniel Mornet in Georges Grente, *Dictionnaire des lettres françaises* (Paris, 1954), II, 96.

[25] La Grange, *Traité des élémens et des météores* (1679), p. 33.

[26] Busson, *La Religion des classiques*, p. 7.

[27] Etienne Gilson, *Etudes sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien* (Paris, 1930), Preface, p. 6. The book was re-edited in 1951.

science is sensed in these old, dust-laden pages. Two centuries later, the continuing struggle between science and religion came to a new head with Darwin. The Scopes trial in Tennessee was a twentieth century American incident in a prolonged war, one battle of which was waged in the days when our almost-forgotten figures took sides for or against Copernicus' and Galileo's astronomy, Gassendi's revival of atomism, Descartes' effort to spurn the past and anticipate boundless scientific progress in a forward-moving, rational world. The Ancients and the Moderns, absolutism and reason, dogmatism and tolerance, were pitted against each other in a struggle the outcome of which has helped to shape the present.

The second reason for the significance of such research has been stated explicitly by M. Gilson. Without tracing scholastic opposition to Descartes, he writes, the full picture of Cartesian philosophy can never be drawn. He has given us a model of the kind of study he recommends when he examines, for example, Jean Du Hamel's *Philosophia universalis* to show us how refutations of Descartes were presented to students of the period. Thanks to "these criticisms without originality", we are able "to grasp more explicitly the true meaning of certain conceptions of Descartes; the irreducible opposition of Scholasticism on certain points gives us a clearer sense of what Descartes was opposing and the veritable raison d'être of one or another of his affirmations . . . Assembling such texts would permit us without doubt to follow closely and with the greatest possible certitude the progress of Cartesian philosophy in the teaching of the 17th century; and no one could deny that this would be one of the necessary chapters in a complete history of Cartesian philosophy." [28]

Thirdly, disinterring our long-slumbering Peripatetics widens our perspective on the eighteenth century. Diderot points out in his Encyclopedia article on "Cartésianisme" that his contemporaries were following a Cartesian example. "The persecutions that this philosopher suffered for having declared war on prejudice and ignorance ought to be the consolation of those who having the same courage will undergo the same buffeting." The leading spirit among the Encyclopedists was aware that his generation could profit by the lesson of

[28] Translated from Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 316-317. E. Signoret similarly reminds us that Descartes must be interpreted in the light of his Aristotelian Thomistic background. Cf. "Cartésianisme et aristotélisme", *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, XLIV (1937), 287-304.

Cartesianism's triumphant struggle. I venture to say that only against the background of the seventeenth century's efforts to shake itself free from the mortmain of neo-Aristotelianism can the century of the Enlightenment be fully understood. Was not the vehemence of the reaction in the century of the Revolution a function of the severity of the hold that tradition and authority had tried to exercise on man's minds and words? The Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns took place on theologic, philosophic, and scientific as well as literary terrain. Cartesianism and the general progression of thought could not be stopped by decree.

Annotated Bibliography

Published Works of Aristotelians in Seventeenth Century France

1. The figures treated herein are for the most part so little known today that comments on their philosophical works have been accompanied by some identifying data on the authors. Reference to works on them seemed necessary.

2. This bibliography was prepared in the United States, centering around the Union Catalogue. In order not to omit essential volumes unavailable in this country, I have included some that I have not seen, marking such books by an asterisk (*). Most of the starred items are found in the Bibliothèque nationale or the British Museum. The fact that some are not is an index of the rarity of much of this material.

3. Unless otherwise noted the place of publication is Paris. The following abbreviations are used:

   JS — Journal des sçavans
   BioM — Michaud, Biographie universelle ancienne et moderne
   PMLA — Publications of the Modern Language Association of America

4. The following are the twenty Peripatics listed alphabetically: Barbay, Bourdin, Casimir de Toulouse, Daniel, Jean Du Hamel, Jean-Baptiste Du Hamel, Fabri, Frassen, Gonet, Goudin, Huet, Labat, La Chaise, La Grange, Le Valois, Maignan, Morus, Pardies, Rapin, Vincent.

Barbay, Pierre, (Barbey). Commentarius in Aristotelis metaphysicam . . . Josse, 1675. x-498 p.

Ten pages of "index" or detailed table of contents. B. claims that, unlike Aristotle, who interspersed logic and metaphysics throughout his Metaphysics, he gives his pure. Book comprises three parts—principles of being, properties of being, and species of being. Of latter class, three species—rational being,

God, and angels. The higher properties of being include unity, truth, and goodness. According to scholastic tradition, the book is methodically divided into disputations, articles, questions, conclusions, corollaries, etc. Subjects treated range from the nature of metaphysics, principles of cognition, act and potentiality, essence and existence, causation, unity, truth, goodness, being, substance, etc., to God and angels. St. Thomas and other theological authorities are frequently cited, as is Aristotle and, with even more approbation, Suárez. Cartesianism is not mentioned by name except as more recent metaphysics. At start, B. states that metaphysical proof is reached by authority of Aristotle and other philosophers, and by reason. B. refutes the objection based on major premise "Nihil est in intellectu, quod prius non fuerit in sensu." He proves that non-material things can be known. But his refutation does not attack the premise that will be used by the sensationalist empiricists of the next century. Instead he states that non-material things, while not sensed per se, are there through God. One almost feels that this is a step toward Berkeley. Legitimate object of metaphysics is not substance alone, nor spirit alone, nor God alone. Metaphysics concerns complete being (p. 6 ff.). "Potentia" is twofold, active, i.e., capacity for action, and passive, i.e., capacity for receiving (p. 28 ff.). Potentiality may also be viewed as objective or subjective. Latter is both metaphysical and physical. As to the "potentia obedientali," it is called obedience to God, but it can not really be distinguished from nature (p. 33). And so, throughout knowledge proceeds by building up, or breaking down into, classifications and definitions.

Barbay, Pierre. Commentarius in Aristotelis Logicam . . . Josse, 1675. xix-576 p.*

Barbay, Pierre. Commentarius in Aristotelis moralem . . . Josse, 1675. vii-511 p.*

Barbay, Pierre. Commentarius in Aristotelis physicam . . . ed. secunda, Josse, 1676, 2 v.*

B. professor of philosophy at Paris. His texts often reprinted and much used in the schools. He was one of the four Thomists from among whom professors of the Oratorian order had to choose their philosophy texts, according to a decision taken in 1677 at a Council of that order, just two years after publication of the Commentarii.

See H. Busson, La pensée religieuse française de Charron à Pascal. Vrin, 1933. p. 153.

Bourdin, Father Pierre, S.J., Objectiones septimae. Amstelodami, Elzevirium, 1642. *Also reprinted in:* Adam-Tannery. Oeuvres de Descartes, Cerf, 1877-1910. 7:451-561.

The Objectiones to Descartes' Meditationes (subtitle, Dissertation concerning basic philosophy) take the form of conversations between Descartes and

B. The Critique is of Cartesian methodical doubt. Discussion centers around two major questions, and answers thereto. First, "whether doubtful things should be considered false, and how." Second, "whether it is sound philosophical method to abstain from making decisions about things that could be doubted." B., professor of mathematics and physics, was sharply critical of Descartes, whose scepticism, he feels, goes too far. Existence of God like addition of two and three, or fact that man has body, needs no further proof. JS 1667, reviewing Descartes' correspondence, recalls that B. had been first to oppose Descartes' dioptrics (2:33-37). For summary of relations between the two, see Adam-Milhaud, Descartes; correspondence. Presses Universitaires, 1947. 4:383-387. For mention of B.'s Objections, see S. von Dunin-Borkowski, S.J. Spinoza. Munster, 1. W., Aschendorff, 1933. 1:274.

Casimir de Toulouse, O.F.M., Cap. Atomi peripateticae, sive tum veterum tum recentiorum atomistarum placita ad neotericae peripateticae scholae methodum redacta, a P. Casimiro Tolosatae. Biterris, Martel, 1674. 4 v.*

According to JS, Peripateticism of this book is only formal. Its reasoning follows the forms of the School. But authority of Aristotle, St. Thomas, Duns Scotus, and all the rest of the Peripatetics, has not prevented C. from trying here to undermine the foundations of the School. He delivers nature from all kinds of beings, substantial and accidental forms. He holds that atoms and space have only mathematical extension, and that physical extension can only be attributed to tissues composed of atoms. Atoms themselves are like angels, physically indivisible. JS., 4:86-90. 30 mars., 1676.

On Casimirus Tolosanus, whose other works are pious biographies, see Bibliotheca fratrum minorum cappucinorum provinciarum occitaniae et aquitaniae. Romae, Praefectum archivi generalis cappucinorum et Nemausae, Gervais-Bedot, 1894. p. 49-51. This Bibliography which does not seem to be listed in Union Catalogue is found in the College of the Holy Name, Franciscan Monastery, Washington, D.C. Casimir's Atomi peripateticae put on Index in 1681, according to H. Hurter, S.J., Nomenclator literarius recentioris theologiae catholicae . . . Oeniponte, Libraria academica Wagneriana, 1892-99. 4 v. 2: 46 n.

Daniel, Father Gabriel, S.J. Voyage du monde de Descartes. V^ve^ de S. Bénard, 1690. 437 p.

D., historian and theologian of repute, had great success with this imaginary voyage. It is a satiric denunciation of Descartes, his cosmology, his vortices, and his philosophy. A zealous advocate of the new philosophy takes D. to third heaven to meet Descartes. On the way Aristotle and then a Chinese mandarin criticize Descartes. Other philosophic figures encountered or referred to include Socrates, Plato, Mersenne, Cyrano de Bergerac (in the moon), Gassendi, Voetius, Cardan, Pascal, Arnauld, Malebranche and Coper-

nicus. Traces of Gassendist influence here. This well-written book was translated and published in Amsterdam, London, Genoa and Madrid.

Daniel, Father Gabriel, S.J. Nouvelles difficultés proposées par un péripatéticien à l'auteur du "Voyage du monde de Descartes" . . . V^e^ de S. Bénard, 1693. 304 p.

In first letter, Preuves de la connoissance des bêtes, the Peripatetic, D.'s mouthpiece, attacks Descartes' hypothesis of the beast-machine, called touchstone of Cartesianism. Vivisection is also denounced. This sequel to the Voyage became its part 5 in later editions, for ex.: Voyage du monde de Descartes. Nouvelle éd. revue et augmentée d'une cinquième partie . . . V. Pepie, 1702. 536 p.

V. Bourke has useful monograph on D.: An illustration of the attitude of the early French Jesuits toward Cartesianism. Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica, supplemento speciale al v. 19, Cartesio, Università cattolica del sacro cuore, Milano, p. 129-137, Jul. 1937. On D., besides works referred to by Bourke, see F. Bouillier, Histoire de la philosophie cartésienne. 3 ed., Delagrave, 1868, 1: 484; 576-577; BioM, Desplaces, 1854. Art. Daniel; and L. Rosenfield, From Beast-Machine to Man-Machine, New York, Oxford University Press, 1941, pp. 86-90.

Du Hamel, Jean. Réflexions critiques sur le système cartésien de la philosophie de Mr. Regis . . . Couterot, 1692. xvi-344 p.*

Bouillier notes that Jean Du Hamel, not to be confused with Jean Baptiste Du Hamel, gathers together in this book arguments of almost all of Descartes' adversaries (*op. cit.*, 1:557).

Du Hamel, Jean. Philosophia universalis, sive commentarius in universam Aristotelis philosophiam ad usum scholarum comparatam quaedam recentiorum philosophorum ac praesertim Cartesii propositiones damnatae ac prohibitae . . . Thiboust et Esclassen, 1705. 5 v.*

E. Gilson points out importance of the man in furnishing documentary evidence as to teachings about Descartes in the France of his time. Although work is dated 1705, its first volume bears an approbation of 1693. Author claims in his dedicatory epistle to Sorbonne that his publication sums up twenty years of his teaching. He taught in Paris at Collège du Plessis-Sorbon. Elements of Cartesianism that were criticized at such colleges may be surmised from chapter headings cited—Cartesian method, axiomatic ideas, clear and distinct ideas, existence of God, immortality of rational soul, principles of physics, nature of physical matter, is there vegetative soul in animals?, percussions of bodies. (Gilson, Etudes sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien. Vrin, 1930. p. 316-317).

Du Hamel, Jean Baptiste, Prior of Saint-Lambert. Astronomia physica, seu de luce, natura, et motibus corporum caelestium, libri duo, in priori libro de lumine, et coloribus agitur, in posteriori universa astronomia tum speculatrix, tum practica physicè et geometricè citra Euclidis opem demonstratur . . . Lamy, 1660. 224 p.

Dialogues among Menander, a Cartesian, Simplicius, an Epicurean, and Theophilus, a Peripatetic. Author refutes first two doctrines and defends Aristotle's. In chapter one, Menander defines light in terms of motion, Simplicius considers light as effluvia, and Theophilus calls light a quality. Later, Fabri, contemporary Aristotelian, is cited approvingly.

Du Hamel, Jean Baptiste, Prior of Saint Lambert. De meteoris fossilibis. Libri duo . . . Lamy, 1660. 310 p.

Dialogues among the same three characters. These first works of J. B. Du Hamel made him known, and he was appointed by Colbert first and "permanent" secretary of the Academy of Sciences, the history of which he wrote. He helped to popularize taste for experimentation.

Du Hamel, Jean Baptiste, Prior of Saint Lambert. De consensu veteris et novae philosophiae libri duo. In priori libro Platonis, Aristotelis, Epicuri, Cartesii, et aliorum de principiis rerum naturalium placita excutiuntur, ac physica generalis penè tota pertractatur. In posteriori agitur de elementis, et chymicorum principiis, necnon de mixtione, et dissolutione corporum, ubi chymia ferè universa explicatur. Savreux, 1663. xxviii-280 p.

Attempts to reconcile doctrines of Plato, Aristotle and Peripatetics, Epicurus, and Descartes, by resolving difficulties. Example—Cartesians don't differ much from Platonists, since both schools think subtle matter permeates world. Refers to Platonic "anima mundi." On Democritean atoms, claims they do not consist of mathematical points, nor is the continuum infinitely divisible. As for Peripatetics, they fight bitterly among themselves. "I don't know whether they can agree on the nature of prime matter". (p. 79) Mentions among other philosophers—Thales, Parmenides, Empedocles, Pythagorus, Diogenes, Seneca, St. Thomas, Averroes, and Sir Kenelm Digby! Book II treats of elements—fire, air, water, earth. On fire, harmonizes Epicurean and Peripatetic views, points out difficulties in Descartes'.

Du Hamel, Jean Baptiste, Prior of Saint Lambert. De mente humana, libri quatuor. Le Petit, 1672. 555 p.

Mentions not only Descartes and Aristotle but Gassendi, St. Bonaventura, Cicero, etc. Opposes Cartesian animal automatism. "If animals know anything, I don't see why they can't think up new arts" (p. 502). Author in-

fluenced by Pardies' Discours de la connoissance des bestes (see *infra*), and praises him in his De corpore animato (1673).

Du Hamel, Jean Baptiste, Prior of Saint-Lambert. Philosophia vetus et nova ad usum scholae accomodata . . . ed. quinta multo emendatior. Amstelodami, Gallet, 1700. 4 v. (1st ed., 1678).

Composed at Colbert's recommendation, this work went through many re-editions. Third volume, 276 pages, Commentarii in metaphysicam Aristotelis, treats of scientific matters—motion, time, space, and animal knowledge, in addition to topics similar to those in Barbay. On controversy over animal intelligence, author rejects both extremes, Cartesian view of animal automatism, and attribution of reason to animals. His position, he says, is an intermediary one (p. 253-273). J. B. Du Hamel was an eclectic who sought to reconcile new with ancient philosophy, Plato with Aristotle, to form new teachings for school use. He does not mention the Cartesians by name, but in the Preface of his above-mentioned Comments on Aristotle's metaphysics speaks of "more recent philosophers". (p. 6). He was well-versed in the neo-Platonism of Marsilio Ficino. But his strongest attachment was to traditional Aristotelianism. He even adhered to Tycho Brahe's system, in preference to the Copernican hypothesis that was encountering so much opposition.

His Philosophia vetus et nova so well represented philosophic views accepted in official circles of his day that the Jesuits translated it into the Tartar tongue to present the Emperor of China with a picture of European philosophy. (BioM, Du Hamel). Fontenelle wrote an Eloge de Du Hamel, cited therein. See also P. Bernier, De mente humana apud Joannem Baptistam Du Hamel, thesim facultati literarum cadomensi proponebat. Cadomi, Valin, 1891. 90 p. Bibliography included. And Bouillier, *op. cit.*, 1:556-557. H. Busson has informative references to Du Hamel in La religion des classiques (1660-1685), Presses Universitaires de France, 1948, 476 p., as well as a bibliography on him, p. 71.

Fabri, Father Honoré, S.J. (Fabry). Una fides unius ecclesiae romanae contra indifferentes hujus saeculi tribus libris . . . Dilingae, Mayer, 1657. 408 p.*

In history of theology, F. known as author of remarks criticizing notes added by Nicole to Pascal's Lettres provinciales.

Fabri, Father Honoré, S.J. (Fabry). Tractatus duo, quorum prior est de plantis, et de generatione animalium, posterior de homine. Muguet, 1666. 440-141 p.

Preliminary outline of book in form of detailed index of propositions, in addition to table of contents. First tract, in five books, deals with plants, their form and parts; nutrition and propagation; species; and then genera-

tion of animals. Tract two contains seven books on man—vegetative life; sentient life; internal senses; animal motions; sensitive appetite and passions; affections of human body; and rational soul united with body. In animals, power to feel is animal soul. In man, rational soul is united with body; it has no inorganic free motor power. F.'s Preface states that he follows Aristotle, except when dissuaded by experimental evidence or demonstrative reason. He taught his students at the College of Lyons the theory of circulation of blood as early as 1638, as a result of his own experiments and observations, without knowledge of Harvey's book on the subject that had appeared in Frankfurt in 1628 (Fabri, Tract II, liber I, prop. 11, p. 204-209). He places Harvey with the great masters on the generation of animals, after Aristotle and Fabricius of Aquapendente.

According to Father Sortais, F. treated Descartes with sympathetic moderation. (Le cartésianisme chez les Jésuites français au XVII[e] et XVIII[e] siècles. Archives de philosophie, 6:1-93. Beauchesne, 1929, no. 3). P. Mouy holds, like Bouillier, (*op. cit.*, 1:467), that F. probably played a part in having Descartes' works placed on the Index. (Le développement de la physique cartésienne [1646-1712] Vrin, 1934, p. 170). For discussion of F.'s attack upon doctrine of substantial forms, see V. Cousin, Fragments philosophiques. Didier, 1866, 3:315-316. See also BioM, on Fabri; and A. Callet, Un Savant oublié, enfant du Bugey, Honoré Fabri l'un des inventeurs de la circulation du sang. Société d'émulation de l'Ain, Annales de la société d'émulation, agriculture, sciences, lettres et arts, Bourg, 30: 353-360, 1897.

Frassen, Father Claude, O.F.M. Philosophia academica quam ex selectissimis Aristotelis et doctoris subtilis Scoti rationibus ac sententiis ordinavit F. ac P. Claudius Frassen, minor Peronensis, et sacrae facultatis doctor theologus, secunda editio. Couterot, 1668. 4t et 3 parties en 1 v. (1st ed. 1657).*

Frassen, Father Claude, O.F.M., Scotus academicus seu universa doctoris theologica dogmata quae ad nitidam et solidam academiae parisiensis docendi methodum concinnavit R. P. Claudius Frassen . . . editio nova. Romae, ex typographia sallustiana, 1900-1902. 12 v. (1st ed., 1672).

Not the metaphysics of a Barbay, but a theological work accompanied by an index of heretics. Subjects treated include: God in himself, intelligence and will in God, the trinity, angels, the divine Word and incarnation, divine grace and virtues, etc. This Sorbonne professor was according to Busson a "retardataire" for whom the appearance of comets was a sign of divine wrath. (*op. cit.*, p. 100). But he has twice been re-edited in this century, for he was one of the leading Scotists of the 17th century, that "golden age of Scotism" (B. Vogt, Origin and development of the Franciscan school, Franciscan studies, no. 3, p. 21-22, Aug. 1925). See Frassen in Enciclopedia universal ilustrada europeo-americana. Espasa-Calpe, S.A., Bilbao, Madrid, Barcelona, 1924. 24: 1147. See also Index of Busson, La pensée religieuse française de Charron à Pascal.

Gonet, Father Jean-Baptiste, O.P. Clypeus theologicae thomisticae, authore P.F. Ioanne Baptista Gonet. Biterrensi, ordinis F.F. Praedicatorum, provincia Tolosanae . . . ed. tertia, Bertier et de la Court, 1669. 5 v. f.º

Each folio volume preceded by ten pages of index. Complete treatise on sacred rites as well as doctrines. First two volumes directed against the "new opponents" of Thomistic theology. Although Bayle disparaged its erudition (Dictionnaire historique et critique, ed. Beuchot, Desoer, 1820-24, 16 v, 7: 120-121), the work enjoyed enormous vogue. Ninth edition had appeared by 1680, according to Vacant-Mangenot-Amann, (Dictionnaire de théologie catholique. Letouzey, 1909-48, 14 v. in 27,–6²:1487). Further editions followed, in Italy and Belgium as well as in France. Republished there as recently as 1876.

Ticklish question of predestination treated at length (Tract V, 2:3-141). This particularly interesting in light of author's personal experience. First he had signed a statement that no heresy was found in Pascal's Lettres provinciales. Then he signed some Gallican propositions favored by Louis XIV, which furnished basis for later Gallican manifesto, the Declaration of 1682. The upshot was that this Dominican professor of theology was suspended from his teaching at the University of Bordeaux between 1660 and 1669—then re-instated. Epitaph, long poem in Latin given in notice on G. in Hurter, Nomenclator literarius recentioris theologiae catholicae. 2:308-313.

Goudin, Father Antoine, O.P. Philosophia juxta inconcussa tutissimaque divi Thomae dogmata, logicam, physicam, moralem et metaphysicam quatuor tomis complectens. Mediolani, Vigoni, 1675. (1st ed., Lyons, 1671).

Roux-Lavergne brought out an edition in 1851, which was republished several times. Edition consulted was published by Sarlit et soc., 1886, 4 v., 272, 240, 237, 311 p. R-L's Preface calls work excellent summary of Thomistic philosophy (p. vi), the classic manual of tradition written at time of rupture caused by Cartesian revolution (p. vii), in brief, an important exposition of Peripatetic theory according to St. Thomas (p. viii). At least twelve re-editions of G's work have appeared, some in France, some in Spain, Italy and Germany. "Even today, this manual is of service and contains an excellent account of the fundamental theories of scholastic philosophy" (Translated from Vacant-Mangenot-Amann, *op. cit.*, 6: 1509). However, some of G's statements on pre-destination evidently were doctored after his death, according to this article. Subject of pre-destination was delicate, in those times of Augustinian influence and Calvinist and Jansenist interpretations.

JS 1688, reviews G.s work from viewpoint of science. Reviewer says that in recent years Thomistic physics has been held insufficient to explain nature. Defenders of old school have tried to oppose progress of new views, and to prove that phenomena may be explained by their school. G. has cited Aristotelian principles. But it is to be feared, concludes reviewer, that his reasoning will not convince all the Scotists, nor all the defenders of current science (JS, 15:547-549, 1688). And see A. Bellanger, De Antonii Goudin

philosophia juxta inconcussa tutissimaque D. Thomae dogmata, thesim facultati litterarum pictaviensi proponebat. Montligeon (Orne), Imp.-Lib. de Montligeon, 1905, 98 p.

Huet, Pierre Daniel, Bishop of Avranches. Censura philosophiae cartesianae. Horthemels, 1689. 224 p.

Divided into eight sections: 1. doubt and the cogito; 2. criteria; 3. human mind; 4. existence of God; 5. body and vacuum; 6. position of the earth; 7. cause of gravity of terrestrial bodies; 8. general criticism of Cartesian philosophy.

Bouillier calls H. one of the most dangerous as well as one of the most famous adversaries of Descartes (*op. cit.*, 1:591). Arnauld said of Censura: "Je ne sais ce qu'on peut trouver de bon dans le livre de M. Huet contre M. Descartes, si ce n'est le latin; car je n'ai jamais vu de si chétif livre pour ce qui est de la justesse d'esprit et de la solidité du raisonnement" (cited in Bouillier, *op. cit.*, 1:605). Nevertheless book had wide diffusion abroad as well as at home. D. Andrea Petermann attacked it in Leipzig, Schweling in Bremen, both in 1690. In Amsterdam, Wolder wrote against it in 1695, Schotanus in 1702. In France, Régis combatted the Censura point by point. H. replied to latter's criticism by his Mémoires, *infra:*

Huet, Pierre Daniel, Bishop of Avranches. Nouveaux mémoires pour servir à l'histoire du cartésianisme. n.p., 1692 (publiés avec les initiales pseudonymes M. G. de L'A). 75 p.

F. A. de Gournay (Huet, Eveque d'Avranches, sa vie et ses oeuvres. Caen, Le Gost-Clerisse, 1854) says that this little book seems out of keeping with character, age and talent of H. (p. 69). Descartes represented as charlatan, but comedy not very witty. D'Alembert, in Eloge de H., says that these Mémoires have had very little recognition, and hardly merit more. (Cited by D'Avenel, Histoire de la vie et des ouvrages de Daniel Huet, évêque d'Avranches. Mortain, Lebel, 1853, p. 203). To excuse own early Cartesianism, the erudite H. wrote in book claiming we cannot know truth with certainty through reason: "The doctrine of Descartes . . . obtained much Reputation; . . . and many conjectured that Aristotle would soon be forsaken, and Descartes get the Ascendent. Tired with the Divisions of the Peripateticks, I was willing to know what might be expected from that new philosophy . . . Nevertheless it was not long ere I perceived that the Peripateticks still stood their ground." (p. xlii-xliii in An Essay Concerning the weakness of human understanding, by the late M. Huet, Bishop of Avranche, translated from the French by Edw. Combe . . . 2 ed . . . London, Meadows, 1732, xlviii—237—29 p.)

H. famous in his day. He was with Bossuet preceptor to Dauphin, member of Académie française, poet, translator, editor, author. Much has been written

on him. See, for example, K. Barach, Pierre Daniel Huet als Philosoph, Wien, Leipzig, 1862, 62 p.; BioM, Huet; Bouillier, *op. cit.*, 1: ch. 28, Huet. On his scientific interests, see Harcourt Brown, Scientific organizations in 17th century France, Baltimore, 1934. p. 216-227. Most recent article and bibliography on H. in Georges Grente, Dictionnaire des lettres françaises, A. Fayard, 1954. 2, 507.

Labat, Father Pierre, O.P. Theologia scolastica secundum illibatam D. Thomae doctrinam, sive cursus theologicus, in quo omnia dubia maxime has tempestate in scholis agisari solita . . . resolvantur. Tolosae, Colomerum, 1658-1671. 7 v.*

Busson states that this like other Peripatetic manuals shows routine character of college teaching of age. (La religion des classiques p. 306 n.). Vacant-Mangenot-Amann says of this Dominican that he was a fervent Thomist who helped maintain, at University of Toulouse, faithfulness to Thomistic positions on grace and pre-destination at a time when these were much disputed. L. forms a link in chain tieing late 17th century French Thomism to Spanish Thomistic tradition of 16th century (*Op. cit.*, 8^2:2386).

La Chaise, François d'Aix de, S.J. (La Chaize in Bibliothèque Nationale; Aix de la Chaise, François d' in British Museum; Chaize, François d'Aix de la Backer-Sommervogel's Bibliography.) Peripateticae quadruplicis philosophiae placita, rationalis, naturalis, supernaturalis et moralis. Lugduni, Molin, 1661. 106 p. f^0.*

Summary of Father La Chaise's philosophic teachings at College of the Holy Trinity, Lyons, where he was professor of rhetoric and humanities as well as philosophy. His method of teaching was to expound views of ancients and moderns, then to dictate his own opinion, an attempted reconcilation.

La Chaise, after whom Père La Chaise cemetery of Paris is named, had twofold career. First as educator. Was colleague of Fabri at Lyons, then rector of college, with its preparatory school. Second, in 1675, Louis XIV chose him as confessor, in which capacity he served till his death in 1709. King gave him Mont-Louis as country house. This site of present cemetery. Louis also appointed him member of Academy of Inscriptions in 1701. See De Boze, Eloge du Père de la Chaize, 1, 373-379, Histoire de l'Académie royale des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres, Imprimerie royale, 1736.

See Charles Daniel, Les Jésuites instituteurs de la jeunesse française au 17^e et au 18^e siècle. Paris, Bruxelles, 1880. P. 276-280; BioM., 22, 349-351; and 2, 1035-1040, Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jesus by A. Backer, continued by C. Sommervogel. Bruxelles, Paris, 1891. Contains bibliography of and on our Peripatetic. He had an uncle François d'Aix who taught him mathematics, and who is erroneously described as the nephew in Backer, *op. cit.* 1, 100.

La Grange, Father Jean-Baptiste de, Oratorian. Les Principes de la philosophie, contre les nouveaux philosophes Descartes, Rohault, Regius, Gassendi, Le P. Maignan, etc. Josse, 1675. 611 p.*

A 1681 edition of the Principles came out in two volumes, Tome I, Traité des qualités, Tome II, Traité des éléments et des météores.

La Grange, Father Jean-Baptiste, Oratorian. Traité des éléments et des météores, contre les nouveaux philosophes Descartes, Rohault, Gassendi, le P. Maignan, etc. V^ve^ Josse, 1679. 653 p.

Attacks not only above-mentioned "new" philosophers, but also his fellow Peripatetics, Aristotle, Copernicus' heliocentrism, and doctrine of rotation of earth. Does not call Descartes impious, but his system, according to which God created matter, gave it movement, and let universe compose itself, is grist for the mill of impious thinkers. Gassendi (like Epicurus and Democritus) set up in atomism a frivolous system, since atoms are incapable of composing any natural body. Maignan is wrong in views on fire, Peripatetics in following Aristotle (who says things without proof) and in their weak refutations of new philosophy. Substantial forms defended by La G. Historic value of book lies in clear exposition of traditionally accepted physics. But modern reader is startled to find La Grange predicting that atoms will wear themselves out against each other (p. 33). Although a member of Oratorian order generally friendly to Descartes, La Grange approved royal decree forbidding Cartesian teaching in all universities of France. (Bouillier, *op. cit.*, 1:554-555).

Le Valois, Father Louis, S.J. (La Ville, or Valois). Sentimens de M. Des Cartes touchant l'essence et les propriétés du corps, opposés à la doctrine de l'Eglise, et conformes aux erreurs de Calvin, sur le sujet de l'Eucharistie . . . par Louis de La Ville. Michallet, 1680. 320 p.*

Three parts: 1. Descartes' definition of matter as extension; 2. irreconcilability of this definition with the Council of Trent's Eucharistic doctrine; 3. Cartesianism identical with Calvinism. Reviewed in JS, 8, 47-50, 1680. Descartes' Eucharistic doctrine main butt of LeV.'s attack. (Sortais, *op. cit., supra,* p. 32.) Book is defense of orthodox religion via violent denunciation of Descartes and Cartesians, before assembly of Bishops of France. Called upon them to condemn Cartesian doctrines as had Holy See and Louis XIV (Bouillier, *op. cit.*, 1:482, 580-581, and Cousin, *op. cit.*, 3:330-331). Tone of the book may be judged by its peroration: "A mes. les archévêques et évêques de France. Messeigneurs, je cite devant vous Monsieur des Cartes et ses plus fameux sectateurs; je les accuse d'être d'accord avec Calvin et les calvinistes sur des Principes de Philosophie contraires à la doctrine de l'Eglise; c'est à vous, Messeigneurs, à en juger!" (cited by Cousin, *op. cit.* 3, 330).

Le V. taught philosophy for ten years. Later he was confessor to Louis XIV's grandsons, and was associated with Beauvilliers and Fénelon in guiding the Duc de Bourgogne. BioM, Valois, 42:519.

Maignan, Father Emanuel (Emannuel), Minim. Democritus reviviscens, sive vita et philosophia Democriti. 1647.*

Reference I have found nowhere else but in Father von Dunin Borkowski (*op. cit.*, 2:277). The scholarship of this authority on Spinoza is impeccable. Century which witnessed Gassendi's revival of Epicurean atomism thus also manifested interest in Democritean atomism.

Maignan, Father Emanuel (Emannuel), Minim. Perspectiva horaria sive de horographia gnomonica tum theoretica, tum practica libri quatuor . . . Romae, Rubei, 1648. 705 p.

Generally called M.'s first book. On clocks and sun dials. Gives his own method of polishing lenses for early telescopes. Bayle in piece on M. wrote that latter invented method of making telescopes and imparted it herein freely (*op. cit.*, 10:127).

Maignan, Father Emanuel (Emmanuel), Minim. Cursus philosophicus concinnatus ex notissimis cuique principiis: ac praesertim quoad res physicas, instauratus ex lege naturae sensatis experimentis passim comprobata. Tolosae, Bosc, 1653. 4 v., 2234 p.*

M. not only one of greatest philosophers of 17th century according to Bayle, but also a physicist and mathematician of note (*op. cit.*, 10:125). He shared Descartes' enthusiasm for experimental science and mechanism. On some points he agreed with him and with Gassendi; on others he disagreed. For example, he did not accept the Cartesian theory of vortices. But he did wish to rid nature of substantial forms.

Maignan, Father Emanuel (Emannuel), Minim. Sacra philosophia, sive entis supernaturalis, . . . Lugduni, Grégoire, 1672. 478 p. (1st ed. 1661).

Effort by this eclectic to reconcile Thomists and their adversaries. A provincial of the Minim Fathers at Toulouse, M. hoped to create a new Christian philosophy. Bayle says that he abandoned opinions of the School, but kept much of scholastic method in his writings (*loc. cit. supra*). In any event, he proved to have a strong influence on Spanish philosophic thought of 18th century, according to R. Ceñal (Emmanuel Maignan: su vida, su obra, su influéncia. Revista de estudios politicos (Madrid, 46:111-149, ano 12, no. 66, 1952). Ceñal gives bibliography on M. See also BioM, Maignan.

Morus, Michael. De existentia Dei, et humanae mentis immortalitate, secundum Cartesii et Aristotelis doctrinam disputatio, in duos libros divisa. Robustel, 1692. 465 p.

JS reviews this book without naming author. I have identified him as M., who wrote two other books on science, all three in Bibliothèque nationale. M. claims, according to reviewer, that reasoning of ancient philosophers is incomparably stronger and more solidly founded than that of Descartes. JS, 21:14, 1693.

M. principal of college of Navarre, then rector of University of Paris. In 1701, was installed as professor of philosophy at Collège Royal when previous incumbent was dismissed for having been not a Jansenist but something of a Gallican and stiff necked. 1,285 in Charles Jourdain, Histoire de l'Université de Paris au 17e et 18e siècles. Hachette, 1862-66. 3 v. This only reference to M. I have unearthed apart from mention of his work in above cited JS.

Pardies, Father Ignace-Gaston, S.J. Discours de la connoissance des bestes. Mabre-Cramoisy, 1672. 239 p. (consulted in 3 ed., 1689).

Voltaire cited this as one of remarkable books of century of Louis XIV. Seven editions had come out by 1724, and Latin and Italian translations appeared. Delightful discourse, in two parts. First expounded animal automatism, second refuted it and defended traditional position. Charge was made that P. was really a Cartesian, masquerading as a Peripatetic. But weight of evidence shows that his Peripateticism was sincere, according to Rosenfield, who points out its influence. (Pardies and the Cartesian Beast-Machine, PMLA, 52:763-772, 1937). And P. refuted Descartes' view of motion and light. See *infra*.

Pardies, Father Ignace-Gaston, S.J. Les Oeuvres de mathématiques contenant les élémens de géometrie, discours du mouvement local, la statique et deux machines propres à faire les cadrans. La Haye, A. Moetjens, 1691. 163 plus 294 p.

Mentions Aristotle more than once, cites his Meteors and Physics. Not only is Descartes wrong in six out of seven of his laws of motion, says P., but his doctrine of light is also faulty. And "I believe I can show he is in error in several places of his philosophy". Then P. demonstrates impossibility of Epicurean atomic movement.

P. well-known physicist and mathematician. A great many editions of this work and English and Latin translations appeared. He followed some features of Cartesian science that were becoming accepted. But he rejects Copernican system and claims that his Statique explains Tycho Brahe's system by laws of mechanics. Busson calls him a "semi-cartésien engoncé dans le vieil aristotélisme", (*op. cit.*, p. 176). On P. and other Jesuit Peripatetics, see G. Sortais, *op. cit., supra,* p. 32.

Rapin, Father René, S.J. La comparaison de Platon et d'Aristote avec les sentimens des Pères sur leur doctrine, et quelques reflexions chrétiennes. Barbin, 1671. 270 p. (consulted in Oeuvres, *infra*.)

Contains inaccuracies about Aristotle, according to Bayle's Dictionary article, Aristote, (*op. cit.*, 2:356-371).

Rapin, Father René, S.J. Réflexions sur la philosophie ancienne et moderne, et sur l'usage qu'on en doit faire pour la religion. Muguet et Barbin, 1676. 264 p. (consulted in Oeuvres, *infra*).

Rapin, Father René, S.J. Les Oeuvres du P. Rapin, qui contiennent les comparaisons des grands hommes de l'antiquité, qui ont le plus excellé dans les belles lettres. Dernière édition . . . corrigée et augmentée du poème des jardins. Les réflexions sur l'éloquence, la poétique, l'histoire et la philosophie. L'esprit du Christianisme. La perfection du Christianisme. L'importance du salut. La foy des derniers siècles. La vie des prédestinés. Comparaison de Pindare et d'Horace. Amsterdam, Mortier, 1709. 3 v.

In his reflections on philosophy, R. acknowledges Descartes as most original of philosophers, but "il enseigne trop à douter" (2:346). Gassendi is most learned and knowing. R.'s reflections upon physics state that Descartes' system is most subtle and accomplished, more consistent than Galileo's. But his doctrine of motion very weak. In comparison between Plato and Aristotle, R. comments: "Never was there such an Itch in Men after Philosophy as there is now-a-days". (The whole critical works of Monr Rapin. In 2 v. Translated into English by Basil Kennet 3 ed., London, Walthoe *et al.* 1731, 1:320). But as to these new philosophies we've seen them born, and we'll see them end. Luther and Calvin in rebelling against Catholicism rebelled against Aristotle. Regulations in France, fixing Aristotelianism alone as the philosophy to be taught, aim to check heresy. R. is most vociferous champion of Aristotle of all those we have examined. ". . . of all the Philosophers, Aristotle has ever done us the most service in the Defense of our Religion" (*op. cit.*, 1:484). And R.'s aim in writing on philosophy, he tells us, is to teach men to be better Christians for it. He disparages the rational approach to religion, and exalts fideism. R. contributed to belles lettres and literary criticism as well as to pious writings and commentaries on philosophy. His Latin verse was still being translated as late as this century. He was historian and critic of Jansenism. Strongly influenced Pope and English classicism. See Augustan Reprint Society, series 2: Essays on poetry, no. 3, 1947, Rapin's De Carmine pastorali . . . with an introduction by J. E. Congleton and a biographical note. 68 p.

Lengthy review of R.'s Oeuvres diverses appeared the year before his death in Jean LeClerc's Bibliothèque universelle et historique (1:29-54, 166-182, 1686). See also Bayle on R. (*op. cit.*, 12:470-474); G. Maugain, L'Italie dans quelques publications de Jésuites français, Champion, 1910, Le P. Rapin, p. 9-26; and BioM, Rapin.

Vincent, Father J. (I). Cursus philosophicus in quo totius scholae quaestiones fere omnes, aequa perspicacitate, ac doctrina in utramque partem propugnantur, authore R.P.I. Vincentio, Congregationis doctrinae christianae, Tolosae in collegio Squillano, philosophiae professore. Tolosae, 1660. 2 v.*

Does not believe that the weight of air has been experimentally proved by Torricelli and Pascal, nor does he believe in "le vide". (Busson, La Religion des classiques, p. 86 n.).

Vincent, Father J. (I). Discussio peripatetica in qua philosophiae cartesianae principia . . . dilicude examinantur. Tolosae, 1677.*

Bouillier (*op. cit.*, 1:483, 553-554) discusses the work and its author and calls him one of the most zealous defenders of scholastic philosophy. V. states in his preface that he condemns Descartes because the three great tribunals condemned him, viz., the Sorbonne, the Parliament, and Rome. He sorely deplores progress of Cartesianism in face of all condemnations. According to this defender of traditionalism, Descartes' Principia were fundamentally wrong. Nevertheless Bouillier classes this professor of philosophy and superior of the Congregation of Christian Doctrine among those who sought to rejuvenate Scholastic Peripateticism by a certain eclecticism (*op. cit.*, I:553-554). The old orthodoxy could no longer survive without the addition of modern elements. Busson concludes: "Le Thomisme est mort, de la ruine de l'Aristotélisme et de sa propre caducité . . . Il se survit encore plus ou moins pur ou dilué dans la nouvelle philosophie dans les manuels scolaires, toujours lents à faire connaître les nouveautés." (*op. cit.*, p. 302).

BOOK REVIEWS

Faith, Reason, and Existence: An Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy of Religion. By JOHN A. HUTCHISON. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. vii, 306 pp. $4.50.

This is an interesting interpretation of the meaning of religion and of its relations to philosophy and science. The author, who inclines toward the views of Paul Tillich and the Niebuhrs, also refers frequently to other well known contemporary religious writers, notably Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, William Temple, Martin Buber. These and a variety of other philosophers and theologians are quoted on their views are summarized when it is felt that they can provide needed illumination on a point under discussion. Professor Hutchison has managed to bring together many insights and stimulating ideas, some of them from writers he opposes. But he has included so many digests, excerpts, and synopses of other points of view that his book has somewhat the character of a compendium or handbook.

Professor Hutchison sees the task of a philosophy of religion as "the evaluation or testing of religious and theological statements." After outlining several alternative methods of accomplishing this task, such as the method of authority, the method of intuition, the method of rationalism, and the empirical method, he decides in favor of what he calls the *existential* method, which, in his opinion, combines the virtues of the other methods without the disadvantage of being limited to only one type of human experience. The trouble with the empirical method, according to Hutchison, is that some of its practitioners interpret it to mean that only sense data are admissible as evidence, with the consequence that their philosophy does not amount to much, while others are willing to accept "data of open and public experience defined in some more inclusive, but more ambiguous way." Professor Hutchison contends that "the wider views of experience assumed by some philosophers who call themselves empirical appear hopelessly ambiguous. In this usage of the term, he asks, "are not all serious philosophers 'empirical'?" I presume his critique would apply to such empiricists, among others, as Peirce, James, Dewey; and after reading his criticism, I looked forward hopefully to his description of the *existential* method. Perhaps here at last I would find that elusive

conception, broad enough to do justice to the wealth of human experience, but free from the ambiguity and uncertainty that has clouded and plagued the definitions of empiricists. Professor Hutchison's definition is as follows: ". . . experience might be defined . . . as the encounter of the human self and the world. A fact is anything *given* in that encounter. Some facts will be easily apprehended and tested; others are obscure and hard to get at, and even harder to verify. These difficulties, however, do not excuse us from making the effort." In an encounter, we are told, the self is active,—it is no piece of wax on which experience is impressed.

But this is nothing new, surely. I realize that a certain magic attaches to the term "encounter" nowadays. But just why an *encounter* is more enlightening or less ambiguous than an *experience* is not explained. A fact, he says, is anything *given* in an encounter. But does the existential method provide some touchstone for distinguishing the genuine from the spurious, or the *real* experience from the dream? If not, what has been gained by adopting the *existential* method in which the self *encounters* the world, in place of the "empirical method" which, I take it, is Hutchison's pejorative synonym for "the methods of science."

Professor Hutchison announces, at the end of Chapter I, that he intends to practice the existential method and that "religious propositions will be validated or disproven by reference to the facts of human existence as they may be perceived in the active encounter of self and world." But what is a religious proposition and how can one validate or disprove it? A religious statement is described in a variety of ways; its object is to express or communicate *ultimate* meaning. Such meaning is conveyed by means of myths. In fact, religious thinking *is* mythical thinking. "Wherever the human mind orients itself to the ultimate problems of man's nature or destiny by means of poetic symbols, there myth comes into being. Such a definition covers phenomena as various as the myths of Plato, the Genesis creation story, and such modern systems of belief as Marxism or the idea of progress, (p. 55)." Another popular myth, called "scientism," is the one which takes science as "a total scheme of life orientation." The statements of *scientism,* according to Professor Hutchison, are themselves extra-scientific, and *not verifiable,* but have the religious purpose of providing life-orientation for adherents of this faith. Genuinely scien-

tific statements are "definitely verifiable." The gist of these remarks would seem to be that there is a dichotomy. Scientific statements are verifiable, but religious statements are myths, or "poetic depictions of ultimate reality," (Niebuhr) and not verifiable. The author appears to believe that although religious statements are not verifiable, they can be validated or disproven by the existential method. But how can you disprove a myth, or validate a poem?

Since religion, according to Tillich and Hutchison, is an object of ultimate concern, we must find out what 'ultimate' means if we are to understand religion. Every man, as he lives his life, develops a certain structure or pattern of assumptions,—propositions that he is ready to accept on trust or faith. Many of these have no particular religious significance. But if you examine the pattern, you will find one assumption which is ultimate or absolute. ("Ultimate" and "Absolute" are used practically as synonyms.) "It is ultimate or absolute," as Professor Hutchison explains, (p. 107), "in the experience of the person holding it, in at least three senses of the words. (a) It carries life and death seriousness. Upon it one ventures one's life . . . (b) It is also absolute in the sense of being the final ground or basis for justifying or validating the other assumptions a person makes. It is derived from no further assumption. (c) Its field of application is the whole of one's experience. It is unlimited in its extension." Since religious propositions are directed to the ultimate, and are the basis for justifying or validating the other assumptions we make, it would seem to follow that they are not themselves susceptible of being validated, but must be among our fundamental articles of faith. It is not clear, therefore, what Professor Hutchison meant, when, announcing his intention to practice the existential method, he said that religious propositions would be *validated* or *disproven* by reference to the facts of human existence.

According to the definition of religion offered here, a man's religion will be whatever he is fundamentally committed to. His basic assumptions about human life and the world constitute his religion. Karl Marx attacked religion, but Hutchison says that Marxism is a religion. A scientist may say he has no use for religion, but if he believes the only important questions are scientific questions and that only scientists really understand what they are talking about, then he has a religion, whether he knows it or not, and it is called by the rather

unpleasant name of "scientism." If a historian asserts that only in history can one find *ultimate* truths, then I suppose his religion is "historicism." Freud, who had some unkind things to say about religion, probably never thought of psychoanalysis as a religion, but it was for him and is now for many others a "total scheme of life-orientation," that is to say, a religion.

It is not surprising to find Professor Hutchison saying that (p. 28) *"all philosophies have religious foundations and all religions have philosophic implications,"* since this is a direct consequence of his definition of religion. Philosophy has religious foundations because religion has been defined as the concern with the ultimate, or foundational beliefs of man. In spite of their varying interpretations of what is ultimate, all philosophers have had to accept some beliefs as basic, or ultimate. And it is in terms of these basic beliefs that their other beliefs are explained or justified. This applies not only to the philosophers mentioned by the author, such as Augustine, Aquinas, Spinoza, and Hegel, but also to Descartes, Hume, and even to Russell and Wittgenstein. However, in italicizing his assertion that all philosophies have religious foundations, Professor Hutchison indicates that he attaches special importance to it. I would agree that the proposition is important (and in need of demonstration!) if religion were understood in the sense of traditional religion, or some form of theism, for example. But since he means by religion that which is of ultimate concern to man, his assertion is truistic. And it will not do to infer that since philosophy has religious foundations in Tillich's sense of "religious," that therefore it has religious foundations, where "religious" or "religion" is understood in a more popular sense, as for example, where religion is thought to connote theism, or supernaturalism. Not that the author actually makes such an inference. But he does alternate between his special sense of the term "religion" and other more usual meanings of the term. For example, in the same context as his assertion about philosophy's religious foundations, he says: ". . . it is one of the great tragedies of the present time to see philosophy and religion so completely divorced from each other." Here the reader cannot help wondering how they can be so "completely divorced" from each other if *all* philosophies have religious foundations and *all* religions have philosophic implications.

One danger of giving a common word an uncommon meaning is

that what was a difficult problem or controversial issue when stated in terms of the old meaning may become temptingly easy to "resolve" if we substitute the new meaning and merely make explicit what we have put into our definition. I will give another illustration of this danger. In discussing the relation of religion and ethics, the author first states some of the well known views. There is, for example, what he calls the policeman theory, (p. 278)

"that religion is needed as an ulterior sanction for ethics. This doctrine of rewards and punishments," he says, "was popular in the eighteenth century, but a modern variant, widely expressed in conventional religious circles, argues that such moral processes and ideals as democracy can be maintained only if supported by faith in God. Another contention frequently heard is that there is a long-range relation between religion and ethics comparable to the roots and fruits of a plant. Thus it is argued that current autonomous or humanistic ethics may be compared to cut flowers—beautiful while they last but unable creatively to reproduce themselves for lack of religious rootage. This view raises difficult and complicated problems on which facile dogmatism of any sort is not helpful."

It seems clear that the author is here using the terms "religious" and "religion" in their older sense, and that he has in mind a traditional religion, such as Judaism or Christianity. He recognizes that the question as to whether ethics can stand on its own feet or whether it requires "religious rootage" is a difficult question and one that raises complicated problems.

But on the very next page (p. 279), he writes: "Still a further interpretation of the relation between religion and ethics may be stated. From a theistic point of view all serious human valuation is of religious significance." Religious in what sense? Any serious human valuation will be concerned with some fundamental human value. A fundamental value is one in which the individual places his trust. He relies on it to "give him his bearings or orientation in existence," which is another way of saying that it is an object of ultimate concern. This establishes its religious significance. *Ergo,* there can be no ethics without religion. Or as he puts it elsewhere (p. 288), "The source of moral values lies in faith. In this sense, all ethics is religious either consciously or unconsciously." But what has become of the "difficult and complicated problems" that confront one who would decide this question? Has it been shown that all ethics is necessarily theological? Or that an autonomous ethics is destined to be short lived because it

must draw its sustenance from theological roots? The author never actually says that he has shown this. But I find his oscillation, within the same context, between the two quite different senses of religion most disconcerting.

To point out that on Tillich's definition of religion, ethical decisions have religious significance does not bear on the controversial question that the author has been discussing as to the relation of ethics and religion (in the older sense). It would be relevant if he held that one who is religious in Tillich's sense is also necessarily religious in the commonly accepted sense of the term. But the author does not believe this. In fact he has already said (p. 159) that "the definition of religion as 'ultimate concern' or 'ultimate meaning' was deliberately formulated to include the faith of the ostensibly nonreligious or irreligious person as well as the religious." And again, on p. 211, he makes the point that in Tillich's meaning men are inescapably religious because, as Tillich puts it, ". . . religion is ultimate concern; it is the state of being grasped by something unconditional, holy, absolute." I can only conclude that when Professor Hutchison said that he would give "a still further interpretation of the relation between religion and ethics," he was misstating the case without realizing it. For, in changing from one meaning of religion to another, he was actually changing the subject under discussion. The old problems and difficulties were not solved or resolved; they were simply ignored.

Professor Hutchison describes his view as a philosophy of realism. To explain what he means by *realism,* I will cite a brief quotation from his book. On p. 18 he says:

> "In addition to analogy, we must take brief notice of paradox as a characteristic of philosophic thinking. Particularly among followers of Soren Kierkegaard it is an important philosophic category. A paradox may be defined as an apparent contradiction. The facts which our minds discover often exhibit apparent contradictions, but often further reflection upon the new fact in relation to fundamental postulates removes or resolves the paradox. The apparent contradiction is shown not to be a real contradiction.
>
> It is the heart of Kierkegaard's position that among certain fundamental religious facts such as the relation of God to the world or the incarnation of God in Christ, according to the historic Christian tradition, contradiction is not so easily removed. God, understood by historic Christianity, is both 'in' history and 'above' history. Moreover the transcendent God becomes incarnate in a man, Jesus Christ!

What shall be our attitude toward such persistent paradoxes? According to the philosophy of realism here espoused, the first and deepest loyalty of the mind is to the facts, however paradoxical an aspect they may wear. A fact should never be suppressed or forced to conform to our notions of coherence. This was Procrustes' method with facts that did not fit his assumptions! It is also imperative, however, to make the further assumption that what appears thus contradictory to our human minds is not ultimately so. Theistic thinkers assume that even though the world may seem riddled with paradox to man, there are no contradictions in the mind of God. Some such assumption seems essential to rationality, and indeed to sanity."

The author's statement that there are no contradictions in the mind of God is not likely to arouse opposition. But in a chapter devoted to expounding the method and task of a philosophy of religion, such a statement would seem to the reviewer to be a useless, if harmless, tautology. Whatever is in the mind of God must occur to the mind of man before it becomes an object for study by the philosophy of religion. Now, as far as the mind of man is concerned, Professor Hutchison says that what appear to be contradictions *often* turn out to be merely apparent, but not genuine contradictions. It seems plausible to infer that, in his view, what looks like a contradiction *sometimes* turns out to be a contradiction. As a matter of fact, he seems to hold that certain other views, e.g. strict determinism and behaviorism (p. 71) and scientism (p. 245, 257) are untenable because they are self-contradictory. But in the above quotation he also says:

"it is also imperative . . . to make the further assumption that what appears thus contradictory to our human minds is not ultimately so."

This needs explanation. If it is meant simply as a heuristic principle: "Let us not be content with contradictions, but always try to resolve them," there could be no objection. But since there is no guarantee of success, we must leave open the possibility that human interpretations of history, science, or religion will be found to contain contradictions, and not merely paradoxes. To believe otherwise is to assume that the human mind has an immunity to contradictions, an assumption which would fly in the face of the facts of human history and psychology. And the author has quite properly warned us of the danger of forcing the facts to fit our assumption.

A number of important ideas are touched upon by Professor Hutchison, but not developed. Perhaps his fundamental thesis is

that "the theistic hypothesis" is not only viable but preferable to alternative views such as monism, naturalism, agnosticism, atheism (see esp. p. 157). Yet this whole subject is treated *en passant* without a systematic examination of the alternatives or a clear statement of the author's reasons for preferring the theistic hypothesis. He does say that theism offers a better explanation of the self and of the relation of body to spirit. But the treatment of these subjects is mainly by brief excerpts from the writings of others, e.g. Paul Tillich, without the full explanation which the importance of the subject warrants. Also, the author fails to consider certain well-known alternative views. For example, the naturalistic position of Santayana is ignored; and Santayana himself is only briefly referred to once on a minor issue. Humanism receives almost no notice. Erich Fromm and Felix Adler are not mentioned.[1] And other notable omissions could be cited.

I don't want to appear captious but I'm afraid I could not state what the author means by "the theistic hypothesis." I would like to explain why I have this difficulty. There is an interesting quotation which the author cites from H. Richard Niebuhr's *The Meaning of Revelation* (p. 117):

". . . Man as a practical, living being never exists without a god or gods; some things there are to which he must cling as the sources and goals of his activity, the centers of value. As a rule men are polytheists, referring now to this and now to that valued being as the source of life's meaning. Sometimes they live for Jesus' God, sometimes for country and sometimes for Yale. For the most part they make gods out of themselves or out of the work of their own hands, living for their own glory as persons and as communities. In any case the faith that life is worth living and the definite reference of life's meaning to specific beings or values is as inescapable a part of human existence as the activity of reason. . . . The standpoint of faith, of a self directed toward gods or God, and the standpoint of practical reason, of a self with values and with a destiny, are not incompatible; they are probably identical. To be a self is to have a god; to have a god is to have history, that is, events connected in a meaningful pattern. . . ."

Similarly, Professor Hutchison writes (p. 119):

"As Martin Luther wrote, 'What does it mean to have a god, or what is God?' And he answered, '. . . the confidence and faith of the heart alone

[1] Erich Fromm's *Man for Himself* is included in one of the Chapter bibliographies.

make both God and an idol. . . . For the two, faith and God have inevitable connection. . . . Whatever your heart clings to and confides in, that is really your God. . . ."

In the light of these quotations, I think we must say that there is no such thing as "*the* theistic hypothesis." There are many theistic hypotheses, as many as there are gods that men have believed in or lived for. The author has nowhere stated explicitly what his own theistic hypothesis is. It would be of some interest to know where he stands, for example, on the question of supernaturalism. In one of the very few references to the subject in his book (p. 111) he seems quite critical of the idea that there is a "supernatural communication from God to man of information necessary for man's salvation." Yet, from his close support and reliance on the views of Reinhold Niebuhr we might surmise that he accepts the view of God as the supernatural embodiment of truth and goodness and the source of human truth and goodness. But the nearest he comes to expressing such a view is a statement like the following (p. 194):

"It is equally important to the biblical view that the will of the transcendent God *alone* imparts ultimate meaning to history . . ." (author's italics).

How much of "the biblical view" does the author accept? And how does he interpret it? Is it mythical? In part, or all of it? Since a myth cannot explain itself, it is up to the theologian to explain its signification and its significance. This is, admittedly, a most difficult task when one takes the whole field of religion as his province.

I have selected only a few controversial issues for comment in this review. It should not be inferred from the strictures expressed here that I didn't find many wise and illuminating remarks on a variety of subjects, including the meaning of revelation, the two types of atheism (Chap. V, Sec. V), the relation of faith and reason, and the problem of evil (I liked especially the author's forthright statement that "after all the 'solutions' are considered, we must plainly state that the problem of evil is unsolved.")

One must be grateful to the author for helping to dispel even a little of the dense fog that has long surrounded this important area of man's concern.

DANIEL J. BRONSTEIN

The City College

The Art Of Indian Asia. By Heinrich Zimmer, completed and edited by Joseph Campbell. New York: Bollingen Series, XXXIX, Pantheon, 1955. 2 vols. pp. xvii, 614: 48 plates, 10 figures. $22.50.

Within the past ten years there has been a procession of handsome books on the art of India. Handbooks and monographs, regional studies, archaeological reports, picture books and outlines have brought the wonder of Indian achievement to a wider audience than ever before. Thanks to new techniques in photography and the excellence of the printed word, and to the opening up of areas that once were inaccesible, masterpieces that formerly were mysteries may now be enjoyed by people all over the world. The publication of *The Art of Indian Asia* is the crowning accomplishment of a decade, holding high place with the most important landmarks in Indian studies.

For Professor Joseph Campbell it marks, literally, the fulfillment of ten years of devotion to a cause and to a person. He has dedicated himself during that time to the editing and publication of notes left by the eminent late Professor Heinrich Zimmer whose brilliant contribution to Asiatic philosophy and art has thus been made available to a grateful public. This superb two volume work, number XXXIX in the Bollingen Series, is the most fitting tribute that could be offered to Dr. Zimmer. Such selfless action is always touching, and in this instance it is particularly appropriate that it has been associated with the culture of India, for nobility of spirit is deep-rooted there. The editor, the author of the original notes, and the art have much in common, and the rest of the world is richer for such a collaboration.

One must not omit the photographers in praising the books, for they have brought to our eyes both the grandeur and the exquisite detail of monuments great and small. If one has had the pleasure of visiting the lands in the large complex called Indian Asia, where the arts of the past form the visible bridge to the present, there will be the joy of recognition as one excellent photograph follows another. Whether one has been there or not, the photographs are exciting. The glare of the hot sun on a shimmering wall, or the cool darkness of an inner sanctuary will come to mind while studying the plates. The photographers must have stood on precipes, hung from scaffoldings, and lain flat on the back beneath many a carved ceiling to capture their shots. They must have waited hours for the proper light to

illumine a corner, or a whole structure. Patience, and artistry, and careful planning were required for such results—and the help of local people. One's thanks must go also to the archaeologists, curators, and guardians who did their utmost in the undertaking. To all armchair travelers and students in quiet libraries, a path is opened, vistas are spread before their eyes that they might never have seen had they actually been on the spot, for details and enlargements focus attention on aspects of beauty that would escape the average observer. Now they are gathered together, a wealth of material for research scholars to use for years to come, a delight for everyone.

The two volumes complement each other in their richness; words and pictures form a balanced whole. If, for instance, one looks at a photograph of Vishnu as the cosmic boar, and wonders why the animal head is joined to the kingly human form, and why a beautiful woman is standing in his hand, lifted above waves and lotus, adored by serpentine deities, he may be sure that a full interpretation is given, and in language that he can understand. Gods and demi-gods, heroes and rogues, all are introduced in such a way that names, qualifications and attributes are clearly described. A romanized version of the original nomenclature is translated, and the religious, literary or mythological significance is explained. The organization of the text was undertaken with the utmost regard for readability and convenience; thanks to the copious index and marginal notations the reader may turn quickly from one volume to the other, from one monument to related material, yet the thread of thought is not interrupted by long footnotes. The research scholar may find his goal without difficulty, but the amateur will not be distracted by obtrusive excursions in the text. This, in itself, is a notable achievement when one considers the intricacy of Indian iconography and the abundance of art in the vast territory encompassed in the scope of the authors.

The very nature of the project would not allow equal coverage to each area and period; from that point of view, the performance is uneven. Beginning with the Indus Valley culture of the third millenium B.C., the development of pre-Moslem Indian art is traced through the centuries, as regional styles flowered under religious patronage and royal encouragement, following the tide of history. A chronological chart and a map of principal sites allows the reader to follow the broad outline of the complex story in India. A relief map of Asia

brings into focus the geographic relationship of peripheral lands to the subcontinent and trans-Himālaya regions. A separate chronological chart summarizes the high periods of production in Ceylon, Burma, Java, Annam, Cambodia and Thailand, with an art map of southeast Asia to guide the reader from Anurādhapura to Bangkok.

Pre-historic Indus Valley culture, fascinating though it is, has been rather briefly discussed. Only those ideas and forms that will emerge again in later historical phases are emphasized, not the whole aspect of life in Mohenjo-daro, Chandhu-daro and Harappā. Some of the best examples of sculpture are reproduced, and impressions taken from the most significant seals, a few toys, a vase, and two architectural views. Tree and serpent worship, the Mother Goddess, and fertility cults are dealt with at some length, with comparative material brought in from the Mediterranean area and Europe.

Abstract symbols of fertility, the male *liṅgam* and the female *yoni* remained in constant use in India, where one may still see them as objects of worship at the foot of a sacred tree, or in a medieval temple. A carved likeness of a deity in human form often occupies a single shrine with the prehistoric phallic cone and circle. The author explains the juxtaposition thus, "the human or animal aspect, emerging from the darkness of the shrine, stepping forward, as it were, out of the formless matter of the rock wall, supplies a model for the devotee, showing him how to visualize the auspicious presence before whom he is bowing. Such a figure is known as the 'likeness' (*pratimā*) and is regarded as a merely momentary of temporary apparition—a mask that the divine being has voluntarily assumed to make manifest some particular aspect of his divine nature and to fulfill a particular task. It constitutes a partial, one-sided glimpse of the god's infinitude, suggesting only one inflection of the totality of his supreme essence. It is but one of his numerous ephemeral gestures or attitudes, these being the visual counterparts of his many sentiments and moods. Such 'likenesses' can be grouped in two opposing classes: (1) the benevolent (*dakṣiṇa*) which answers prayers, grants wishes, bestows security and peace: and (2) the terrific (*ghora*) which threatens disaster and brandishes weapons of many kinds, exhibiting terrible countenances and attitudes. All are inflections of a single timeless essence, beyond change and event: and that immovable, immutable, fundamental,

eternal essence is what is symbolized in the rigid, silent form of the *liṅgam-yoni.*"

Some of the most eloquent passages of the book are inspired by the Indian ideal of feminine beauty, and the photographs, almost pulsating with life, bear out Dr. Zimmer's words. The tenderness of motherhood, the grace of dancing girl, cloud deity, and dryad, the ascetic austerities of a Durgā intent on attracting the attention of Lord Siva, the brooding voluptuousness of the lover, are described in word and picture as each tale unfolds. All kinds of male personages, too, are portrayed, including potbellied *yakshas,* serpent *nagas,* portal guardians, Kings of the Four Directions, heroes of the Āryan and post-Āryan periods, princely donors, meditating yogis, leaders of religious sects (such as the aloof Jain saviours), demi-gods, and the presiding deities of Buddhist and Hindu pantheons. True to a basic concept in Indian philosophy and the Indian way of life, the animal kingdom receives the same careful treatment as the world of men. Animals and birds, both real and fabulous, whether as vehicles for the gods and symbol of superhuman power, or as central image and ornamental adjunct, come in for their own interpretations and share of praise. With his penetrating analyses the author reveals both inner meaning and outer beauty that would escape the casual observer.

He thinks of these primarily in terms of sculpture, the real hero of the book; the most exciting and unusual photographs portray plastic form, and the work of carvers and metal-casters takes precedence over painting and architecture. In contrast to the Greek (and Western) pre-occupation with the outer aspect of the visual world, he explains that:

"both human organism and the animal are experienced in Indian sculpture from within. Welling from an interior life center, a current pervades and animates the body, pressing out against the surface and pervading the sensitively modeled limbs. The frame created by the profile and its outline is not allowed to predominate over the body substance; the material itself gives up its quality of stone or metal and is transubstantiated into life. This particular miracle of Indian sculpture is first made evident to us in the animal symbols of Mohenjo-daro."

It is continued, milleniums later, in masterpieces of the Maurya, Āndhra, Gupta and Medieval periods. One factor that gives rise to

dramatic narrative sculpture in India was the minor role played by the art of writing:

"India never invented any of her later (post-Indus Valley) alphabets, but received them all from the Near East, either directly or through the mediation of Persia. The Brāhmans from the time of their entrance into India until long after the opening of the Buddhist era, handed down their sacred Vedas orally; and the majority of the Buddhist traditions contained in the Pāli canon (which go back, in part at least, to the Buddha's lifetime in the fifth century B.C.) were also oral until circa 80 B.C. when they were committed to writing by the order of a king of Ceylon (outside the bounds of India proper). The still more ancient traditions of the Jains found their way into writing even later. And among the Brāhmans to this day the oral authority of the living teacher, the *guru* who knows by heart the whole encyclopedia of his sacred lore, is regarded as superior to that of even the most honored manuscripts . . . Writing was never an intrinsic part of the holy revelation and the sacred tradition; following its introduction during the first centuries of the first millenium B.C., it remained for a very long time merely a practical technical device, endowed with no character of sanctity or higher meaning. This accounts for the utter freedom with which the Indian sculptural tradition could evolve its own forms, producing works of an exquisitely refined realism, never stylized to conform to some hieratic script . . . Abundant freedom, buoyant vitality, and a superb realization of plastic values are tellingly evident. The Indian artist could visualize and express an ideal of organic life, flowing with a gentle yet rich vitality that transformed the austere, stern, and silent matter of stone to something resilient, swinging, full of music and the breath of life—much more like blossoms or fruit swelling with sweet juice than the hard, solid matter out of which they were carved."

Stories in stone took the place of the book in the early phases of development. The function of the image was described in later treatises on sculpture. It was a utensil, a vessel designed to receive and hold a charge of consciousness, of breath, projected from himself by a meditating devotee:

"The form has to function technically, that is to say, in the actual crisis of a psychological transference." The inner vision the worshipper and the figure of wood, clay, or stone must conform strictly to the correct vision of the god as rendered in the orthodox tradition; it must be flawless. The sculptor should be a pious man, a member of the upper castes, learned in the śilpaśāstras (the 32 craft manuals based on oral directions handed down from early days), and the Vedic mantras. He should work in solitude or with another artist; a layman must not be present. His spirit should be that of a devotee "invoking and contemplating the form of the gods in daily worship,

for the image sustains the presence of the god, the aspect through which he is made manifest before the inner vision of the worshipper who longs to behold him."

After a period of meditation, he would proceed to give form to the inner vision, never following a direct or immediate model or actual object. His was an inherited calling, not one of his own choosing; he should remain anonymous, trained in a guild system wherein he must be typical of his own kind, rather than as an individual expressing himself. The hundreds of examples in volume II, taken from the high periods of artistic expression, allow the reader to see the result of this unique approach to plastic rendering of form.

By comparison, much less space in text and illustration is alloted to architecture. There are no plans, elevations or scale drawings. He does, however, explain the symbolism of the temple as a home of the god on earth, with pavilions, terraces, pools and gardens laid out in a scheme attuned to cosmic order in an auspicious place. Such is the Kailāsanātha of Elūrā, representing man's vision of Śiva's home atop a silver peak of the Himālaya range; it was hewn out of a cliff in the period between A.D. 750-850, but one cannot properly speak of it as construction, for it was not built up piece by piece, it was cut from the top down, to a depth of a hundred feet when the central monolithic mass was isolated, a block 276 feet long and 154 feet wide, from which the various parts of the temple then were carved and decorated.

Another mountain, Sumeru, is described as the model for the north Indian temple tower and associated sanctuaries. It is the mythological quadrangular axis in the center of the earth's surface, the heart of an egg-shaped cosmos, on whose jewelled slopes many divine beings live together. Still another type of structure is modeled upon the chariots of the gods, huge cars of infinite dimensions that fly through the heavens and move at will, "like some vast air liner in the stratosphere, or rather a whole fleet of such liners with passengers soaring back and forth between. It is a heavenly caravan of residences for innumerable celestial inmates, all enjoying the presence of the god; and as such the full constellation—comprising the kingly capital in circumference, with countless buildings, towers and pavilions—may be thought of as supported by the god's vehicle." The 13th century Temple of the Sun at Koṇārak, with huge stone wheels carved in relief in the base, was one of the most ambitious representations of the chariot-temple.

In southern India may be seen the small star-shaped shrines of the Hoyśala Dynasty near Mysore, and the towering *gopuras* of the Tamil country in the Madras area. The latter are the final expression of the builders' art before a period of stagnation set in after the seventeenth century. Structure, however, always shares honors with surface decoration, or is smothered by it; one is more impressed by the number of joyous attendants, dancing girls, and loving couples than the architectural framework.

From her seaports and cities India sent emigrants to neighboring lands. In the third century B.C. the Emperor Aśoka sent Buddhist missionaries to the Mediterranean, and overland to China, and his own son went to Ceylon to install relics of the Buddha and to spread his gospel. Princes, teachers, traders and craftsmen went out to Java, Cambodia, Thailand, Annam, Burma, Nepal and Tibet, taking the core of Indian philosophy and art with them. Hinduism and Buddhism took root in Greater India, and from the roots new growth appeared, transformed by geographic conditions, indigenous beliefs, and the temperament of the local people.

A Buddhist stūpa rose in the volcanic stone of Java, more magnificent than any in the mother country, the famous Borobuḍur of the eighth century. Professor Zimmer devotes many eloquent passages to its symbolism and sculpture, and the photographs supplement his words. In the heart of the jungle country of Cambodia there was created a city-temple, home of the king who was the earthly incarnation of a god, the Aṅgkor Thoṁ, whose four-sided towers were adorned with giant faces looking out into endless avenues of space and time. Nearby, the Aṅgkor Wāt and sister temples were dedicated to Vishnu or the Buddha, and the familiar guardians, heroes and deities took on the character of Khmer culture. Authors and photographers again join in a superb presentation.

There is a sympathetic approach to the other areas of Indian Asia, but not the persuasive enthusiasm of the earlier chapters. Complex and subtle forms inspired Dr. Zimmer more than the simple and the serene. His sensitiveness of observation and his impressive knowledge of iconography were challenged more by the elaborate, abundant art of India and the colonial styles that stemmed from it than by the quiet grandeur of Hinayāna Buddhist monuments of Ceylon, Thailand and Burma. The art of painting receives little more than a passing nod in

an appendix that was added later to fulfill the promise implicit in the title. If the reader expects to find any Islamic monuments of India or Java, he will be sorely disappointed, for, like Ananda Coomaraswamy and Benjamin Rowland, these authors do not consider mosques, mausoleums, Moghul miniatures and palaces as part of "Indian Art."

Within the chosen orbit designated as "Indian Asia" the brevity of discussion, and of space, alloted to Burma is particularly regrettable. When commenting on Bengal, in its "geographical position between Nepal and Tibet in the north, and Java to the southeast . . ." Burma is ignored, yet their borders touch, and Burmese art in one phase was almost an extension of Bengali art of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. When speaking of the Mahābodhi Temple of Bodhgayā, still a center for Buddhist pilgrims in India, restoration of the structure is discussed, but there is no mention of the Burmese kings who supplied funds and workmen at a critical time when there was no interest in it in India. In describing the famous Burmese temple in Pagan, the Ānanda, we are told that it "is of a brilliant white stone with pinnacles of gold," though it is, like the majority of stūpas and temples in Pagan, constructed of brick covered with plaster. Only two edifices of the 5,000 in Pagan are illustrated, and nothing significant is said about those of Pegu, Ava, Mandalay, or Rangoon. There are comments on a few pieces of Burmese sculpture, but no stylistic development (such as in the study of Cambodia and Thailand). Mural paintings and manuscripts of both Thailand and Burma were apparently unknown to the authors. Photographs of Burmese art came from archives outside of the mother country, and that, in itself, helps to explain the omissions. For many years conditions in Burma have not been favorable for travel, research, and photography except to a devoted few. Articles have appeared in learned journals, but little has been said in general books on southeast Asian culture. Dr. Gordon Luce of Rangoon University has prepared a text on architecture that will fill a gap, and other steps are being taken to encourage study and publication of Burmese monuments. Our comments are not offered in a spirit of criticism, but to call attention to a situation that has made Burma almost a terra incognita, and kept her from taking her rightful place among her sister nations.

There is one matter in which the authors are at variance with recent scholarly opinion. In speaking of the Kuṣāns and their King Kaniṣka

of the second century A.D., reference is made to a "Mongoloid people, the Yüeh-chi" and to the "Mongolian strain in their royal portrait statues" among which the portrait of Kaniṣka "reveals how the Mongoloid invaders from the north, out of their barbaric juvenility brought forth an art expression of their own." This portrait is mutilated, a headless figure standing erect, a broadsword forming a vertical axis from waist to feet, clad in a fitted coat. This kind of frontal view of a monarch was known in earlier Persian and Parthian art, and is not an invention of Kuṣāna sculptors; the fitted coat with tight sleeves, the broad belt and sword, even the big boots, may be seen in Parthian and Iranian sculpture. The visage of Kaniṣka was stamped on his coins, and adorned the casket, now in the Peshawar Museum, that once was buried beneath the great stūpa he dedicated to the Buddha. His features are not at all Mongoloid; his long face and very prominent nose are of the Āryan type common to Iran and certain parts of Central Asia. Eminent scholars are still discussing the Yüeh-chi-Kuṣān problem; much information has come from Iranian sources, and the physical evidence of coinage-portraiture and sculpture should rule out the designation of "Mongoloid" for the "people of the moon." The challenge of the problem serves to point up the need for the study of comparative materials gathered from all peripheral areas, where the written word and the testimony of monuments may be scrutinized by qualified scholars who will join together to pool the knowledge of their several disciplines.

For all who love the people and the art of southeast Asia the joint undertaking of Professors Zimmer and Campbell, their photographers and other assistants, has been of inestimable worth. It was a monumental task, but the results justify their dream, for between the covers of these two volumes one may find hours of enchantment.

Jane Gaston Mahler

Columbia University

Mythes, rêves et mystères. By Mircea Eliade. Paris: Librairie Gallimard 1957. 310 pp. 750 fr.

The book we are here considering is not a systematic treatise. *Mythes, rêves et mystères,* like the earlier *Images et symboles: essais*

sur le symbolisme magico-religieux (Paris, 1952), is a collection of studies which originally made their appearance in divers journals and were addressed to audiences sometimes differing widely in their expectations and preconceptions. In spite of their variety, however, the essays collected here are recognizably the product of a single enquiring spirit; their unity depends not as the author claims, on a central subject-matter to which each of them alludes, namely, the relationship of the dynamic of the unconscious psyche to religious structures of myth and ritual, but rather on the author's primary concern with the *morphology* of the sacred and the opposing natures of profane and mythical time.

Neither this volume nor *Images et symboles* is harmed by its fluidity of content and absence of a single organizing theme. Indeed, both are enriched. I would recommend them, taken together, as the best introduction, for the intelligent "common reader," to the new world of Eliade's thought. They afford matter of interest to the scientific student of primitive religions, the philosopher, the cultural historian, the mythographer, the depth psychologist, the theologian, even the literary critic, and, above all, to the reflective man or woman who is seeking to apprehend *meaning* in the past and in the flux of his own life.

Mythes, rêves et mystères consists of nine essays and a foreword. The foreword, programmatically important here as in *Images et symboles,* outlines the author's position as to the proper and mutually useful relationship which should obtain between depth psychology (especially that of the Zürich school, which seems to Eliade most obviously relevant in this context) and the comparative study of religions. Just as literary critics are today concerned to establish the autonomy of their discipline and warn against the trap of the genetic fallacy in art set for students of literature by certain psychoanalysts, so Eliade emphasizes the danger of confusing the respective disciplines of the psychologist and of the scientific historian of religions. While admitting and even stressing the coherence of all human activity, he cautions against ontologically confounding the dream and the myth by reducing them to an easy equivalence as products of the unconscious psyche. Constitutive dimensions of the Myth, he insists, are that it is always *exemplary* and *universal,* referring always to the *real* and the *sacred.* Although individual dreams may contain mythical material, more ex-

actly, oneiric homologues of mythic structures, they are, by definition, not lived by the whole being of man. While a dream-image may, by its intrinsic energy-value, restore equilibrium to a disturbed psyche and thus implement the rescue from the unconscious of a split-off fragment of individual personality, dreams cannot, by their very nature, make the demand for total engagement which is characteristic of the Myth.

As the foreword notes, the problem of the relationship between manifestations of unconscious psychic activity such as the dream and symptomatic behavior, and structures of religious symbolism is taken up most attentively in the sixth chapter, on "Symbolisms of Ascension and 'Awakened-Dreams'." The technique of the "*rêve éveillé*" associated with the French psychotherapist R. Desoille, like the Jungian "active imagination," is essentially a means of effecting a confrontation between the ego and heretofore unconscious contents of the psyche by means of spontaneous though directed images. Desoille asks most frequently of his patients, Eliade notes, that they phantasy themselves as ascending a staircase or climbing a mountain. He relates this imagery to the mythical motifs of the magical flight and ascension and concludes that everywhere, on different but phenomenologically linked planes, a pattern of such symbolism refers to the break-up of a "petrified" situation which makes possible passage to a new mode of being. He finds that the kind of reductive explanation whereby a religious symbol in its developed condition is explained solely by reference to its germinal form or to its homologue in psychotherapy or individual psychology is always insufficient, and that ultimately reference to metaphysics cannot be avoided.

Three essays on "The Myth of the Noble Savage," "Nostalgia for Paradise in Primitive Traditions," and "Sense-Experience and Mystical Experience among Primitives" are offshoots of Eliade's detailed studies of shamanism and primitive religion. Although highly interesting, they do not incorporate much material new to students of anthropology. Followers of Lovejoy in the exploration of the history of ideas should be stimulated by viewing similar idea-complexes in non-European civilizations and by the author's account of "nostalgia for the primitive" among the primitives themselves. For psychologists there is a fascinating comparison of the uses made by the "noble sav-

age," the yogi, and the psychoanalyst, of memory as a curative agent and healing power.

Among the essays most important to scholars of comparative religion and anthropologists are those which were originally delivered as talks at the Eranos Conferences, "Power and Sacrality in the History of Religions," "*Terra Mater* and Cosmic Hierogamies," and "Mysteries and Spiritual Regeneration." Although they are quite comprehensible to the lay reader, they assume a general knowledge of previous theoretical formulations used as heuristic hypotheses in the sociology, psychology, and anthropology of religion. In "Power and Sacrality" Eliade takes up such broad but inescapable topics as the nature of mana, the question of priority in time of categories of divinity, the opposition between "supreme beings" and fertility gods and goddesses, and the historical tension between the numinous and the sacred Person. "*Terra Mater* and Cosmic Hierogamies" attempts to shed light on the whole vexing question of the meaning to be ascribed to the matriarchal complex in the history of primitive cultures. Here as always Eliade evidences common sense and humility before the richness of the facts to be explained:

> As has already been noted, we nowhere find a "pure," "simple," religion, reducible to a single form or structure. The predominance of celestial or telluric cults in no way prevents the coexistence of other cults and symbolisms. One always runs the risk, while studying a particular form of religion, of giving it an exagerrated importance and of neglecting other forms which are in reality complementary, although they may seem at times incompatible. *(p. 253, my translation)*

The remaining two essays, on "Religious Symbolism and the Valorization of Anguish," and on "The Myths of the Modern World," are of greatest immediacy to the non-specialized reader. In the first-named Eliade replies to current existentialist theology by an enquiry into the meaning of our concern with history as the unrepeatable and unique. Traditionally obsession with history as memory foretells approaching death, and awareness of the imminent death of the old European culture is, he hints, the cause both of historicism and metaphysical anguish. In effect he pleads for a new eschatology, since he asks us to revalue death, which is, as he points out in the last chapter of the book, in traditional cultures integral with the Mystery of Rebirth.

It is difficult to believe that anyone could find anything novel, interesting, or profound to say about so hackneyed a subject as "The Myths of the Modern World." These myths, he indicates, now take place chiefly, with the obvious exception of political myth, in the realm of "amusement," whereas in traditional cultures work and all "serious action" is mythically sacramentalized. Since one of myth's principal functions, according to Eliade, is quite literally to "kill time," to return the participant in mythic action to a primordial sacred Time, *illud tempus,* wherein are stored the patterns of actions in profane time, the mythic is frequently disguised in the modern world as distraction, as anything which gives the illusion of the mastery of time. While the *content* we know as mythic in primitive cultures is found subterraneously all about us, in play and art, in comic strips, the cinema, novels, advertisements, etc., wherein mythical themes run riot in secularized form, the *social function* of myth is today taken over by education on the one hand and on the other by all activities which take place in a "concentrated time," such as the theatre, baseball games, reading, etc. Finally, in the dreams of individuals, nostalgias, and celebrations such as New Year's Eve the currents of mythological time still flow.

The prevailing ignorance of the work of this great Roumanian scholar will soon be dissipated. One may even predict that Eliade will become *popular,* in that his name will be familiar to the non-specialized intelligentsia who read Auden, Riesman, Cassirer, Jung, Auerbach, and Martin Buber. His first book to be translated into English, *The Myth of the Eternal Return* (Pantheon, Bollingen Series XLVI, New York, 1954) is likely to appear next year as a "quality paper-back." At the time of this writing a translation of his provocative and penetrating study *Le Yoga* (Paris, 1954) is in the press, a translation of the important *Traité d'histoire des religions* (Paris, 1940) is scheduled for 1958 publication, and translations of *Le Chamanisme et les techniques archaïques de l'extase* (Paris, 1951) and of *Das Heilige und das Profane* (Hamburg, 1957) are contemplated. Essays and monographs which were given originally as lectures at the Eranos meetings at Ascona will be included in forthcoming volumes of the series of *Papers from the Eranos Yearbooks* currently in process of publication by Pantheon Books for the Bollingen Foundation. Except for his recent

Forgerons et alchimistes (Paris, 1956) and some early studies written in Roumanian, one foresees that all the major scholarly productions of Dr. Eliade will soon be readily accessible in English.

GERRIT Y. LANSING

Columbia University

Beautyway: A Navaho Ceremonial. Myth recorded and translated by Father Berard Haile. With a variant myth recorded by Maud Oakes. And sandpaintings recorded by Laura A. Armer, Franc J. Newcomb, and Maud Oakes. Edited with commentaries by Leland C. Wyman. Seven text figures, two charts, one map, 16 plates in color. Bollingen Series LIII, New York: Pantheon Books, 1957. 218 pp. $8.50.

Of the more than fifty Navaho song ceremonials, some ten had been described in considerable detail prior to the publication of this volume. This account, however, is the most satisfactory and complete of any. There is a full text in Navaho (in a separate booklet at the back of the volume). There is an English translation of this and also a variant version of the myth recorded in English from another singer. Both the sandpaintings published here and those of this chant available elsewhere are analyzed exhaustively. The literature has been covered most carefully, and Beautyway is set in its place in Navaho ceremonialism and in Navaho culture generally. The chant is also related to the Holiness Rite of the Jicarilla Apache, and a brief text of this recorded by Father Berard is presented in translation. All that is lacking is a comprehensive description of observed behaviors in a performance of this ceremonial, although a few data are presented (p. 28).

Beautyway belongs to the Mountain Chant sub-group of Navaho chants. It is performed to cure illnesses resulting from "snake infection" (i.e., etiological factors resulting from supernatural dangers brought about by contact with snakes of all kinds). The myth states more specifically that Beautyway may be employed in cases of aching feet, legs, arms, back and waist; swollen ankles and knees; itching skin; painful urination; dry throat; mental confusion and fear; loss of

consciousness. Like most other Navaho chants there are or were five-night and nine-night forms; brief excerpts could also be performed. Father Berard's text supplies a detailed description of a typical nine-night Holyway chant with the standard component ceremonies of consecration of the hogan, unraveling ceremony, setting out of symbolic bundle prayersticks, short-singing, sweat and emetic, offering, bath, and sandpainting ceremonies. Beautyway has or had Male and Female Branches. Both myths are of the Female Branch, and there is evidence that the Male Branch of this chant was less frequently carried out. There are, however, recorded sandpaintings of the Male Branch.

The origin of the name of this chant is not as clear as is the case with respect to most Navaho ceremonials. But the Navaho stem "appears in nouns used to express such concepts as beauty, perfection, harmony, goodness, normality, success, well-being, blessedness, happiness, and in adjectives that might be rendered beautiful, pretty, pleasant, good, worthy, ideal, perfect, holy, or sacred." The late Gladys Reichard (to whom this volume is appropriately dedicated) said that this stem meant " 'perfection so far as it is attainable by man,' the end toward which not only man but also supernaturals and time and motion, institutions, and behavior strive. Perhaps it is the utmost achievement in order."

The myth deals with events held to have taken place after the Navaho conducted a war dance following a war with the Pueblo Indians. There were two sisters who had been promised as prizes to Navaho warriors who could take the scalps of two non-sunlight-struck Pueblo virgins. The girls are fairly won, but then are seduced by two elders, Bear Man and Big Snake Man. The two sisters then have separate adventures while fleeing from their unwanted husbands. The story of the elder sister constitutes the myth of Mountaintopway, while that of the younger is the myth of Beautyway. Each sister learns from the Holy People the respective rite. They are finally reunited, and they then give the first earthly performance of these chants. The myth, as is customary, embraces three sections: an introductory tale to link the story of this particular chant to the main stream of Navaho mythology and to set the stage for the sequel; the adventures of the protagonist while being instructed by the Holy People; a detailed description of the prototype performance.

The ninety songs of Beautyway dictated by Singer Man to Father Berard are unusual in a number of respects. Often only one or two words with meaning are interlarded among many meaningless syllables. The language of a large number of the songs is foreign—possibly Apache or Pueblo. One Navaho informant has asserted that the words were learned from two women captives from a Pueblo III (roughly 1000 A.D.) village in Chaco canyon. The melodies, on the other hand, appear to conform to usual Navaho pattern.

The mythological journeyings of Younger Sister (according to the two versions of the myth) are traced in detail in an excellent map and chart. In both cases, the routes encompass almost the whole of the traditional Navaho country.

Dr. Wyman analyzes altogether six versions of the myth obtained from informants widely representative of the range of Navaho localities. The versions vary in length and quality, but of 19 major motifs five appear in all, and six more are repeated in four or five versions. In general, as Wyman says:

> This comparison of the six versions . . . illustrates the considerable degree of variation and the sometimes surprising correspondences of motifs in the narration, recording, and translation of oral tradition. The variations could result from such factors as geographical variants, peculiarities of a "school" of singers, incomplete narration, deliberate abbreviation, invention by the narrator, imperfect interpretation or translation, and intrinsic differences representative of different chantways (pp. 23 f.).

Wyman has located reproductions of 38 sandpaintings of Beautyway and 17 more that are atypical or doubtful Beautyway sandpaintings. The main theme symbols are naturalistic Snakes or Snake People; the "people of the myth," especially Bear Man and Big Snake Man and the two girl protagonists; Rainbow People; Talking God and Bears; Water Creatures; Blue Big Thunder; Pollen Boy on the Sun and Cornbeetle Girl on the Moon; and Frogs. All but the last are shared with several other chantways and rites, especially with Shootingway and Navaho Windway. Wyman summarizes as follows:

> A feature not common in drypaintings but shared nevertheless with a number of other ceremonials is white faces on the figures, representing face paint or white masks. One unusual and perhaps unique motif is a white Dawn God encircling guardian.
>
> The color symbolism of direction is white for the east, blue for south,

yellow for west, and black for north. The linear sunwise sequence may be in either direction, but north to south predominates.

All other elements are found in the drypaintings of numerous other ceremonials. There is no single characteristic that is distinctive among Beautyway sandpainting symbols. The features nearest to this are the headdresses, occasional red skirts, and the weasel motifs, but these do not distinguish Beautyway from its sister chant, Mountainway (p. 184).

Dr. Wyman has produced another of the superb pieces of workmanship which anthropologists have come to expect from him. There is extraordinary precision on minutiae; the synthesis of relevant materials is amazingly inclusive; the writing is clear and compact. The twelve introductory pages on Navaho culture and ceremonialism are a model of accurate digest and discriminating selection for pertinence. The quotations from Coomaraswamy on symbolism and aesthetic theory are not exhibitionistic but unobtrusive and yet very much to the point. It should be noted also that Wyman has done an unusual service in bringing together unpublished materials of five other workers.

Congratulations and appreciation are likewise due to the Bollingen Foundation, The appearance of this book is singularly appropriate to the name of the chant. The marvelous illustrations, the most excellent printing and book-making, the total format delight the senses as much as the content satisfies the intellect. The reviewer knows of no monographic treatment in the field of comparative religion and symbolism which is the equal of this in all aspects. Students and laymen who have no particular interest in the Navaho Indians or indeed in any kind of "primitive" religion will nevertheless want to read and to possess this handsome volume alike on scholarly and on aesthetic grounds.

CLYDE KLUCKHOHN

Harvard University

Thirteen Tibetan Tankas. By EDNA BRYNER. Colorado: The Falcon's Wing Press, 1956. XXV, 153 pp. 15 plates, 14 figures. $9.95

In a golden book bearing a vermilion image of the Buddha stamped on its cover, Miss Bryner presents the wonderful old Jataka Tales, the Garland of Birth Stories, that had their origin in India some 2,500 years ago.

When the City Art Museum of St. Louis came into possession of

thirteen paintings from Tibet, the vertical scroll hangings that are called Tankas, she was asked to interpret them. With her impressive background of language study in Pahlavi, Avestan, Pali, Sanskrit and Tibetan, she was well qualified to undertake the task, and she discovered that the pictures illustrated stories from Arya Sūra's Sanskrit poem, the Jātakamāla.

Out of the mythology and folklore of India, even before the time of Gautama in the sixth century B.C., the fables have come down through the ages to enrich the literature of both Orient and Occident. Their greatest fame and influence have been associated with the Buddha and his teaching, for he used them to instruct his disciples and set forth his doctrine of Cause and Effect, of potential rebirth in a higher form of being after a life of blameless conduct and compassionate thought.

As the author defines reincarnation, "the immense joy of being alive more and more, not being born once as a man striving to go to heaven, and avoid hell, but the great hopefulness of an endless scale of values." Thus, whether as woodpecker, monkey or prince, one may work always toward greater service to one's own kind, repaying evil with good, cupidity with generosity, until a final goal of illumination is reached. Though the origin of fables had been obscured for most Europeans, the stories had reached us, and we have learned from many a wise animal, speaking as a man, to avoid the pitfalls of selfish action.

She explains that this series of paintings was used in a monastery to supplement the spoken word when a *guru* (teacher) was illustrating the virtues of Buddhist moral law to novices. The reader can well imagine a lecture hall in some remote mountain retreat where an old lama may have sat with his yellow-robed pupils, all their shaven heads turned in his direction while he told a Jataka Tale and pointed to the Tanka with his staff, moving it from one sector to another as the story unfolded. How fascinating it must have been to see each scroll in full color and full scale, to hear the voice in rhythmic accents extoll the generous prince Viśvantara, or the Golden Swan, or warn against temptation and selfishnes, while following every detail of the narrative in the picture. What an experience it must have been for the lads born in a land of windswept wastes and snowy peaks to see palaces set in blue-green landscapes, rosy peonies and lotus, white elephants and fantastic beasts, brave men in royal robes, fair ladies, and heavenly

visions. The tropical splendor of India, where the action of the tales took place, and the formal elegance of Chinese pavilions and gardens had become a part of Tibetan art. Tradition, not observation of their own terrain, had guided the painters.

The artist copied designs handed down from generation to generation. He may never have seen a lion or a mango, but he was supported in his craft by inconographic formulas, and by a system of apprenticeship training that prepared his to meet the demands of his mature years when he would become a master-designer. He would have traveled to far distant places in his own country, and supplemented the instructions of his first teacher by ideas and techniques known in other monasteries. He was often a priest, but lama or layman, we know nothing about his personal life, for the paintings are unsigned as a rule. As Miss Bryner puts it, "out of time and space, working in the eternal verity *now,* while producing sacred images that have power" each craftsman did his part to illustrate scriptures for temples and homes.

This set is unusually fine in quality. There is an extraordinary grace of form, suavity of rhythm and contour, and elegance of line. The general tone is one of mildness—quite a revelation to the viewer who has come to expect a dramatic power, emphasis on punishment to sinners, and mystical intensity in most Tibetan painting. In these there is a vivacious narrative sense and lively imagination, but even when the story calls for illustration of a journey through strange and terrifying seas (as in Tanka number eight), the painter chooses to depict the voyage as though four boats were drifting about a lake, free from fantastic apparitions. A scene of drunkenness is not a gay feast or revel, but a gathering of dignified friends who hold their wine bowls in perfect balance.

It is because the Thirteen Tankas are beautiful as pictorial records and as independent works of art that one must regret the small scale of reproduction, the lack of enlarged details, and the need, therefore, to use a magnifying glass for full enjoyment and understanding. Color must be judged from the frontispiece alone; it will surely inspire the reader to go to St. Louis to see the other twelve. It would have been helpful if charts had been drawn of each one, with numbered areas to correspond to episodes described in the text. The author gives general

directions, such as "start in lower left corner and continue to right side center"—but great concentration is necessary to separate the component parts when three or four stories are woven together in a massive pattern on a single tanka.

She gives valuable information on technical aspects of the art. The author tells how each piece of cotton was stretched on a frame, covered with a thick mixture of glue and chalk which is then polished evenly with the smooth surface of a conch shell. On this was drawn the principal figures that were done according to canonical rules, and on days that were considered auspicious for the creation of images. The outlines were usually transferred from cartoon or patterns that had been cherished for centuries, thus maintaining correct emphasis and proportion. Mineral colors, prepared by apprentices, were laid on after every detail had been minutely drawn. When the painting was complete it was framed on all sides by a woven material, normally silk, in tones that harmonized with the pigments in the painting, suggesting a rainbow effect as though a radiance emanated from the heart of the work. Like a Chinese scroll, both ends were fastened to bamboo rods to insure even hanging and rolling.

The painter had to be a saintly man of good behavior, learned in the scriptures, reserved in manner; his place of work must be clean and proper for the making of sacred images. This was expressly stated in the Kanjur that had been formulated in India. A priest was often present to join with him in a constant recitation of prayer as the work progressed. His apprentices would be nearby, grinding pigments or attending to his needs while he held the painting on his knees.

This communal enterprise offers an interesting contrast to the working methods of the Ch'an or Zen priest-painter of the Far East. He would be alone, after a period of meditation, and then set brush to paper in a burst of energy following a sudden illumination. The result would be a personal, freehand interpretation of a mental image, in monochrome. Mu Ch'i of China and Sesshu of Japan, both ardent Buddhists and both renowned artists, would have been amazed at the Tibetan system.

In minor figures and small details the Tibetan painter could follow his own ideas, which accounts for touches of humor and pathos, and a mingling of styles. In this series one may find costumes from India,

China and Japan, while architecture, landscape, cloud motifs, flames and floral forms are primarily Chinese in inspiration. The central images are, of course, true to Indian prototypes.

Though the title of her book emphasizes Miss Bryner's particular interest in the paintings, her chief concern is with literature rather than the visual arts. She does not analyze the tankas from the point of view of an art historian, nor does she concern herself with the probable date of production, or relationship to other contemporary interpretations.

The chapter on the literary sources is well presented. In a direct, clear fashion she gives the history of Buddhist doctrine, how it was formulated, recorded, and finally printed. The Tibetan versions (translated from the Sanskrit) came into being about A.D. 645; they constitute the Kanjur with its commentaries, called the Tanjur. The Jataka Tales were included in volume 91 of the Tanjur. These texts are literally piles of unbound folios printed from hand carved blocks on coarse paper; they recall the shape of palm leaves, used before printing was common. 300 to 500 sheets of paper are wrapped in a piece of silk and placed between wooden boards to form each volume. The Kanjur, as printed in 1730, in an edition that required the service of 800 men to cut the blocks which are still stored at the Narthang Monastery, consists of 102 volumes, and the Tanjur of 225 volumes. An edition printed off of the original Narthang blocks was presented to the East Asiatic Library of Columbia University. The most recent edition of the Kanjur, completed in 1927 in Lhasa in a 100 volume set, was presented by the Dalai Lama to Yale University. Miss Bryner used both of these collections in making her presentation of the twenty-nine Birth Stories illustrated in the Thirteen Tankas.

The reviewer is not qualified to judge the merit of the translations, but would like to comment on several other matters. Nalanda University is not, as she states, in northwest India; it is a day's motor journey northeast of Bodhgaya, in Bihar Province. The mural decorations illustrating the tale of the Hungary Tigress in Qyzil were located in Chinese Turkestan, or Sinkiang, not in East Turkey. She gives credit for these illustrations to "E. Walderschmidt, Die Buddhistische Spätantike," when she probably means A. von Le Coq, and A. Grunwedel, who photographed and sketched them on their expedi-

tion to Central Asia. The seventh century Chinese Buddhist monk who described the shrines of Kucha and Qyzil in his record of the long march to India is usually referred to as Hsüan-tsang, a romanization preferred to Watter's version of Yuan Chwang.

This tale of the Hungry Tigress is illustrated also on the walls of the Caves of the Thousand Buddhas in Tun-huang, West China. The Chinese painting serves as a link between the Central Asiatic and Japanese portrayals of the subject. The famous Japanese panel comes from the Tamamushi Shrine which she does not identify specifically; it is published in all good recent books on early Japanese art, and the captions are in English (for some reason Miss Bryner, in her discussion of the theme, retains the French caption from Buhot's Histoire des Arts du Japon, though all of her other references to the story and to illustrations of it are in English). She gives a full section of her book to it in the chapter entitled "Feeding the Tigress", with a portion devoted to "Records of the Tigress Story in Medieval Art"; she would have difficulty in defending the Central Asiatic and Japanese versions as being "Medieval" art. But she is, of course, most interested in language and literature, and less at home in the field of visual arts. It would have been helpful had she given a bibliography of her many source materials, and an index would have been equally welcome.

Her primary purpose was to present the Jataka Tales and the Thirteen Tankas illustrating them, so that a wide audience could enjoy them, and in this she has done a great service. Her translations from the Tibetan Kanjur of three of the stories adds another dimension: the richness of detail is delightful, and allows the reader to enter a world of poetry and high moral precept.

When the Dalai Lama presented the "Lhasa" Kanjur to Yale University it was with the hope that the text would "illumine the darkness like the radiance of the sun." Too few of us can read the language printed on the horizontal leaves to go directly to this source of light, but thanks to Miss Bryner we may be touched by some of its radiance.

JANE GASTON MAHLER

Columbia University

Maccabees, Zealots, and Josephus: An Inquiry into Jewish Nationalism in the Greco-Roman Period. By WILLIAM REUBEN FARMER. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. xiv, 239 pp. $4.50.

The problem which Dr. Farmer sets himself in this book is to demonstrate that the Jewish resistance to Rome in the first century A.D. was motivated by a religious fervor like that which motivated Jewish resistance to the Seleucids in the second century B.C., and indeed that the Zealots of A.D. 70 were the spiritual descendants in an uninterrupted succession of the fighters for freedom of 165 B.C. Demonstration is called for because Josephus, who is of course our principal authority for the Jewish War, and modern scholars who must rely upon him do make a sharp distinction between the two sets of rebels: whereas the Maccabees are praised for their pure devotion the Zealots are condemned as unprincipled ruffians with only secular motivation. Dr. Farmer's ultimate objective is to throw a clearer and more favorable light upon the environment in which Jesus lived and wrought. The combination of nationalist and apocalyptic elements reflected in the Gospels and now documented by the material from the Dead Sea constituted the spiritual climate which also fostered the drive towards political independence.

Actually Josephus' testimony is not so great an obstacle to Dr. Farmer's thesis as appears at first sight. Josephus is a reliable enough historian, but not when his interests and convictions (the two seem to coincide most conveniently) are involved. It would be impossible for him to say kind words for rebels against the benign authority of Rome when he was wholly committed to Rome, and almost as impossible for him to say unkind words about resistance to an oriental tyrant who was an enemy to Rome—a resistance which in Roman eyes would be his people's finest hour. The motives which impel a people to resist foreign domination and assert its own liberty remain relatively constant; Demosthenes fought Philip for much the same reasons that Themistocles had fought Xerxes. But it is an oversimplification to imagine that motivations remained uniform and unchanging, either among the Greeks or the Jews. Initially the Maccabean movement was at least as much secular as it was religious, and the pious withdrew when restrictions on religious observance were removed. During the period of national sovereignty they constituted a protestant, even

subversive, element, which is why the Maccabees are virtually ignored in rabbinic literature. And as the relative strength of parties shifted the left, as always, moved towards the center. Dr. Farmer is therefore doubtless correct in stressing the religious basis for the revolt against Rome; he is on less certain ground in conceiving of the partisan alignment as remaining monolithic for almost three centuries.

Dr. Farmer's book is evidently an expanded dissertation, and it shows the merits and defects of its genus. There is the refreshing enthusiasm of new discovery, but also a touch of naivete, much repetition, and that incubus on all philological dissertations—an easily dispensable chapter detailing the shortcomings of nineteenth century scholarship in the author's subject.

Moses Hadas

Columbia University

The Dead Sea Scriptures in English Translation. By Theodor H. Gaster. Doubleday Anchor Books. Doubleday and Company: Garden City, New York, 1956. x, 350 pp. $.95.

While the literature on the Dead Sea Scrolls is steadily mounting in volume, some fourteen hundred independent studies having already made their appearance in almost a score of languages, the number of translations thus far published is relatively small, and most of these have been confined to the documents from Cave I and the Zadokite Fragments discovered by Solomon Schechter in the Cairo genizah. T. H. Gaster now undertakes to give a rendering of all the scrolls at present available to scholars. It is a thoroughly independent work and contains scores of new readings or renderings. Géza Vermès' *Discovery in the Judean Desert* (New York and Rome, 1956) gives us many of the same materials, but is of much greater range and amplitude than Gaster's book and is radically different in many of the translations of the texts.

The book opens with an unusually instructive and stimulating essay. Gaster states his own views succinctly but always with adequate defence. The translations are admirably ordered into four main sections: The Service of God: Rule of the Brotherhood; The Praise of God: Hymns and Psalms; The Word of God: the Study of Scripture; The Triumph of God: Descriptions of the Final Age. In the first

division he includes the Manual of Discipline, the Zadokite Fragments, and a formulary of blessings; in the second, the *Hodayoth* or Thanksgiving Hymns and the poetic portion at the close of the Manual, which he believes to be the hymn of the initiants upon their entrance into the New Covenant; in the third, the Words of Moses and the commentaries (Micah, Nahum, Habakkuk, and Psalm 37); in the fourth, the War of the Sons of Light and the Sons of Darkness, the two-column Rule of the Congregation, and two minor pieces. Each section is prefaced by a brief introduction and followed by a number of useful and informative notes, which frequently give the reason for the particular rendering. A most helpful feature of the work is the Analytical Index, in which the major themes and concepts are conveniently classified in the following categories: The Community, Government of the Community, Laws and Practices, Opponents of the Brotherhood, the Last Things, and Angelology. Here we have a mine of useful information, extremely condensed, but rewarding to the diligent student. The book closes with lists of biblical parallels (Old and New Testaments) to the scrolls.

The translation is fresh and eminently intelligible, and frequently vivid and telling, but it is also very free at times and even paraphrastic. An attempt is made to convey the style and nuances of the original, and the mode of rendering shifts according to the particular literary *genre*. There will be those who will register complaints against some of the author's more venturesome excursions, but he defends himself by saying that an authentic translation must dare to take such leaps. It is surely true that we cannot assume that the meaning of words in the period of the original composition of the scrolls was the same as that in the Old Testament, but it is precisely because of the complexity of the cultural and linguistic situation that the translation is at times almost inevitably precarious and uncertain. One cannot resist the impression that the translator's own understanding of the piety and temper of the community has influenced his wording, more particularly in contexts which most scholars interpret as clearly eschatological. Yet, whatever one's judgment may be about literally scores of passages, it must be said that Gaster is exceptionally well-schooled in the culture and literature of the period. Indeed, it is one of the merits of this new volume in the Anchor series that it places the Qumran documents in their appropriate cultural

milieu. Many interesting parallels are adduced from contemporanous and other literatures. What is more, Gaster is always intent upon arriving at an understanding and appreciation of the religious life and piety of these ancient sectarians, of how they felt and thought about matters of ultimate concern.

According to Gaster, the Qumran community accommodates some two hundred persons. They probably numbered many more, however. The New Covenant did not involve the abrogation of the Old but was simply a new affirmation of it. This is hardly consistent with what is said elsewhere. He is probably correct in saying that the members of the community believed themselves to be repeating in a later age the early Mosaic period (cf. Joachim Jeremias' article on Moses in the *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*). He properly stresses the second-Moses motif, and calls attention to the quotation of Deut. 18:15ff. in the messianic florilegium. The Teacher of Righteousness connotes a continuing office rather than a particular historical individual (p. 26). It is possible that this view is correct, but the writer remains dubious because of the extraordinary things that are said concerning him. As to the references to the Teacher in the Habakkuk Commentary, Gaster says that "it soon becomes apparent that the author is simply citing a number of incidents which might illustrate the prophet's words." It would seem that we have something decidedly more striking here, and this judgment is confirmed by what we read in the Zadokite Fragments. The author finds no vestige of the idea of Original Sin; this again seems to overstate the case (cf., e.g. many passages in the hymns). Many other similar questions might be raised concerning Gaster's interpretations. But outweighing all others is his conception of the piety of the community. He thinks of its members as mystics. The Qumran devotee "achieved harmony with the eternal cosmic scheme and broke the trammels of mortality . . . He achieved, in short, what mystics term the 'unitive state'." The preparing of the way of the Lord in the desert was in reality "escape from the inexorable cycle, release not from sin but from mortality". The desert was not simply the Desert of Judah; "it was also the mystic's Desert of Quietude." Comparisons are made with John Tauler, Saint Teresa, and other mystics. It is inevitable that such views affect the translation. This is apparent above all in eschatological contexts. In a word, despite the fact that Gaster does not deny

the presence of eschatological ideas among the Covenanters, he transforms them into mystical categories. This is the major defect of an otherwise admirable work.

Despite the foregoing criticisms and others which might be made of Gaster's book, it is one of the most stimulating, refreshing, and independent studies we have yet had on the scrolls. It is receiving wide reading, and rightly so, and it is to be hoped that we may soon have the second edition which Dr. Gaster assures us is in the offing.

JAMES MUILENBURG

Union Theological Seminary

Muhammad at Medina. By MONTGOMERY W. WATT. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956. xiv, 418 pp. $6.75.

This volume follows on and supplements the author's earlier work *Muhammad at Mecca* (Oxford, 1953). It is not, as is commonly announced, a new *Life* of Muhammad, at least not in the sense of such *Lives* as have been written by Sprenger, Sir Wm. Muir, Margoliouth or Buhl-Schaeder, but is what its title says, an account of Muhammad at Medina. When Margoliouth wrote his *Mohammed and the Rise of Islam* in 1905 he had the justification of new source material not available to Sprenger or to Muir. When Tor Andrae produced his *Muhammed, hans liv och hans tro* in 1930 he was attempting an approach from the viewpoint of Comparative Religion. No fresh source material of any account, however, has become available, nor the resources of any new discipline which might help to explain Muhammad, though there are rumours of a psycho-analytic examination of the Arabian Prophet under consideration. The present study confines itself largely to the historical material in the *Sira,* bringing in the evidence of the Qur'an and what may be gleaned from the *Hadith* only incidentally. This cannot be condemned as a fundamental mistake in methodology for this is not properly a *Life,* but an account of the problems Muhammad faced in the situation in which he found himself at Medina and how he dealt with them.

The study is based on certain a priori assumptions. One is the author's theory as to the causes which produced the social and political malaise of the times. Another is his judgment as to the essen-

tial trustworthiness of the historical sources, at least as to their core. A third is that Muhammad was a much greater figure than European scholars have generally allowed him to be. It is to be feared that many readers will feel that a great deal of special pleading has been employed to justify these assumptions, especially the last of them.

The great value of the study is the careful way in which it sets forth the data in the *Sira,* illustrating it wherever possible from other relevant material and seeks to make clear the significance of all this for an interpretation of the growing importance of Muhammad's position as a political leader in the city. There were problems he faced from internal Arab politics in Medina, problems arising from the Jewish groups established there, problems of relationship with Mecca which involved the Battles of Badr and Uhud and the Ditch, problems concerned with the outlying Arab tribes. The detailed investigation of this material involved the author in labours of no inconsiderable magnitude, and his results are set forth with meticulous care. That this should be wordy and make dull reading lay in the nature of the task, but it was well worth doing, and has been so well done that whether one agrees with the author's conclusions or not there is no doubt as to nature of the evidence on which conclusions have to be based. The setting forth of this material, moreover, brings constantly to one's attention how seriously all our sources have been tampered with, and with what care they must be scrutinized. Much easier reading are the chapters on the character of the Islamic State which Muhammad little by little set up to replace what he found at Medina when he arrived there, and the reforms in social structure which that involved. The importance of this lies in the fact that what Muhammad set up at Medina has become normative for all subsequent Islam.

From the book this reviewer rose more impressed than ever with the political sagacity, political astuteness, political wisdom of Muhammad, but even less impressed with his "prophetic" stature. Is this a figure we can justly place beside Zoroaster or Mani, let alone the great prophets of the Old Testament? It is not enough to argue that religion and politics were involved with one another in that milieu. That is true, but it is also true that those contemporary individuals and groups whom we should have expected to be impressed by his prophetic claims were definitely unimpressed, though apparently they were impressed by his political abilities. Nor is it sufficient to argue

that we are unfair in judging Muhammad by comparing him with the best Western standards of the nineteen-fifties, for we can compare him with the standards expected of "men of God" in Semitic Palestine, Arabia's near neighbour, from the days of Samuel onwards, standards which one claiming to be the "seal of the prophets" might be expected to rise above not fall beneath. Muhammad's reforms were religiously oriented, and he lives on as the founder of one of the enduring major religions, so it is clear that ultimately he must be interpreted as a religious leader rather than as a political leader, but where his religious genius lay seems as great a mystery as ever. Maybe further study of the Qur'an and the Traditions will provide us with a clue, for the historical material in the *Sira,* in spite of much special pleading, certainly does not.

Arthur Jeffery

Columbia University

The Koran: a New Translation. By N. J. Dawood. London: Penguin Books Inc., 1956. 428 pp. $.95.

It is somewhat difficult to understand why this translation came to be published. It makes no attempt to incorporate the results of modern scholarship, as the translations of Richard Bell and Régis Blachère have done, so as to do for the Qur'ān what the new Standard Revised Version attempts to do for the Bible, nor does it venture to present some particular interpretation of the book as it done in the recent version by Arberry, but claims to put into contemporary English the interpretation given in the late Muslim commentaries of az-Zamakhsharī, al-Baiḍāwī and al-Jalālain. This may be good enough in a translation meant for Muslims, and is, indeed, the principle adopted in the versions made by Indian Muslims, and the French translations by Laimèche et Ben Daoud, and more recently by Mercier, but is hardly justifiable in a translation offered to the non-Muslim English-speaking world. It is somewhat as though the translators of the new Standard Revised Version of the Old Testament instead of taking full account of the new knowledge available through the tremendous advances made in archaeology, philology, literary, historical and textual criticism, had followed in their translation the exegesis of Rashi, Qimhi and Ibn Ezra.

The author's quarrel with previous translators, he tells us, is firstly, that they have "completely failed to convey both the meaning and the rhetorical grandeur of the original," and secondly that they have adhered to too literal renderings of Arabic idioms. On the first point one who has been working at the Qur'ān for many years now must confess that this present rendering conveys the rhetorical grandeur of the original far less than does the chaste and dignified English prose of the older version by Rodwell. The point about the meaning and the idiom needs some consideration, which can best be given by examining a few verses in this translation. Idioms in a language are always a problem and can rarely be translated literally, but this should not be made an excuse for translating so freely as to obscure things which the original reveals clearly.

For example in Sūra XIX, 4/3, the aging Zachariah, pleading that he may have a son, says: "O my Lord, as for me, the bones have grown weak from me, and the head has kindled a hoariness." So literal a translation is, of course, intolerable, so Rodwell translates: "O Lord, verily my bones are weakened, and the hoar hairs glisten on my head," but this present translation reads: "I am stricken in years and my hair is all silver," which not only omits the characteristic, "O my Lord, verily," but obscures the fact that Muḥammad is here reproducing an Eastern Christian legend which emphasizes the weakening of the bones and the grey appearing like hoar frost among the hairs of the head. Similarly in vv. 16-18 the text says: "And in the Book make mention of Mary, when she withdrew from her family to an eastern place, so that she veiled herself from them. Then We sent to her Our Spirit, who took before her the form of a perfect man. She said: I take refuge from you, if you are a god-fearing person." Here this is rendered: "And you shall recount in the Book the story of Mary; how she left her people and betook herself to a solitary place to the east. We sent to her Our spirit in the semblance of a full-grown man. And when she saw him she said: 'May the Merciful defend me from you! if you fear the Lord, leave me and go your way'," which is not only unnecessarily paraphrastic but quite obscures the fact that again Muḥammad is reproducing an Oriental Christian legend which expressly mentions her veiling herself from the people.

There are other such examples in this same Sūra and it is hardly right to excuse such departure from the text on the ground that a

literal rendering of idioms is to be avoided. Nor is it right to call in the help of Arabic idiom to avoid a conclusion of literary criticism, as is done in the note on v. 29/28 of this Sūra. Mary is there being upbraided for having a child, and is addressed: "O sister of Aaron," revealing the well-known confusion on Muḥammad's part between the two Maryams, Mary the mother of our Lord, and Miriam the sister of Moses and Aaron. As early as aṭ-Ṭabarī we find this noted as a difficulty which some explained as an idiom meaning, "O virtuous woman," giving a curious legend as to how it became an idiom, but others admitted it was Aaron the brother of Moses, arguing that Mary was legitimately so called because she was descended from that family, and still others said that this was another man, a local Aaron of evil reputation, so that Mary, having been, as they thought, unchaste, could be called "sister of Aaron." The translator's note in this place, however, is quite misleading, for it tells us that the charge of the critics that Muḥammad confused the two Maryams is based solely on this passage. That is not so. In Sūra III, 35/31 Mary's mother is called the wife of 'Imrān, and in LXVI, 12 Mary herself is called the daughter of 'Imrān. Now 'Imrān is the Arabic form of the name 'Amrām, which in the Old Testament is the name of the father of Moses and Aaron and Miriam, and the identification is made quite certain by III, 33/30 which clearly refers to the four covenants, the Adamic, the Noachic, the Abrahamic and the Mosaic.

Actually there are very few notes to this translation, though the Qur'ān is a book which, to non-Muslim readers, badly needs explanatory notes. It was a major tragedy that the publisher refused to print the great body of Richard Bell's notes to his translation. The one concession here made to modern scholarship is that the Sūras are not arranged in their traditional order, but in an order which, while not strictly chronological, yet does arrange the Suras more or less according to historical periods, the earlier material first and the later last. No indication is given, however, of the fact that in one and the same Sūra we often have material from very different periods of the prophet's activity.

As a whole the translation reads easily, and though it is far from what one expects a scholarly version at the present day to be, at least it does not deliberately seek to pull wool over the eyes of the English reader in the way Marmaduke Pickthall's translation does. If this

translation, as a cheap and easily available book, succeeds in putting Pickthall's version off the market it will have accomplished something worth while.

ARTHUR JEFFERY

Columbia University

The Bay Psalm Book: A Facsimile of the First Edition of 1640. The Enigma of the Bay Psalm Book. By ZOLTÁN HARASZTI. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956. 2 vols., boxed. xiii, 144 pp. $10.00.

It is good to have a new facsimile edition of *The Whole Booke of Psalmes Faithfully Translated into English Metre,* produced in line offset from negatives made from an original copy in the Prince Collection of the Boston Public Library, with certain pages which were poorly printed supplied from a second copy in the same collection, and with blemishes such as fox-marks or blotches removed by careful opaquing all under the supervision of Dr. Zoltán Haraszti, Keeper of Rare Books in that library. For everyone except the professional bibliographer, who must examine every extant copy and cherish the peculiar imperfections of each, the result is a text clearer and more usable than any other: the original printing of 1640, of which only eleven of the seventeen hundred copies printed survive, or the extremely rare facsimiles of 1862 and 1903. It is even better to have Dr. Haraszti's companion volume, *The Enigma of the Bay Psalm Book* which sets forth the results of what is virtually the first intensive investigation of the authors and artistry of the book.

As is the case with so much of our knowledge of the accomplishments of our seventeenth-century colonial ancestors, we have until recently accepted with a kind of innocent naïvete estimates of their literary achievement and information about their intellectual activities handed down to us by their contemporaries or by students of generations earlier than ours. Men like Winthrop, Mather, and Prince, who were there or almost there, had told us enough and with a kind of earnest emphasis which allowed us with clear conscience to pursue less tedious channels. Literary annalists like Kettel in 1829 had furnished sufficient evidence to convince us that we need explore no farther. Then from the Middle West to Harvard came Perry Miller, who in an impressive series of volumes has tested and corrected many

conceptions concerning colonial intellectual history, and Harold Jantz, also an outlander, who examined manuscript collections of colonial poetry to discover that earlier literary judgments, based on less scrupulous surveys, "were almost worthless, since they left out of account much of our finest verse . . . and gave undue emphasis to certain well-known poems which were strictly mediocre or worse." The studies of Professor Miller have had large influence in stimulating fresh valuations of the colonial mind and, among a great many other things, in providing background for the interpretation of our finest colonial poet, Edward Taylor, whom Thomas H. Johnson brought first to attention in the late 1920's. Those of Professor Jantz have been less influential—indeed, the sections on colonial poetry in the two most extensive historical surveys of American writing, *The Literary History of the United States* (1948) and *The Literature of the American People* (1951), are written in the old tradition, as if his studies had never been made. The reason perhaps is that Professor Jantz, a student of German literature who turned briefly to the study of colonial verse when the second world war made research in his own field in Europe impossible, having returned since then to his German studies, no one else has been seriously at work in the field.

That is one reason why it is good to have Dr. Haraszti's book. He also has gone beyond misconceptions handed down inadvertantly by Cotton Mather, who was ambiguous enough in his attribution of authorship to allow later historians to suppose that he meant that his great-grandfather was principally responsible for the Bay Psalm Book. Led on first by internal evidence to suspect some of the pronouncements of the past, Dr. Haraszti examined evidence of every kind in an attempt to discover exactly what guiding hands were behind this first American book. The results of his investigation are startling—it seems strange (here again a triumph for the Middle West) that they should have been published by the University of Chicago rather than the Harvard University Press. Briefly stated, they are these: (1) the Bay Psalm Book was not an "Eliot-Welde-Mather version" as many historians have called it, but a work to which "the Chief Divines" (this Cotton Mather had said) of the Bay Colony contributed; (2) noting, in spite of George Parker Winship's description of the psalms as "consistently uniform," a variety in style, Dr. Haraszti succeeded in identifying John Cotton as the author of the twenty-third psalm, and

John Wilson and John Bulkeley as the author of others—"But these," he says, "are the results of a few experiments only. Many others should be made"; (3) daring the fine rhetoric of Moses Coit Tyler's pronouncement that in the Puritan rendering of the Psalms "sentences were wrenched about end to end, clauses heaved up and abandoned in chaos, words disembowelled or split quite in two" to make verses which seen "to have been hammered out on an anvil, by blows from the blacksmith's sledge," as a result of which, says Dr. Haraszti, "as if to preclude the dreaded charge of provincialism, scholars have outdone each other in their ridiculing of the work" as dull and involuntarily funny—daring such pronouncements, he forwards without special pleading an argument (which should, though it may not, bring blushes to scholarly cheeks) that colonial verse, at very least, need no longer be laughingly apologized for as a comically disreputable skeleton in our literary closet; and (4), perhaps most important of all, establishes, I think beyond any measure of doubt, that John Cotton and not Richard Mather was the author of colonial America's first essay in literary criticism, the preface to the Bay Psalm Book.

Thus justice is partially done, and some ancient errors laid to rest. But the most heartening thing about the conclusions in this book, some of them admittedly tentative, is Dr. Haraszti's repeated refrain that there is more to be done—together with the implication that, now that his sleeves are rolled, he will keep at the task. It is not likely, however, that he or anyone else can do it alone. There are, as he points out, problems aplenty for scholars, in textual analysis, identification of authorship, literary criticism, and historical research. It seems only fitting that our generation should, in the words of one of the psalmists

> give them like to their handy-work
> and render unto them their meeds

not only in their shortcomings but in their flights toward excellence which are equally like our own. Perhaps, following John Cotton, it can be learned that what is needed is "Conscience rather than Elegance," so that condescending (the text reads "lying")

> lips be silenced
> that against men upright

doe speak such things as greivous are,
in pride, & in despight.

LEWIS LEARY

Columbia University

A Rauschenbusch Reader: The Kingdom of God and the Social Gospel. Edited by BENSON Y. LANDIS. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957, xxii, 167 pp. $3.00.

In 1950, the Editorial Board of Haddam House, realizing that "many young people today never heard of Walter Rauschenbusch and never read a paragraph of his pioneering works," published Benjamin E. Mays' *A Gospel for the Social Awakening: Selections from the Writings of Walter Rauschenbusch.* In his introduction to the most recent compilation, here under review, Harry Emerson Fosdick similarly observes that Rauschenbusch's books, "honored though they are in historical recollection, are not by many read and studied." Thus, the youthful earnest reader, solicitously judged by his elders to be in need of Rauschenbusch, now has two fine, portable volumes to choose from, and one can hope that the vibrant consciousness of human family in Rauschenbusch will now reach out to kindle the mind and spirit of "the silent generation" as it did their fathers' in their own time of youthful bafflement.

"The Prophet of Rochester" possesses perennial appeal as a symbol of the spiritual crisis of our time. Descendant of six generations of ministers, he undertook a pastorate in a German Baptist Church in Hell's Kitchen of New York in 1886 hoping to save souls. But a "procession of men out of work, out of clothes, out of shoes, and out of hope" convinced him that personal piety alone was inadequate for the demands of modern industrial life. Later, as a member of the faculty of Rochester Theological Seminary, he courageously undertook to solve the thorniest problem confronting the religiously disturbed of his day, the reconciliation of traditionally individualistic theology with aroused social conscience. Finding his clue in the Lord's Prayer: 'Thy kingdom come. Thy will be done, as in heaven, so on earth,' Rauschenbusch created a systematic social theology. As observed by his biographer, Dores Robinson Sharpe, this system denied

centrality to Luther's "justification by faith," Calvin's "sovereignty of God," and western Christendom's divine atonement, so as to elevate the Kingdom of God as "the central message of Christianity." By resurrecting this ancient ideal, long obscured in churchmanship and in theology, Rauschenbusch hoped to remove "the baffling hindrance" of pietistic dogma from the path of social progress, to make "this earth clean and sweet and habitable." His successful defense of this unorthodox position assured the socially-religiously distressed of their linkage with the spirit of the Hebrew Carpenter-Teacher, supplied the social gospel movement with a sorely-needed theology, and won its originator a commanding position in religious circles at home and abroad.

Speaking of the bracing wonder of his discovery, Rauschenbusch said: "And so, wherever I touched life, there was the Kingdom of God. That was the brilliancy, the splendor of that conception—it touches everything with religion; it carries God into everything you do, and there is nothing else that does it in the same way." Millions of people responded to the beauteous force of hope in the Kingdom of God ideal. Byron's words can well be quoted to describe Rauschenbusch's role for his age: "Be thou the rainbow to the storms of life! The evening beam that smiles the clouds away, and tints tomorrow with prophetic ray!"

This power is compellingly conveyed by Benson Y. Landis, the church statistician, in his editing of *A Rauschenbusch Reader.* The gently argumentative theologian is amply represented by selections from his main works, *Christianity and the Social Crisis, Christianizing the Social Order,* and *A Theology for the Social Gospel.* Characteristically pithy and direct in style, rich in homely analogies, his emotional fervor under discipline, Rauschenbusch is a propitiating theologian. Refreshingly pugnacious in debate on the economic and social issues of his time (Landis reprints the rarely-seen "Contributions to the Baptist Congress"), he brings a sense of immediacy to his age. The author of much unpublished verse, his *Prayers of the Social Awakening* offer as original a contribution to devotional lyrics as his Kingdom of God thesis did to theology. Capable of poignant poetry and rhapsody, Rauschenbusch's prayers merit recital; many of them would, it seems to me, evoke enthusiastic response from audiences of

many sorts today (see particulary "A Social Litany", "For This World", "For Women Who Toil", "Morituri Te Salutant", and "For Our City").

The reason for Rauschenbusch's remarkable resiliency can be found in the fact that he went forth to preach to the tradition-bound churchly rather than to the rootless worldly. Hell's Kitchen ever in mind, his own body carrying the wound of deafness from his service there, he confronted church congresses and seminaries with the admonishment of the harsh, prayerful world: "theology is silent or stammers where we most need a ringing . . . message. It has no adequate answer to the fundamental moral questions of our day. . . . Its hymns, its ritual, its prayers, its books of devotion, are so devoid of social thought that the most thrilling passions of our generation lie in us half stifled for lack of religious utterance." Truly "a child of his age" (the telling phrase of Charles H. Hopkins), Rauschenbusch immersed himself in the social, economic and theological thought of his time. And while this fact has been acknowledged by students of Rauschenbusch, a study in depth along this line should be undertaken. Materials for it are now available.

Rauschenbusch has been admirably presented as a social gospel theologian by Bodein, Gabriel, and Hopkins, among others, but he possesses even wider relevance as a key figure in modern American Civilization. The recent appearance of several exceptionally illuminating studies of American life and thought at the turn of the century should prove suggestive in properly appraising Rauschenbusch. Although these studies are barely, or not at all, concerned with him or with theology, they bear witness to the role of both as the touchstone of an age. Certainly, had Morton G. White been so minded, he could most fittingly have included Rauschenbusch's Kingdom of God theology in his *Social Thought in America* (1949), along with Dewey's instrumentalism, Veblen's institutionalism, Holmes' legal realism, Beard's and Robinson's "new history," all as part of the same fertilizing insistence "upon coming to grips with life, experience, process, growth, context, [and] function" as over against traditional scholarly processes of abstraction and deduction. Robert H. Bremner, in gathering materials for *From the Depths: The Discovery of Poverty in the United States* (1956), was impressed by "the parallel development of factualism in the social sciences and realism in the arts". Though he

touches upon Rauschenbusch lightly at several points, a major chapter on the discovery of poverty by churchmen and theologians suggests itself quite naturally. Sidney Fine's *Laissez Faire and the General-Welfare State* (1956), documenting the surprising loss of ground by laissez faire both as theory and practice as early as the 'eighties, testifies to Rauschenbusch's characteristic grasp of a main current of his time.

In his conviction that "the greatest future awaits religion in the public life of humanity", Rauschenbusch made his greatest contribution.

JOSEPH SCHIFFMAN

Long Island University

When Prophecy Fails. By LEON FESTINGER, HENRY W. RIECKEN, and STANLEY SCHACHTER. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956. vii, 256 pp. $4.00.

The history of religion includes many examples of millenial and messianic movements organized around the prediction of a miraculous event. These may be predictions of the second coming of Christ, of the end of the world, or some less spectacular occurrence to be wrought in a miraculous way. Sometimes the predictions are vague and indefinite about the nature, time, and place of the event; in other cases they are very specific going into great detail about what will happen, when, and with what effect. The authors of this book are concerned with messianic movements having the latter characteristic where the event is predicted to occur within the lifetime of the movement's members. What they are concerned about is to test a set of propositions bearing on the nature of such movements through a case study of a recent American example of the type.

Briefly stated, their basic proposition is that under certain conditions the beliefs of the core participants in messianic movements are not discarded when the prophesied event fails to occur. On the contrary, belief not only persists beyond the invalidation of the prediction but is actually strengthened by it. In fact, one effect of the invalidation may very well be to increase rather than decrease the efforts of members to proselytize for the movement. For this to happen, however, the belief must be very strongly held; it must have

implications for the believer's behavior requiring him to take some action with regard to proclaiming his belief in a way that is difficult to undo, and finally, and most important in the author's view, the individual believer must have social support of other members of the movement subsequent to the disconfirmation.

The first chapter of the book is devoted to elaborating these hypotheses and to testing them insofar as possible against admittedly inadequate historical material on messianic movements. The balance of the book is given to a case study of a particular movement; one that arose several years ago in a mid-western community (disguised by the authors) around a prediction of a coming flood which would submerge the entire North and South American continents. The date of the coming cataclysm was specifically stated, the source of the prediction was said to be superior beings on a planet called "Clarion," and the believers in the prophecy, it was claimed, would be saved by being taken away in time in flying saucers. The movement developed around these beliefs was studied by the authors beginning shortly after its inception primarily through means of participant observation. The authors and their assistants became in varying degrees active members of the movement, withholding, of course, their true purpose in joining.

The book provides a fascinating peek into the operations of a fringe group of a type usually closed to social scientific scrutiny. However, its fascination stems more from the "exposé" character of what is reported than from any feeling of scientific learning being conveyed. The original propositions leading to the study would appear to be confirmed in a general way. However, the authors must fall back on some superficial reasoning concerning variations in the strength of conviction to explain why some members defected after the disconfirmation while the belief of others was reinforced by it. The real disappointment of the book, however, is that it tells us so little about the conditions producing the kind of movement under study, about the background and motivations of the people who join them, and about the functions which such movements serve for society and the individual. It is perhaps unfair to ask so much given the methodological limitations under which the investigators were obliged to work. Nevertheless, a little more attention to such questions might have

produced some shrewd insights about answers which would have been welcome.

Despite these qualifications, the book does warrant attention for what understanding it does contribute on a phase of our social system seldom examined, and for its theoretical contributions to the social psychology of belief. And, it is rather delightful reading.

CHARLES Y. GLOCK

Columbia University

The Imperial Intellect: A Study of Newman's Educational Ideal. By A. DWIGHT CULLER. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955. xiii, 327 pp. $5.00.

In one of his parochial sermons, published in 1838, Newman said, "There are in every age a certain number of souls in the world, known to God, unknown to us, who will obey the Truth when offered to them, whatever be the mysterious reason that they do and others do not." In a journal entry in 1874 he speaks of his "habit, or even nature, of not writing & publishing without a *call*." Thus, years apart, does Newman point to an essential in his life: that mysterious summoning to interpretation and guidance, controversy and combat, wherever the *call* should lead him. "I *cannot* write without such a stimulus," he tells us in the 1874 journal. "I feel to myself going out of the way, or impertinent—and I write neither with spirit nor with point." Each of the Newmans we know—the preacher, the philosopher, the educationalist—responded in turn to the stimulus; each achieved his pertinence, not only to the matter at hand, but also to the faith of Newman, in the way he waited for the summoning and the manner in which he responded when it came.

Professor Culler's book, as its title makes clear, deals primarily with Newman the educationalist; necessarily too it must take into consideration Newman the educator, the education of Newman, and the pattern of "call" and response in these central experiences of Newman's life. The book accomplishes all of this in a narrative style of uncommon charm which makes particularly compact and coherent the intellectual career of Newman. And through it all Professor Culler

manages to draw with a commendable tightness the springs of a dramatic tension. The drama comes, the preface tells us, not from "the steady, ineluctable march toward Rome, but [from] an oscillation between an intellectual liberalism and a religious submissiveness which revealed itself most dramatically in the five crushing illnesses of Newman's adolescence and early manhood."

It is not a manufactured drama. There is abundant testimony from Newman himself about the devitalizing effect of these illnesses, to be found in particular in the manuscripts piled up at the Birmingham Oratory which Professor Culler, it might be said, has culled so carefully and so impressively in the making of his book. No, the drama is there, and it is Newman's, not Professor Culler's. But the ultimate significance of the five illnesses is something else again. I am not persuaded, as this author is, that

> as the mind takes in larger and larger bodies of material, the burden upon it becomes almost intolerable, and it was this burden which produced in Newman the five shattering illnesses which form the basic pattern of his undergraduate and liberal years. Gifted with a ranging and curious intellect, he was led again and again into novel sciences and extracurricular studies, until at last, breaking under the strain or thrown into a panic by some approaching examination, he found that he had not mastered his materials at all, that his mind was 'a labyrinth more than anything else.' In almost every case the disordered state of his knowledge was symbolized by the very form which his illness took—he felt 'a twisting of the brain, of the eyes,' and it seemed that his 'head inside was made up of parts'—as if the divine vengeance were chastising his arrogance by confirming him in the very state in which he had sinned (p. 205).

One sees clearly enough the signal importance of illnesses which produced such derangement and more, "a confusion, an inability to think or recollect," such a loss of control that he found it "quite impossible" to count his pulse: "Before I had got to 30, my eyes turned round and inside out, all of a sudden." But this does not necessarily yield "the basic pattern of his undergraduate and liberal years." Dramatic accents, yes, punctuations of a startling pointedness, interjections almost of a violent nature; but in spite of the depressing effect of these illnesses, the acute discomfort they brought, the upheaval, they did not necessarily impose a fixed pattern upon Newman's life, any or all of it. They were rather the inevitable result of a

temperament and a spirituality based, for whatever "mysterious reason," on obedience to the "Truth," whenever and however it was "offered" to him. Even as a Trinity undergraduate he realized that when he prayed, "Let me get no honours here if they are to be the slightest cause of sin to my soul," he might actually be "buoyed up by the secret idea, that by thus leaving the event in the hands of God, when I pray, He might be induced, as a reward for so proper a spirit, to grant me my desire."

This is the temperament, this is the spirituality—may one not say it explicitly and simply?—of the saints. One can understand and applaud Professor Culler's apparent unwillingness to descend to the distortions and uncertainties of a commonplace hagiography. He is after all concerned here with "the philosophy of an imperial intellect." Like Newman's *Idea of a University*, his work "is based, not so much on simplification as on discrimination." One wishes that he had followed the prescription a little more precisely, that as "Its true representative," he had aimed "at no complete catalogue, or interpretation," of his subject, but had only followed out "as far as man can, what in its fulness is mysterious and unfathomable." He would not then have made what was really conciliation in Newman's life into conflict; he would have seen, as Newman perhaps did himself, that what he describes, at its least ordered, as "oscillation" and "conflict," and at its most controlled as "precarious balance," was to Newman much of the time little more than necessary stress and strain of the argument of assent. From Professor Culler's own evidence one cannot help concluding that Newman found the argument, at least in the pursuit of his educational ideal, more invigorating than debilitating. For there is a liveliness in this book which is as much the author's as the subject's, and at least one altogether pleasing certainty, where certainty is altogether allowable, that in few contexts is the largeness of Newman so well revealed as in the educational. Whatever one's disagreements may be with Professor Culler, one recognizes that both Newman and his educational ideal have had dimension added to them as a result of the fresh scholarship and engaging writing which have gone into this book.

BARRY ULANOV

Barnard College

The Theology of Haham David Nieto, An Eighteenth Century Defense of the Jewish Tradition. By Jakob J. Petuchowski. Welch, W. Va.: Congregation Emanuel; Selling Agents, Bloch Publishing Co., New York, 1954, ix, 166 pp. $2.00.

This excellent doctoral thesis is the first serious study of the philosophical and theological writings of David Nieto (1654-1728), the erudite rabbi of London's Sephardic community during the Age of Enlightenment. Professor Petuchowski analyzes Nieto's views from the perspective of the intellectual cross-currents which prevailed in eighteenth century England and the messianic and heretical movements which agitated Jewry after the Spanish expulsion. Nieto's apologia for traditional Judaism was prompted, as Petuchowski points out, by a four-pronged threat from the following quarters: Christian evangelism, Sabbatianism, Karaism, and Deism with occasional echoes of Spinozism. This carefully documented monograph offers a detailed exposition of Nieto's spirited polemics. In addition, the author has provided a useful chapter on "The Antecedents of Heresy" which sums up the history of opposition to the Oral Law or the rabbinic tradition with special attention to the *Kol Sakhal* and Uriel da Costa's *Theses Against the Tradition.*

In his role as a staunch defender of the rabbinic tradition, Nieto had many illustrious predecessors, for the opposition to the Oral Law is as old as this law itself, and virtually every age has contributed its share to rabbinic apologetics. Nieto can hardly be called an original or systematic thinker; he was essentially an eclectic who selected judiciously from the stock of arguments which had accumulated in Jewish apologetic literature, occasionally giving a new turn to an old argument or borrowing an idea from his opponents and converting it from foe to friend. Nevertheless, Nieto's writing has a freshness and verve about it, for it breathes the intellectual controversies of his time. Petuchowski has made out a strong case for Nieto's influence on the intellectual development of Anglo-Jewry, with its bent towards conservatism in Jewish belief and practice. Although this reviewer feels that this point is somewhat overdrawn, and that the predilection for traditionalism in English Jewry is largely due to environmental conditioning, there can be no doubt that Nieto's works admirably served the purpose of this predisposition to conservatism.

Petuchowski raises the interesting question, is Nieto to be regarded as a spokesman of medieval Jewish thought, or is he a forerunner of modern Jewish thought? "Did Nieto's secular learning really influence his religious thought, and to what extent did it merely serve as a 'window-dressing' for the presentation of unmodified, inherited religious notions?" Nieto admits that the Copernican proofs are "absolutely logical" but, nevertheless, rejects them because they contradict the biblical account that Joshua made the sun stand still. Only by arbitrarily rejecting the dictates of his own reason does Nieto escape falling into the "doctrine of the twofold truth." Also, his qualified acceptance of astrology falls far short of Maimonides' outright denunciation of astrology as a spurious science. In maintaining such views Nieto can hardly qualify as a precursor of what is generally held to be modern thought. In spite of his careful consideration of the backward aspects of Nieto's thought, Petuchowski's thesis is that Nieto is *not* "a mere survivor of the Jewish Middle Ages," who, in a phrase of Julius Guttmann, managed to "adorn the old ideas with the crown of some Humanistic learning." He finds that Nieto was clearly affected by the philosophical trends of his own time, as witnessed by his famous sermon identifying God and Nature (in the sense of *Natura Naturans*); by his introduction, under the influence of Deism, which was the dominant contemporary philosophy, of the argument *de consensu gentium* to demonstrate the existence of God and the doctrine of retribution; and by his very eclecticism, which betrays an awareness of the fact that the intellectual problems of his age were not, after all, exactly identical with those of any of his predecessors.

Perhaps this question can be settled simply by identifying Nieto as the first important spokesman of what later came to be known as Jewish orthodoxy or neo-orthodoxy. Is not Nieto's adherence to the literal interpretation of Scripture (in opposition to Maimonides), his disinclination to give up even the most extravagant *aggadah* without a struggle, his sacramental view of the Mosaic commandments as inherently efficacious, his slurring over the motif of national or Messianic redemption from Exile in spite of his avowed emulation of Yehudah Halevi, in whose thought this notion is central, his extensive secular learning, which he employs eclectically, and which is somehow never permitted to interpenetrate his religious world in the way that, for instance, Aristotelianism permeated and transformed

the thought of Maimonides—are not these distinguishing features of Nieto's philosophy also the earmarks of modern orthodox Judaism?

Lipkind, in his article on Nieto in the *Jewish Encyclopedia,* has described him as "one of the most accomplished Jews of his time," who "was equally distinguished as a philosopher, physician, poet, mathematician, astronomer, and theologian." Graetz, on the other hand, describes him as an "educated rabbi" who, "besides many platitudes, wrote much that was reasonable." Petuchowski feels that Graetz does "scant justice to a man who has set the tone for much that has remained permanent in the orientation of Judaism in England." Actually, the two opinions are not irreconcilable, and together they give a fair estimate of the man they describe.

MILTON ARFA

Hunter College

BOOK NOTES

Nicolai de Cusa, De Pace Fidei, ed. R. Klibansky and H. Bascour, Medieval and Renaissance Studies, Supplement III, The Warburg Institute, 1956. liii, 135 pp. £2.10/.

Nicolas of Cusa has been described as belonging both to the Middle Ages and to the Renaissance. *De Pace Fidei,* published in a new edition by the Warburg Institute of the University of London, displays this double loyalty.

The preface of the editors gives the background. The Turks had finally taken Constantinople and were threatening Europe. The Pope, Nicolas V, was calling for a new crusade to stop the infidels and retake Constantinople, and Nicolas of Cusa, among others, was called on to promote this crusade. Yet he was by nature a mediator and not a fighter. At the Council of Basle, he had at first sided with the conciliarists, and then had shifted to the papacy, when he realized that peace could more effectively be achieved through the latter. His theological vision was of the unity of opposites in and through God. He found it difficult, therefore, to encourage a venture which would conquer the infidels by force of arms.

Thus he and his one-time friend at Basle, John of Segovia, entered into a correspondence concerning the best way to convert the Mohammedans. They agreed that peaceful persuasion rather than force was proper. John of Segovia translated the Koran into Latin and Spanish, and Nicolas provided the intellectual and apologetic foundation, demonstrating the ultimate unity of faith within the diversity of forms and customs.

De Pace Fidei, written in September, 1453, shortly after the fall of Constantinople, shows how, on the basis of Christian orthodoxy, believers in other religions, particularly Mohammedans, could accept Christianity without giving up their own local rites and customs. His was not the tolerance of such men as Ficino and Pico, as the editors point out, but it led in that direction.

This edition of *De Pace Fidei* has a careful and thorough preface which deals with the background of the times, the manuscripts and printed copies of the work, the rationale behind the edition, the sources used by Nicholas, the references to the work in subsequent writers, and the relationship betwen Nicolas and John of Segovia. The text, with careful textual and contextual notes, follows, and is supplemented by a letter of Nicolas to John of Segovia, in which the main thought of *De Pace Fidei* is outlined. There are quite thorough indices. The edition would have been far more valuable if an English translation had been supplied, since such is not yet available. Hopefully one will be forthcoming.

John H. Gay

A Source Book in Indian Philosophy, Edited by Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Charles A. Moore. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, xxix, 689 pp. $5.00.

For a long time there has been need for such a book as this, organized on broad lines, with selections chosen for a comprehensive survey of the literature of Indian Philosophy, to meet the growing interest of western students in eastern thought.

Since there are always limitations to the scope of such a work, there are inevitable differences of opinion as to the choice of materials. On the whole, the balance has been well sustained; but one would like to see a little more from the wide range of thought of later Buddhism. The Hīnāyāna has fifty-five pages, the Māhāyāna seventeen. The Nijaya deserves the liberal attention it has received if for no other reason, because of the revived interest in Indian logic during the last half century. One is particularly sensible of the gap between Mādhava (13th century) and Ghose (20th century). Changes have occurred especially in the latter part of that long period. Shaṁkara (8th century) has been under criticism continually at least from Ramanuja (11th century) on; and in later times theistic tendencies have posed a problem in the consideration of Brahma, with the impact of Islam and later western thought. In the writings of Deben Iranāth Tagore this is clearly seen; and Radhakrishnan himself is often ambiguous in his use of the word "God". However, ignoring this gap, the long history of Indian Philosophy has been well covered.

Some points may be noted. In *Manu* iv. 21 the editors supply the words "elementary forces" after "bhūtas." This word here and in other places in *Manu,* as the context shows, means "spirits of the dead," "ghosts," "pretas." Is there adequate recognition in the Introduction to the part played by Dranidian Culture in the formation of the characteristic Indian thinking in the later parts of the *Rig Veda* and in the *Upanishads,* for example? Do quotations from the latest portions of the *Rig Veda* cover adequately the thought of that collection?

The authors supply introductory remarks to the various divisions of the text to serve as a guide to students. Here the question might be raised as to the use of "western" terminology. Indian thought and religion have suffered from this practice since the early British officers discovered Sanskrit texts and laid the substantial basic interest in Indian culture. Does not "spiritual" as a characteristic of Indian thought need definition? With reference to the Sāṁkhya: *Parusha* is a plurality. All action is in disturbed *Prakriti.* An unexplained proximity of eternally discrete entities, *Perusha* and *Prakriti* explains the evolution of the latter. The late professors called this a perfuming. "Insight" resolves the seeming personality and *Perusha* is, as eternally, alone. *Kaivalya* the aim of the system is the state of an unrelated entity, a *Perusha.* And who are "we" (p. 425)? Again, the use of "meditation" in *Yoga,* "thought

control," needs attention. To stop mental activity is the aim of the *Yoga*. "Yoga is the restraint of mental modifications." (Yoga Sutra 2.) Professor Dasgupta spoke of it as "killing the mind." Even *bhakti* of such men as Caitanya issued in trance. Yoga aims at elimination of the objective, at *Kaivalya*, as the last Sutra quoted in the text indicated. This general criticism applies to both Indians and ourselves.

The format, type and analytical form are excellent and the price is remarkably low.

GEORGE W. BRIGGS

The Philosophy of Jnanadeva. By B. P. BAHIRAT. Bombay: Popular Book Depot (Regd), 1956. x, 220 + 20 pp. Price Rs.6/.

Jnanadeva was a South Indian Saint who flourished in the thirteenth Century A.D. His main works are Jñaneswari, Amritanubhva and Abhangas. Of these, the first one, which is a commentary on Bhagavadgītā, is taken by UENESCO for rendering it into English.

The present book is a pioneer attempt to give an exposition to the philosophical views of the saint.

Jnanadeva follows Śankara in his conception of God, Nature and its relation to man, but inclines more to the Kashmir Śaivism. He goes further and realizes that God and His Love are the only inmates of the Universe and that not even a blade of grass is created without their mutual help.

The present book consists of twelve chapters dealing with the time and currents of thought prevailing at the period when the saint was born, as well as his philosophy. He explains also the metaphysics, cosmology and the conception of God-realization of Jnanadeva. He next shows how far he was indebted to the Upanishads and Yogavashistha and other scriptures for his views.

In the last chapter the author gives the views held by scholars like Dr. Ranade, Dr. Dandekar and others about Jnanadeva's philosophy. He next draws a similarity in the thought Jnanadeva and those of the west—as Plotinus, Spinoza and Bradly.

In conclusion the author says that the saint's preference to adopt his mother-tongue as a medium of expression kept him secluded. His thought is unknown to many, but he influenced his successors at Namadeva, Ramadas and others.

At the end of this dissertation, the author adds an English translation of Jnanadeva's work—Amritanubhava. This is in ten chapters.

The book as a whole throws light on the life, and thought of this Indian Saint, born in Maharashtra, and I doubt not that it will help many to understand the philosophy of Jnanadeva.

SAKUNTALA RAO SASTRI

God and Caesar in Nebraska. A Study of the Legal Relationship of Church and State, 1854-1954. By Orville H. Zabel. Lincoln, Nebraska: The University of Nebraska, 1955. xii, 198 pp. $2.50.

A large part of the studies in the relation of church and state in the United States has concerned the large issue of separation and its infringements on the national level. Some earlier monographs have concerned themselves with the achievement of a theory of separateness by the process of disestablishment in Virgina, Connecticut and other original states. But the assumption has been that once the First Amendment to the Constitution had guaranteed Federal non-interference in matters of religious belief and practice the whole question was settled for the states, except for the minor detail of cleaning up inconsistencies between State and Federal law where any inconsistencies happened to exist. Anyone who has delved with any thoroughness into the literature of religious freedom in America knows that this usual version is simply inaccurate. Federal law allows a wide range within which local legislative and judicial determinations can differ among themselves and all but contravene Federal law and its interpretation by the Supreme Court.

God and Caesar in Nebraska is an excellent and a pioneering attempt to study the church-state law of one state, Nebraska, over a period of a century —a period sufficiently long to permit the viewing of developments in perspective. If equally competent and thorough studies were to be made for all the states, we should for the first time have the raw materials for an adequate analysis and interpretation of the legal meaning of religious freedom in America.

Dr. Zabel's account indicates that Nebraska has gone through much about the same problems as any other state. The state has established religious freedom, but has shown some preference for religion over against irreligion by according some special privileges to religious groups. Administrative decisions have tended to favor religious corporations. Sunday laws have prohibited certain types of activity on the day observed by most Christian groups as a day of rest; characteristically, however, where in earlier days the legislative justification of Sunday laws was religious, in more recent times it has rested on the secular grounds of the police power. There have been many questions that have arisen in connection with the public and parochial schools, and disputes over tax exemption. Most of the differences between Nebraska and other states would show up in a careful comparison of the detailed solutions that have been found for all the issues that have arisen under all the major heads listed above.

Much of this book does in the way of studying the legal situation as it has developed in Nebraska, there is a grave lack—perhaps irremediable—in its failure to transcend the merely legal. A good part of religious freedom lies not in statutes or enactments but in the popular mind. How profoundly the ordinary man or woman in Nebraska is concerned to maintain freedom of

religion for himself and others is possibly a matter that cannot be discovered by the tools of academic research. Yet I am convinced that the future of religious freedom depends far more upon how the ordinary person feels and thinks than it does on the law codes. Perhaps a series of Kinsey-like questionaires? But no; people would be too embarrassed to answer.

J.L.B.

The Social Structure of Islam: second edition of *The Sociology of Islam;* By Reuben Levy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957. vii, 536 pp. $9.50.

Though Islam was born in Arabia and has always maintained a close contact with its homeland, the wide expansion of the religion outside of Arabia has brought it into areas of very different culture both in the East and the West, so that the way in which it has affected and been affected by those cultures presents an abundance of features that are of considerable interest to sociologists. This sociological interest has been evident in several recent studies of Islam, and perhaps another indication of it is this reissue of Reuben Levy's study, which appeared in two volumes in 1931 and 1933, sponsored by the Herbert Spencer Trustees as part of an extension of Spencer's *Descriptive Sociology.*

All religions necessarily operate in a social context, are concerned with human behaviours in social situations, and the purpose of this study is to examine how Islam functions in society, how it deals with particular social problems, how it adapts itself to changing social conditions. The social unit is the family, and the Islamic family has generally been polygamous, as Muhammad was a man of many wives, and the modern Ibn Sa'ud of Arabia even more so. Thus a study of the family structure as it was in earliest Islam, the changes in the position of women in Muslim society, the harem and its concomitants, the developments in legislation concerning marriage and divorce in different areas, is of abiding interest. In a family the child naturally has an important place, and with children come the problems of education, of inheritance, of social responsibility, for all of which Islam has its peculiar solutions. Families do not live in isolation, so there arise problems of social relationship, the development of social classes within Islam and certain privileged groups, the problem of slavery, the problems of buying and selling and family finances. Beyond this, all families are part of a state which has its problems of government, of legislation and administration of law, of policing, of military organization, of state finance, and beyond that the relationship of individual states to the Caliphate which theoretically embraced all areas of Islam. This concept of Islam as a whole then raises questions of the general ethical system of Islam, and what is perhaps even more important, the general thought-world of Islam which, because men are Muslims, will be much the same everywhere as a framework within which there may be almost infinite local variety.

A comprehensive investigation of all these matters is a big order, and it is a tribute to Professor Levy's wide range of competence that he has digested so much and set it forth so clearly and accurately as to make this book as good an introduction to the study of Islam as one could put into the hands of students.

ARTHUR JEFFERY

The Book of Tea. By OKAKURA KAKUZO. Rutland, Vt.: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1956. xvii, 133 pp. $2.50.

This new de luxe edition of a classic published half a century ago is a joy to the lover of beautiful books. The frontispiece is a reproduction of a portrait sketch of the author drawn by Shimomura Kanzan, and the book is further ornamented by seven landscape paintings by the great Sesshu, one at the head of each chapter. A Biographical Sketch by Elise Grilli, art critic for the *Japan Times,* introduces the reader to a remarkable person in Okakura Kakuzo, one of the makers of modern Japan, who, together with Ernest Fenollosa, deserves the credit for preserving Japan's priceless artistic heritage. As Curator of the department of Chinese and Japanese Art at the Boston Museum from 1906 to his death in 1913, he built up a collection of Chinese painting unrivalled in the Western world.

In this delightful collection of seven short essays, the author uses the Tea Cult to interpret for the West the essence of Japanese culture which, he believes, is permeated by the philosophy of Zen Buddhism, as exemplified in the tea ritual. He traces the spirit of Zen back to the Taoism of the Chinese, and says that "Teaism was Taoism in disguise." The ideal man of the Taoist philosophy is the man who has mastered the art of living, and surely the Tea Master best exemplifies this art. In fact, he is, in his own person, a carefully perfected work of art. "The cut and color of the dress, the poise of the body, and the manner of walking could all be made expressions of artistic personality. These were matters not to be lightly ignored, for until one has made himself beautiful he has no right to approach beauty." And it is the worship of beauty which is Japan's true religion, underlying all the outward forms and symbols of its many cults, and carried into the humblest concerns of daily life. A simple tea cup may be a thing of beauty and as worthy of veneration as a famous painting. This is essentially the meaning of the Tea Cult.

M.B.

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

Ancient Religions

Franz Altheim, Konstantins Triumph von 312. *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte,* IX (1957), 221-31.

Rudolf Anthers, The Legal Aspect of the Instruction of Amenemhet. *The Journal of Near Eastern Studies,* XVI (1957), 176-91.

Carsten Colpe, Die gnostische Gestalt des Erlösten Erlösers. *Der Islam,* 32 (1956), 195-214.

G. Dumezil, Remarques sur les armes des dieux de "troisieme fonction" chez divers peuples indoeuropéens. *Studi et Materiali di Storia delle Religioni,* XXVII (1957), 1-9.

R. Dussand, Melquart, d'après de recents travaux. *Revue de L'Histoire des Religions,* CLI (1957), 1-21.

Erland Ehnmark, Transmigration in Plato. *The Harvard Theological Review,* L (1957), 1-20.

I. J. Gelb and E. Sollberger, The First Legal Documents from the Later Old Assyrian Period. *American Journal of Archeology,* XVI (1957), 163-75.

J. Gonda, Ancient Indian Kingship from the religious point of view. *Numen,* IV (1957), 24-58.

Edmund I. Gordon, Summerian Proverbs: "Collections Four." *Journal of the American Oriental Society,* 77 (1957), 67-78.

J. Walter Graham, The Central Court as the Minoan Bull-Ring. *American Journal of Archeology,* 61 (1957), 223-54.

B. Lundman, Nagot om urindo-européernas. *Religion och Kultur,* 28 (1957), 10-13.

Martin P. Nilsson, Royal Mysteries in Egypt. *The Harvard Theological Review,* L (1957), 65 f.

Ch. Picard, Sur quelques documents nouveaux concernant les cultes de Cybèle et d'Attis: Des Balkans a la Gaule. *Numen,* IV (1957), 1-23.

F. Sokolowski, Partnership in the Lease of Cults in Greek Antiquity. *The Harvard Theological Review,* L (1957), 133-44.

C. R. Stonor, Notes on Religion and Ritual among the Dafla Tribes of the Assam Himalayas. *Anthropos,* 52 (1957), 1-23.

Oriental Religions

A. Bausani, On some recent translations of the Qur'an. *Numen,* IV (1957), 75-81.

Jacques Berque, Quelques problemes de l'Islam Maghrebin. *Archives de Sociologie des Religions,* 3 (1957), 3-20.

Pravas Jivan Chaudbury, Indian Personalism. *The Personalist,* XXXVIII (1957), 260-65.

Ernest L. Dietrich, Die Lehre von der Reinkarnation im Islam. *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte,* IX (1957), 129-49.

P. M. D'Elia, S. I., Il Dio degli antichi cinesi. *Gregorium,* xxxviii, 2 (1957), 193-256.

Terence W. Gervais, Some New Thoughts on India and the West. *The Hibbert Journal,* lv (1957), 323-29.

Helmuth von Glasenapp, Buddhism and Comparative Religion. *Sino-Indian Studies,* v (numbers 3 and 4) (1957), 47-52.

Paul Horsch, The Wheel: an Indian Pattern of World Interpretation. *Sino-Indian Studies,* v (numbers 3 and 4) (1957), 62-79.

J. M. van der Kroef, The Indonesian Idea of God. *The Journal of Religious Thought,* xiv (1957), 43-54.

G. Montesi, Uṣāsānaktā—Mitologia Vedica della notte. *Studi e Materiali di Storia delle Religioni,* xxviii (1957), 10-52.

Hajime Nakamura, The Influence of Confucian Ethics on the Chinese translations of Buddhist Sūtras. *Sino-Indian Studies,* v (numbers 3 and 4) (1957), 156-70.

Constance E. Padwick, The Language of Muslim Devotion. 1. *The Muslim World,* xlvii (1957), 5-21.

Herma Plazikowsky-Brauner, Beitrage zur Geschichte des Islam in Abessinien. *Der Islam* 32 (1957), 324-29.

P. T. Raju, Influence of Industrialization and Technology on the Philosophies of India. *Prabuddha Bhrata,* lxii (1957), 306-9.

Hishām Sharabi, The Crisis of the Intelligentsia in the Middle East. *The Muslim World,* xlvii (1957), 187-92.

R. Morton Smith, On the Ancient Chronology of India (1). *Journal of the American Oriental Society,* 77 (1957), 129-36.

Arthur Waley, A Legend about the Caves of the Myriad Buddhas. *Sino-Indian Studies,* v (numbers 3 and 4) (1957), 241.

J. H. M. Whiteman, The Early Buddhist Teaching concerning "Birth". *The Journal of Religion,* xxxvii (1957), 189-200.

Susanna Wilzer, Untersuchungen zu Ġazzālīs Kitābat-Taube. *Der Islam,* 32 (1957), 237-309.

Judaism

Michel Allard, Note sur la formule: 'Ehyeh ašer 'ehyeh. *Recherches de Science Religieuse,* xlv (1957), 79-85.

W. H. Brownlee, Messianic Motifs of Qumran and the New Testament. *New Testament Studies,* 3 (1957), 195-210.

Alan D. Corré, The Spanish Haftara for the Ninth of Ab. *The Jewish Quarterly Review.* xlviii (1957), 13-34.

M. Dahood, Some Aphel Causatives in Ugaritic. *Biblica,* 38 (1957), 62-73.

A. Dupont-Sommer, Les rouleaux de cuivre trouves a Qoumran. *Revue de L'Histoire des Religions,* cli (1957), 22-36.

A. Ehrhardt, The Birth of the Synagogue and R. Akiba. *Studia Theologica,* ix (1956), 86-111.

N. Golb, Literary and Doctrinal Aspects of the Damascus Covenant in the Light of Karaite Literature. *The Jewish Quarterly Review,* xlvii (1957), 354-74.

E. R. Goodenough, The Bosphorus Inscriptions to the Most High God. *The Jewish Quarterly Review,* xlvii (1957), 221-24.

Robert Gordis, The Knowledge of Good and Evil in the Old Testament and the Qumran Scrolls. *Journal of Biblical Literature,* lxxvi (1957), 123-38.

W. A. Irwin, The Study of Israel's Religion. *Vetus Testamentum,* vii (1957), 113-26.

Israel J. Kazis, Hassidism Re-examined. *The Reconstructionist,* xxiii (1957), 7-13.

Bruce M. Metzger, The "Lost" Section of II Esdras (= IV Ezra). *Journal of Biblical Literature,* lxxvi (1957), 153-56.

Sigmund Mowinckel, Die Metrik be Jesus Sirach. *Studia Theologica,* ix (1956), 137-65.

C. Rabin, Alexander Jannaeus and the Pharisees. *The Journal of Jewish Studies,* vii (1957), 3-12.

A. Sharf, An Unknown Messiah of 1096 and the Emperor Alexius. *The Journal of Jewish Studies,* vii (1957), 59-70.

Jerome Lee Shneidman, Jews as Royal Bailiffs in Thirteenth Century Aragon. *Historic Judaica,* xix (1957), 55-66.

Erik Sjöberg, Neuschöpfung in den Toten-Meer-Rollen. *Studia Theologica,* ix (1956), 131-36.

Zosa Szajkowski, Marriages, Mixed Marriages and Conversions Among French Jews During the Revolution of 1789. *Historia Judaica,* xix (1957), 33-54.

M. Treves, The Date of Joel. *Vetus Testamentum,* vii (1957), 149-56.

Alfred Werner, Marc Chagall and His Bible illustrations. *Reconstructionist,* xxiii (1957), 6-14.

N. Wieder, The Qumran Sectaries and the Karaites. II *The Jewish Quarterly Review,* xlvii (1957), 269-92.

R. McL. Wilson, Simon, Dositheus and the Dead Sea Scrolls. *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte,* ix (1957), 21-29.

Ernest M. Wolf, The Varieties of Jewish Self-Hate. *The Reconstructionist.* xxiii (1957), 7-13.

H. A. Wolfson, Negative attributes in the Church Fathers and the Gnostic Basilides. *The Harvard Theological Review,* l (1957), 145-56.

Solomon Zeitlin, The Titles High Priest and the Nasi of the Sanhedrin. *The Jewish Quarterly Review,* xlviii (1957), 1-5.

Christianity: Historical

Heinrich Berger, Calvins Geschichts-auffassung. *Svensk Teologisk Kvartalskrift,* 33 (1957), 57.

Bernard M. Bonansea, The Concept of Being and Non-Being in the Philosophy of Campanella. *The New Scholasticism,* xxxi (1957), 34-67.

Quirinius Breen, John Calvin and the Rhetorical Tradition. *Church History,* xxvi (1957), 3-21.

T. A. Burkill, The Cryptology of Parables in St. Mark's Gospel. *Novum Testamentum,* i (1957), 246-62.

C. Calvetti, Presupposti e postulati filosofici nel pensiero di Zwingli. *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica,* xlix (1957), 25-53.

O. Cullmann, Que signigie le sel dans la parabole de Jesus? *Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie Religieuses,* 37 (1957), 36-43.

Jean Daniélou, Trinité et Angélologie dans la Théologie judéo-chrétienne. *Recherches de Science Religieuse,* xlv (1957), 5-41.

James A. Davidson, Saints and Sinners of the Southwest Frontier. *The Chronicle,* xx (1957), 131-44.

C. H. Dodd, A L'arrière-plan d'un dialogue johannique. *Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie Religieuses,* 37 (1957), 5-17.

D. Jacques Dupont, Pierre et Paul à Antioche et a Jerusalem. *Recherches de Science Religieuse,* xlv (1957), 42-60.

Paul Galtier, Théodore de Mopsueste: sa vraie pensée sur l'incarnation. *Recherches de Science Religieuses,* xlv (1957), 161-86.

Sister Mary Michael Glenn, C.D.P., A Comparison of the Thomistic and Scotistic Concepts of Hope. *The Thomist,* xx (1957), 27-74.

G. Guitton, S. J., Le réveil du Jansénisme, Pasquier Quesnel et le Père de la Chaize (1696-1708). *Nouvelle Revue Theologique,* 89 (1957), 388-401.

Harry B. Gutman, In Re; Iconological Problems of Michelangelo's Last Judgment. *Franciscan Studies,* 17 (1957), 43-57.

Ernst Haenchen, Aus der Literatur zum Johannes-evangelium 1926-1956. *Theologische Rundschau,* 23 (1955), p. 295-335.

———, Zum Text der Apostelgeschichte. *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche,* 54 (1957), 22-55.

A. de Halleux O. F. M., La christologie de Martyrios-Saidona dans l'évolution du nestorianisme. *Orientalia Christiana Periodica,* xxiii (1957), 5-32.

William Hamilton, Johann Sebastian Bach as Theologian. *Colgate Rochester Divinity School Bulletin,* xxix (1957), 41-58.

Howard Kaminsky, Chiliasm and the Hussite Revolution. *Church History,* xxvi (1957), 43-71.

R. Koch, Die Wertung der Besitzer in Lukasevangelium. *Biblica,* 38 (1957), 151-65.

Pierre Kovalevsky, Le "Rascal" et son rôle dans le developpement de la Russie. *Archives de Sociologie des Religions,* 3 (1957), 37-56.

L. de Lacger, L'Albigeois au siècle de S. Louis. Les evèques Durand de Beaucaire et Bernard de Combret. 1228-1271. *Revue d'Histoire Ecclesiastique,* lii (1957), 26-50.

J. Leclercq, Un document sur les debuts des Templiers. *Revue d'Histoire Ecclesiastique,* LII (1957), 81-90.

F. J. Leenhardt, Réflexions sur la mort de Jesus. *Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie Religieuses,* 37 (1957), 18-23.

George Lindbeck, Participation and Existence in the Interpretation of St. Thomas Aquinas. *Franciscan Studies,* 17 (1957), 1-22.

Ralph McInerny, The Logic of Analogy. *The New Scholasticism,* XXXI (1957), 149-71.

Christine Mohrmann, Linguistic Problems in the Early Church. *Vigiliae Christianae,* XI (1957), 11-36.

James D. Mosteller, Baptists and Anabaptists. *The Chronicle,* XX (1957), 3-27.

———, Baptist and Anabaptist II: John Smyth and the Dutch Mennonites. *The Chronicle,* XX (1957), 100-114.

P. Nautin, Irénée, "Adv. haer.", 111, 3, 2, église de Rome ou église universelle? *Revue de l'Histoire de Religions,* CL 1 (1957), 37-78.

É. des Places, Hymnes grecs au seuil de l'ère chrétienne. *Biblica,* 38 (1957), 113-29.

Kurt Rudolph, Ein Grundtyp gnostischer Urmensch-Adam-Spekulation. *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte,* XI (1957), 1-20.

J. Scharbert, Formgeschichte und Exegese von Ex 34, 6 f und seiner Parallelen. *Biblica,* 38 (1957), 130-50.

Edward Schweitzer, The New Testament Idea of the Church. *Theology Today,* XII (1957), 471-83.

J. Smith, Hebrew Christian Midrash in Irenaeus Epid. 43. *Biblica,* 38 (1957), 24-34.

Rev. Dr. Vincent Taylor, The Messianic Secret in Mark: A Reply to Dr. Burteill. *The Hibbert Journal,* LV (1957), 241-48.

Ch. Thouzellier, La pauvretè, arme contre l'albigensisme, en 1206. *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions,* CLI (1957), 79-92.

Philip Watson, Luther och Hegelsen. *Svensk Teologisk Kvartalskrift,* 33 (1957), 24-36.

George H. Williams, The Golden Priesthood and the Leaden State. *The Harvard Theological Review,* L (1957), 37-64.

Christianity: Contemporary

Roland H. Bainton, The Universal Ministry of All Believers. *Encounter,* 18 (1957), 131-40.

Markus Barth, Introduction to Demythologizing. *The Journal of Religion,* XXVII (1957), 145-55.

R. Pierce Beaver, Nationalism and Missions. *Church History,* XXVI (1957), 22-42.

N. A. Dahl, The People of God. *The Ecumenical Review,* IX (1957), 154-61.

Clarence Jordan, Christian Community in the South. *The Journal of Religious Thought,* xiv (1957), 27-36.

Ruben Josefson, Nyare systematisk-teologisk litteratur. *Ny Kyrklig Tidskrift,* i (1957), 1-31.

Clark Kucheman, Automation, Society, and the Protestant Non-Conformist Tradition. *Faith & Freedom,* 10 (1957), 125-36.

W. G. Kummel, L'Eschatologie conséquente d'Albert Schweitzer et le jugement des contemporaims. *Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie Religieuses,* 37 (1957), 58-70.

René Marlé, Bultmann devant les théologiens catholiques. *Recherches de Science Religieuse,* xlv (1957), 262-72.

Reinhold Niebuhr, Theology and Political Thought in the Western World. *The Ecumenical Review,* ix (1957), 253-62.

Schubert M. Ogden, Bultmann's Project of Demythologization and the Problem of Theology and Philosophy. *The Journal of Religion,* xxxvii (1957), 156-73.

Talcott Parsons, Reflexions sur les Organisations Religieuses aux Etas-Unis. *Archives de Sociologie des Religions,* 3 (1957), 21-36.

Franz-Heinrich Philipp, Tolstoj und die protestantische Bibel wissenschaft. *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche,* vii (1957), 80-94.

Otto A. Piper, The Meaning of Work. *Theology Today,* xiv (1957), 174-94.

Hannelis Schulte, Christliche Erziehung? *Theologische Rundschau,* 23 (1955), 336-70.

Donald J. Selby, Changing Ideas in New Testament Eschatology. *The Harvard Theological Review.* l (1957), 21-36.

H. Shelton Smith, Moral Crisis in a Troubled South. *The Journal of Religious Thought,* xiv (1957), 37-42.

Walter W. Sikes, Emerging Ministries of a Church in Re-formation. *Encounter,* 18 (1957), 141-51.

Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard's Verhältnis zu Hegel. *Theologische Zeitschrift,* 13 (1957), 200-226.

Vilmos Vajta, Den Kristna Friheten och Kyrkans Enhet. *Svensk Teologisk Kvartalskrift,* 33 (1957), 1-23.

George H. Williams, Reluctance to inform. *Theology Today,* xiv (1957), 229-55.

General Theory of Religion

A. Bausani, Note per una tipologia del monoteismo. *Studi e Materiali di Storia delle Religioni,* xxvii (1957), 65-88.

Ernst Benz, Die Reinkarnationslehre in Dichtung und Philosophie der deutschen Klassik und Romantik. *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte* ix (1957), 150-74.

L. C. Birch, Creation and the Creator. *The Journal of Religion,* xxxvii (1957), 85-99.

Douglas P. Dryer, Metaphysics and Christian Faith. *The Review of Metaphysics,* x (1957), 666-75.

Allen W. Eister, Religious Institutions in Complex Societies. *American Sociological Review,* 22 (1957), 381-91.

Ralph W. V. Elliott, Runes, Yews, and Magic. *Speculum,* xxxii (1957), 250-61.

A. C. Ewing, Religious Assertions in the Light of Contemporary Philosophy. *Philosophy,* xxxii (1957), 206-18.

W. D. Glasgow, Knowledge of God. *Philosophy,* xxxii (1957), 229-40.

L. V. Grinsell, The Ferryman and his Fee: A Study in Ethnology, Archeology, and Tradition. *Folk-Lore,* lxvii (1957), 257-69.

Charles Hartshorne, Whitehead and Berdyaev: Is There Tragedy in God? *The Journal of Religion,* xxxvii (1957), 71-84.

Gabriel Herbert S.S.M. The Bible and Modern Religions; IV Fundamentalism. *Interpretation* xi (1957), 186-203.

Rudolf Hirsch, Der erste Kritiker Marxens. *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte,* ix (1957), 246-56.

Winston L. King, Negation as a Religious Category. *The Journal of Religion,* xxxvii (1957), 105-18.

Joseph M. Kitagawa, Joachim Wach and Sociology of Religion. *The Journal of Religion,* xxvii (1957), 174-84.

George P. Klubertanz, S.J., The Problem of the Analogy of Being. *The Review of Metaphysics,* x (1957), 553-79.

T. M. Knox, Hegel's Attitude to Kant's Ethics. *Kant-Studien,* 49 (1957-1958), 70-81.

Gustav Mensching, Tradition und Neuschöpfung in der Religionsgeschichte. *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte,* ix (1957), 201-20.

Th. P. Van Baaren, de ethnologische basis van de faenomenologie van G. van der Leeuw. *Nederlands Theologisch Tüdschrift,* 11 (1957), 321-53.

C. A. Van Peursen, Quelques remarques sur l'angoisse comme theme anthropologique. *Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie Religieuses,* 37 (1957), 127-42.

R. J. Zwi Werblowsky, Revelation, Natural Theology and Comparative Religion. *The Hibbert Journal,* lv (1957), 278-83.

12 new

HARPER TORCHBOOKS

LIBRARY-SIZE PAPERBACKS

KARL BARTH: *The Word of God and the Word of Man.* The most powerful theologian of the 20th century writing on a wide range of topics. TB 13. $1.65

NICOLAS BERDYAEV: *The Beginning and the End.* "The nearest thing to a full, systematic statement of his thought."—*L. Harold de Wolf.* TB 14 $1.35

F. M. CORNFORD: *From Religion to Philosophy:* A Study in the Origins of Western Speculation. A classic work whose importance is recognized in religion, anthropology, and sociology. TB 20. $1.35

ADOLF DEISSMANN: *Paul:* A Study in Social and Religious History. A notable contribution to Pauline scholarship. TB 15. $1.45

WILLIAM HALLER: *The Rise of Puritanism.* "A book of rare maturity and wealth."—*Robert Hastings Nichols.* TB 22. $1.85

ADOLF HARNACK: *What Is Christianity?* "A theological-historical document of the greatest importance."—*Rudolf Bultmann.* TB 17. $1.35

EDWIN HATCH: *The Influence of Greek Ideas on Christianity.* Introduction by Frederick C. Grant. TB 18. $1.45

KARL HEIM: *Christian Faith and Natural Science.* ". . . nothing short of epoch-making in its scope."—*Interpretation.* TB 16. $1.25

STANLEY R. HOPPER, Ed: *Spiritual Problems in Contemporary Literature.* "Illuminating commentary on contemporary society."—*N. Y. Times.* TB 21. $1.50

JOHAN HUIZINGA: *Erasmus and the Age of Reformation.* "A wise and critical biography."—*N. Y. Times.* With a selection from the letters of Erasmus and 32 illustrations. TB 19. $1.50

AUGUSTE SABATIER: *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion:* Based on Psychology and History. Reprint of a classic work, long unavailable. TB 23. $1.45

GEORGE SANTAYANA: *Winds of Doctrine* and *Platonism and the Spiritual Life.* One-volume edition of two out-of-print books. TB 24. $1.45

At your bookseller

HARPER & BROTHERS, N.Y. 16